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This dissertation explores the worldwide mobility of seventeenth-century Spanish 
imperial officials who traveled around the Americas, Asia, Africa, and Europe. My study 
focuses on the lower echelon of imperial officials in order to demonstrate how their 
experiences of service to the king in a variety of locales affected the the governance of 
the Spanish Empire and how such a polity was imagined by these officials as a global, yet 
connected and coherent unity. I argue that the officials’ circulation was central for the 
cohesion and stability of the empire. It allowed the actual and imagined overcoming of 
the far-flung geography of Spain’s empire and the incorporation, and sometimes 
exclusion, of diverse subjects across the globe. The intense and extensive mobility of the 
officials permitted the consolidation of certain imperial political practices, values, and 
patterns of rule and administration, which played a decisive role in the emergence of a 
common imperial identity built from the ground up. This imperial identity worked to give 
cohesion to a polity as heterogeneous as the Spanish Empire. Imperial official’s 
interactions with very different peoples and cultures spawned a cosmopolitan imperial 
culture that unified the many cultural, geographic, demographic, and social peculiarities 
	
 
of diverse societies under the umbrella of the imperial mission of enforcement, defense, 
and expansion of the crown’s rule and spread of Catholicism. 
This work departs from the traditional national and area models of study by 
emphasizing the utility of an analytical framework that takes the whole imperial 
system—and not just one of its component regions—as the unit of analysis, in order to 
show that the histories of Europe, America, Africa, and Asia were far more entangled 
than previously thought. Despite the empire’s enormous diversity, extension, 
discontinuous territoriality, and the near-autonomous status of many imperial outposts, a 
great number of Spanish imperial subjects saw the empire as an integrated and coherent 
political unit. I analyze some of the conditions and settings that made possible the global 
mobility of the officials, and some effects of such circulation in the ruling and political 
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On May 1590, while working as a tax collector in Andalusia, the not yet famous 
writer Miguel de Cervantes asked the king to appoint him corregidor (chief magistrate) 
of the city of La Paz in present-day Bolivia. Cervantes, like many of his contemporaries, 
was hoping to improve his social and economic condition by crossing the Ocean under 
the king’s patronage. He supported his petition by exposing his many merits and services 
to the Monarchy for more than 30 years, which took him away from his native Castile: he 
served in Rome as an aide to the cardinal Acquaviva; as a soldier in various 
Mediterranean posts like Naples, Sardinia, Sicily, and in the much celebrated battle of 
Lepanto, where he badly injured his left arm; and above all, he suffered imprisonment 
and enslavement by the Muslims in North Africa from 1575 to 1580.1  
Although the literary talents of the creator of El Quixote were exceptional, his 
wanderings throughout this wide array of settings were not. Indeed, thousands of 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century imperial officials circulated widely around the 
Spanish Empire and traveled across the Americas, Asia, Africa, and Europe to serve the 
king and assert his authority, and promote Catholicism. 
This dissertation explores the meaning and historical significance of the 
worldwide mobility of the Spanish imperial officials in order to demonstrate how their 
experiences of service to the king in a variety of locales affected the governance of the 
Spanish Empire and how such a polity was imagined by these officials as a global, yet 
                                                
1 AGI, Patronato, 253, R. 1, fol 1-2 “Méritos y servicios de Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra,” 1590. 
Cervantes also asked as alternative options to be granted with posts of accountant in Nueva Granada, 
governor of Soconusco, or auditor to the galleys in Cartagena, however the Council of the Indies rejected 




connected and coherent unity. While Benedict Anderson has argued that the circulation 
of colonial officials facilitated the imagining of the new nineteenth-century American 
republics and, therefore, their break from Spain, I show that, in contrast, in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, such mobility was an essential mechanism of imperial 
stability.2 In recent years, scholars have begun to pay attention to the effects of mobility 
in the stabilization and formation of communities.They have argued against the 
traditional view of mobility as a centrifugal force that dispersed the members of such 
polities and thus weakened them.3 I argue that the circulation of the royal officials, which 
was sponsored by the crown, was central to the cohesion and stability of the empire. It 
allowed the actual and imagined overcoming of the far-flung geography of Spain’s 
empire and the incorporation, and sometimes exclusion, of diverse subjects across the 
globe. 
The intense and extensive mobility of the officials permitted the consolidation of 
certain imperial political practices, values, and patterns of rule and administration, which 
played a decisive role in the emergence of a common imperial identity built from the 
ground up. This imperial identity worked to give cohesion to a polity as heterogeneous as 
the Spanish Empire. Imperial official’s interactions with very different peoples and 
cultures spawned a cosmopolitan imperial culture that unified the many cultural, 
geographic, demographic, and social peculiarities of diverse societies under the umbrella 
                                                
2 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London; New York: Verso, 2006). 
3 Heather Roller has shown that in the eighteenth century native Amazonians engaged in various forms of 
mobility not because they were forced by colonial authorities, but also because it fitted their own interests 
and served as a way to consolidate their communities, and not as a form of resistance to colonial rule. 
Heather F. Roller, Amazonian Routes: Indigenous Mobility and Colonial Communities in Northern Brazil 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2014). Likewise, Pekka Hämäläinen contends that, also in 
the eighteenth century, the Comanche were able to build an empire in North America thanks to their 
nomadic nature and control over large areas, trading routes, and posts. The Comanche Empire (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2008). 
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of the imperial mission of enforcement, defense, and expansion of the crown’s rule and 
spread of Catholicism. In the end, this dissertation is a study of how royal officials 
exercised imperial power, which tried to homogenize subjects, in heterogeneous ways. 
My dissertation uncovers the mechanisms that allowed for the working, 
maintenance, and union of the empire. Contrary to traditional historiography that has 
focused on the crisis of the empire and sought reasons of its decay, I am interested in 
revealing the political devices and culture that held the Spanish Empire together and 
made it a functioning and viable polity. While over the past decades there has certainly 
been a great advancement in our understanding of how the colonial subjects responded, 
adapted, rejected, and challenged the empire, our knowledge of the imperial mechanisms 
of power is still very limited.4 I follow Frederick Cooper’s recommendation to “take 
seriously what it meant for a polity to think like an empire, to conjugate incorporation 
and differentiation, to confront problems of long-distance extension and recognize limits 
of control over large and diverse populations.”5 This study contributes to our 
comprehension of how the Spanish Empire bound distant people and places, how power 
was actually enforced, how the far-away regions were administrated locally and 
incorporated into the global polity, how they were connected, and how some people were 
included as others were excluded. 
My dissertation builds upon a traditional institutional historiography that was 
concerned with the ways in which political institutions and laws were transplanted from 
                                                
4 Alejandro Cañeque, “The Political and Institutional History of Colonial Spanish America,” History 
Compass 11, no. 4 (2013): 280–291. 
5 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2005), 200. 
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the center of the empire onto the periphery.6 I bridge such studies with a newer 
historiography that looks at the political culture and the actual practices of power to 
appreciate in greater depth the workings of the empire. This perspective allows me to 
uncover the actual practices of imperial government on the ground, and to observe how 
the global empire and its diversity was experienced, seen, and understood by the mobile 
imperial officials.  
My story centers on the lower echelon of imperial officials who primarily carried 
out political and administrative duties: the governors and the district and town 
magistrates, known as corregidores. I do not examine high-ranking officials such as 
viceroys or royal councilors, but rather, train my eye on those officials who interacted 
daily with the crown’s subjects and arguably constituted the backbone of the Spanish 
Empire. These were the ultimate enforcers and representatives of the empire.7 In fact, for 
the majority of the imperial subjects, these officials were the most visible, concrete, and 
closest manifestation of the king’s authority. 
                                                
6 For example, C. H. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947); 
J. H. Elliott, Imperial Spain 1469-1716, 2nd ed. (London: Penguin, 2002); Ernst Schäfer, El Consejo Real y 
Supremo de las Indias: su historia, organización y labor administrativa hasta la terminación de la Casa de 
Austria (Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1975). These classic studies continue to be, in many 
regards, some of the best available interpretations of the Iberian’s mechanisms of government, which 
clearly speaks to historian’s neglect of such matters. 
7 For some of the most recent historiography on the paradigms and mechanisms of imperial service see 
Alicia Esteban Estríngana, ed., Servir al rey en la monarquía de los Austrias: medios, fines y logros del 
servicio al soberano en los siglos XVI y XVII (Madrid: Sílex, 2012); Juan Francisco Pardo Molero and 
Manuel Lomas Cortés, eds., Oficiales reales: los ministros de la Monarquía Católica: siglos XVI-XVII 
(Valencia; Murcia: Departament d’Història Moderna, Universitatde València ; Red Columnaria, 2012). 
These books follow the footsteps of previous studies that have renovated the field of institutional 
historiography, such as António Manuel Hespanha, Visperas del Leviatán. Instituciones y poder político 
(Portugal, siglo XVII) (Madrid: Taurus Humanidades, 1989); António Manuel Hespanha, La gracia del 
derecho: economía de la cultura en la edad moderna, trans. Ana Cañellas Haurie (Madrid: Centro de 
estudios constitucionales, 1993); Marvin Lunenfeld, Keepers of the City: The Corregidores of Isabella I of 
Castile, 1474-1504 (Cambridge, CB; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Robert Descimon, 
Jean-Frédéric Schaub, and Bernard Vincent, eds., Les figures de l’administrateur: institutions, réseaux, 
pouvoirs en Espagne, en France, et au Portugal, 16e-19e siècle (Paris: Editions de l’Ecole des hautes 
études en sciences sociales, 1997). 
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While most of these imperial officials served at some point in the military, they 
did not form a uniform class or social group. They were members of the high nobility, or 
impoverished residents of urban centers. Some had little education, while others trained 
at prestigious universities. Some took offices as part of a pre-established familial path of 
social climbing, while others accepted posts as their only means of survival. With their 
common service to the king in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, however, they all 
shared similar experiences of rulership and administration of the global empire. 
The officialdom of the early modern Spanish Empire was far from being a 
modern bureaucracy. Several scholars have already shown the perils of using 
anachronistic terms and concepts to understand, analyze, and describe the early modern 
political systems. Modern concepts, closely associated with the modern nation-state and 
its institutions, practices, and ideologies, have, for the most part, obscured more than 
clarified our understanding of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century polities.8 In fact, the 
main characteristics of a modern bureaucracy—labor division, professionalization, 
meritocracy, and service to an impersonal state—did not exist at the time.9 The 
administrative organization of the Spanish Empire was a flexible and permeable one. 
Officials engaged with the political and administrative apparatus by means of personal 
bonds. They did not work for an abstract entity, but as faithful subjects, served their king. 
Thus, such service needed not to be constant, but depended on the particular needs of the 
sovereign and of his subjects. Likewise, officials did not work for a salary in the strict 
                                                
8 For a critique against this historiography obsessed with the nation-state and that has studied the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries seeking for the “roots” of such state, see Alejandro Cañeque, The King’s Living 
Image: The Culture and Politics of Viceregal Power in Colonial Mexico (New York: Routledge, 2004), 1–
16; Cañeque, “The Political and Institutional History of Colonial Spanish America.” 
9 See, for example, the classic definition of a modern bureaucracy in Max Weber, Economy and Society: An 
Outline of Interpretive Sociology, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1978), 956–958. 
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sense. Although they might receive some payments, they served with the promise of 
future royal rewards, which could take many forms, from money to honorary distinctions. 
Moreover, a clear distinction between the public and private spheres had not yet emerged. 
Official’s functions and duties were not clearly delimited or described. Most of 
the time, officials were only given the broad command of promoting the general good 
and ensuring the development and protection of the republic. Imperial officials often 
crisscrossed not only geographical boundaries, but also boundaries within the imperial 
system and within the structures of government and administration. In fact, institutional 
limits were really hard to set, and sometimes were plainly non-existent. This is why the 
fields in which officials could act were so varied and there was not a professionalization 
of their service. Officials received appointments not only because of their ‘professional’ 
merits, but also due to other factors, such as the honor of the official and his family, and 
of course, the will of the monarch. A judge could be commissioned to administer a city, 
to quash a rebellion, or to conduct military actions.10 Likewise, a soldier could easily be 
appointed as treasurer, despite not having any expertise on financial matters.11 In the 
same vein, civil and religious spheres were closely connected. Some officials became 
ordained, and many religious officials held government posts.12 In fact, it was not unusual 
for bishops to act as temporary viceroys. Therefore, while in this dissertation I focus on 
                                                
10 Such was the case of Juan Francisco de Montemayor, judge of the Royal Audience of Mexico City, who 
was given the political command of Oaxaca in order to put an end to the 1660 Indigenous revolt there. See 
Chapter Four. 
11 AGI, Lima, 297 “Sobre particulares de don Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, tesorero de la Real Hacienda 
de Lima” (Madrid, February 8, 1631). The captain Hurtado de Corcuera was a renowned soldier who had a 
distinguished participation in the 1623 Siege of Breda. Although in 1630 he was officially appointed as 
royal treasurer of Lima, despite his openly manifest inexperience, he was also commissioned to train the 
soldiers and to organize the defense of the Peruvian port of Callao, without neglecting his fiscal duties. He 
later was appointed governor of Panama, of the Philippines (see Chapters Two and Four), corregidor of 
Córdoba (see Chapter Four), commander in chief of Asturias, and governor of the Canary Islands.  
12 For instance, Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos, whose activities and writings are studied in Chapters One and 
Five, was ordained priest at the end of the sixteenth century, after several years of royal service in which, 
among other things, inspected some provincial governments, and raided against runaway slaves.  
	
 7 
those officials who had political and military duties, on some occasions, I also analyze 
officials who at first glance would be regarded as holders of religious, legal, or financial 
offices. 
Accordingly, I depart not only from the conceptual constrains of the nation-state, 
but also from its physical and geographical limitations and boundaries. The 
historiography of the Spanish Empire is, for the most part, a fragmented one. Most 
historians, taking the nation-state as their point of departure, have concentrated on 
national histories, while paying little or no attention to the connections with other parts of 
the empire. Additionally, there is a remarkable lack of communication between the 
historiographies produced on the two sides of the Atlantic. Whereas North and South 
American scholars of the Spanish Empire tend to overlook its European domains, 
something similar occurs with European historians, who tend to ignore the American 
experience.13 I firmly believe that the geographical divisions imposed by the nineteenth- 
and twentieth-century nation-states should not lead us to a compartmentalization of the 
study of the Spanish Empire, which at that time was a global polity. The histories of 
Europe, America, Africa, and Asia were far more entangled and interdependent than 
previously thought. There existed interconnections that remain buried if imperial regions 
are considered in isolation. To study the imperial mechanisms of power and authority it is 
necessary to use a holistic approach that takes the whole imperial system—and not just 
one of its component regions—as the unit of analysis.  
                                                
13 For example Matthew Restall does not include any studies about Europe on his historiographical review 
of the Spanish empire “The Decline and Fall of the Spanish Empire?,” William & Mary Quarterly 64, no. 1 
(January 2007): 183–194; and in Antonio Alvarez-Ossorio Alvariño and Bernardo José García García, eds., 
La monarquía de las naciones: patria, nación y naturaleza en la monarquía de España (Madrid: Fundación 
Carlos de Amberes, 2004) there is only one out of twenty-nine articles that deals with America. 
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In the seventeenth century, and especially during the union of the crowns of 
Castile and Portugal from 1580 to 1640, the Spanish Monarchy became a global empire. 
Its presence extended to almost every corner of the world, from populous European cities 
such as Naples and Brussels, to frontier forts such as Valdivia in Chile, and Oran in North 
Africa, to port cities in India and in East Asia, such as Goa and Manila, to young cities in 
the New World such as Lima and Buenos Aires. The Spanish monarch ruled over a great 
diversity of peoples, from Castilian peasants to the natives of the Philippines, from 
Catholics and Protestants to converted Muslims, from naturalized French traders to 
enslaved Africans. Difference and heterogeneity lay at the core of the empire. The myriad 
people, places, languages, cultures, and organizations were located in disjointed spaces, 
separated by vast oceans, mountains, desserts, and jungles. In practice, many of these 
regions maintained near autonomy. However, despite this enormous diversity, extension, 
discontinuous territoriality, and the near-autonomous status of many imperial outposts, a 
great number of Spanish imperial subjects saw the empire as an integrated and coherent 
political unit. Thus, I approach the study of the Spanish Monarchy as people perceived it 
in the seventeenth century. In this way, this dissertaion is an answer to John Elliott’s 
question: “to what extent did these men [the imperial officials] see it [the Spanish 
Empire] as a coherent unit as a result of their experiences on both sides of the 
Atlantic?”14 
My project joins the still incipient endeavor of tracing the globalization of 
Spanish government.15 Globalization is a slippery term. I agree with Frederick Cooper, 
                                                
14 J. H. Elliott, Spain, Europe & the Wider World, 1500-1800 (New Haven [Conn.]; London: Yale 
University Press, 2009), 177. 
15 Mireille Peytavin, “Españoles e italianos en Sicilia, Nápoles y Milán durante los siglos XVI y XVII: 
sobre la oportunidad de ser ‘nacional’ o ‘natural,’” Relaciones 19, no. 73 (1998): 87–114; Domingo 
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who warns against a reckless use of this concept.16 The fact that we live now in a world 
defined by the unprecedented intense and almost instantaneous global connections 
certainly impacts our understanding of the past. Jeremy Adelman, in light of the current 
rising of neo-nationalism across the globe, has argued for the necessity of revising the 
precepts, goals, and possibilities of global history, which despite the expectations and 
promises, has not lessened the hegemony of the nation-state as the framework of 
historical analysis, or the affection for nationalism. I agree with his assessment and 
critical reflection about the excessive optimism generated by the new interest on the 
global paradigms and the desire to write a celebratory history of the past, in which we 
could find past connections, tolerance, diversity, and inclusion.17 The history of an early 
modern globalization should not be the history of inexorable progress toward the 
formation of our contemporary world, nor the craving for an idealized better world. It 
should be a history of global dynamics and relationships on their own terms, which were 
much conditioned by peculiar power structures. In consequence, it is important to look at 
the global linkages, but also at their darker effects: at the structures of dominion and 
exclusion that they created. Furthermore, past globalizations and connections should not 
                                                                                                                                            
Centenero de Arce, “¿Una monarquía de lazos débiles?: veteranos, militares y administradores 1580-1621.” 
(Doctoral Dissertation, European University Institute, 2009); Bartolomé Yun Casalilla, ed., Las redes del 
imperio: élites sociales en la articulación de la Monarquía Hispánica, 1492-1714 (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 
2009); José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez and Gaetano Sabatini, “Monarchy as Conquest: Violence, Social 
Opportunity, and Political Stability in the Establishment of the Hispanic Monarchy,” The Journal of 
Modern History 81, no. 3 (September 1, 2009): 501–536; Serge Gruzinski, Las cuatro partes del mundo: 
historia de una mundializacion (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica de Argentina, 2010); Manuel 
Rivero Rodríguez, La edad de oro de los virreyes: el virreinato en la Monarquía Hispánica durante los 
siglos XVI y XVII (Tres Cantos, Madrid: Akal, 2011); Pedro Cardim et al., eds., Polycentric Monarchies: 
How Did Early Modern Spain and Portugal Achieve and Maintain a Global Hegemony? (Brighton: Sussex 
Academic Press, 2012); Oscar Mazín and José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez, eds., Las Indias Occidentales: procesos 
de incorporación territorial a las monarquías ibéricas (siglos XVI a XVIII) (México, D. F: El Colegio de 
México, Centro de Estudios Históricos, 2012). 
16 Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 91–112. 




be taken for granted just because there was a claim for the universal. This dissertation 
exposes how such linkages occurred and what their consequences were. Moreover, 
following Cooper’s advice, I show how the different constitutive regions of the empire 
were bounded, how the global empire was actually put into practice, including and 
excluding people, in well-determined spaces.18 This perspective allows seeing how the 
Spanish Empire was actually developed across the globe and what were the requirements 
and effects of such globalization, which was not mere rhetoric, but truly impacted on the 
government and development of the polity and on the lives of its members. 
In this regard, cosmopolitan culture played a pivotal role structuring the empire 
and allowing for diversity. The linkages between cosmopolitanism and imperialism are, 
indeed, intense. I move away from moral understandings of cosmopolitanism that 
idealize it as an intrinsically positive value and that also tend to be driven by 
contemporary issues and problems. Instead, I take cosmopolitanism as a conceptual tool 
to analyze the capacity of imperial officials to bridge different cultures and to establish 
permanent structures that knitted together such distinct societies.19 Furthermore, this 
approach to cosmopolitanism also breaks away from the European and Enlightened 
framework to which it is usually ascribed—the idea of cosmopolitanism as a project of 
global tolerance in a world composed by modern nation-states—and instead, follows a 
more “cosmopolitan” understanding of cosmopolitanism, one more attentive to its 
multiple notions and locus.20  
                                                
18 Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 112. 
19 Here, I follow the conceptualization of cosmopolitanism proposed by Myles Lavan, Richard E. Payne, 
and John Weisweiler, “Cosmopolitan Politics,” in Cosmopolitanism and Empire: Universal Rulers, Local 
Elites, and Cultural Integration in the Ancient Near East and Mediterranean, ed. Myles Lavan, Richard E. 
Payne, and John Weisweiler (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 1–28. 
20 Akhil Gupta claims that in order to be fully coherent with the notion of cosmopolitanism we have to step 
away from the usual Eurocentric historical significance of cosmopolitanism and acknowledge that there 
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I highlight the simultaneous nature of an empire that was being built at the same 
time and by the same people across the globe, not only in America and Asia, but also in 
Europe. It was an empire that scholars have come to define as a “polycentric monarchy,” 
a system that “allowed for the existence of many different interlinked centers that 
interacted not only with the king but also among themselves, thus actively participating in 
forging the polity.”21 Power did not flow in one clear and unique direction, but through 
multiple and interconnected foci. The colonial experience was not the product of an 
exclusive relationship between America and Europe. Colonial governance in America 
was affected by, and it affected, other imperial regions. This imperial approach, which is 
neither celebratory nor judgmental, critically appraises the emergence of colonial 
difference and the colonial subject, asking whether and how the experiences of the 
imperial officials in “colonial” America differed from those in Europe, and how these 
regions were mutually influenced. 
Those multiple experiences in diverse settings were promoted by the crown itself, 
for which mobility was central. Mobility was indeed a major factor in imperial rule: the 
sovereign was able to reach his most far-away possessions thanks to the intermediation of 
various officials who physically displaced to those locations and served there as images 
of the king. Institutional historiography has already taught us that the consolidation of 
Spain’s global hegemony was possible because of the widespread mobilization of 
officials around the world, who, almost literally, papered it.22 Moreover, the crown relied 
                                                                                                                                            
exist different cosmopolitan experiences in the history of the World, that we cannot reduce this concept 
only to the thoughts and ideas of some bourgeois European travelers. Akhil Gupta, “Globalisation and 
Difference: Cosmopolitanism Before the Nation-State,” Transforming Cultures eJournal 3, no. 2 (2008): 
http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/TfC/article/view/921. 
21 Cardim et al., Polycentric Monarchies, 4. 
22 Cf. note 6. 
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on these men in order to transplant institutions and experiences of government from one 
region to another. However, the monarchy also stimulated the mobility of its officials as 
means to control them, allowing them to hold their posts only for limited periods of time. 
Officials were constantly transferred from one post to another, and were not expected to 
settle in the provinces they ruled. The purpose was to avoid any attachments to the distant 
regions that could diminish officials’ objectivity and loyalty; and instead, to have the 
officials thoroughly engaged and identified with the imperial project.23 
The sources I have used are also varied in their kind and origin. I integrate 
disjointed sources traditionally used by Latin Americanists with those used by 
Europeanists. Most of my research took place in the imperial archives in Spain. The 
Archivo General de Indias holds documents related to the Spanish empire in America and 
the Philippines, the Archivo General de Simancas has information related to the Councils 
of Italy, Flanders, and Portugal; and the Archivo Histórico Nacional contains all of the 
documentation pertaining to the Spanish kingdoms of Castile, Aragon and Navarre. 
Although this seems to be a clear administrative division, it follows a logic driven by the 
modern nation-state. The three archives contain similar and related documentation and 
they even hold documents from regions theoretically foreign to them. These imperial 
archives were originally part of one unique imperial collection, but since the advent of 
the nation-state they have been split and organized following fictional divisions of the 
Monarchy and forgetting the composite and global nature of the seventeenth-century 
Spanish empire. These archives themselves express the cosmopolitan, heterogeneous, and 
global nature of the empire. As any scholar who has worked on any of these repositories 
                                                
23 Officials were not even legally allowed to get married or to engage in business with local citizens, 
something that, evidently, seldom complied.  
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could testify, they contain rich information on various issues from distinct and apparently 
unrelated regions, written in multiple languages, and provide much detail about the local 
dynamics and perspectives of the distant imperial provinces. I have complemented this 
varied information with documentation held in the National Library of Spain, which also 
comes from and touches on subjects from all across the empire, and in some local 
archives and libraries that I occasionally could consult. The quantity, quality, and 
diversity, both of topics and of locations, of the information found in these archives have 
exonerated me from going into local archives in each of the multiple regions I study. 
Moreover, while researching in regional and national archives across the world might 
have given some peculiar and complementary insights, the logistics that such a research 
would suppose escape the possibilities of this doctoral dissertation. 
The documents found in these archives are of different kinds. First, I have relied 
heavily on official documentation: reports and letters written by the officials while on 
their posts, the juicios de residencia (the judicial reviews and investigations after their 
terms), the informaciones, that exposed the deeds and services performed by the officials, 
as well as the consultas, which were produced by the king’s advisers in the various 
Councils and dealt with a wide range of issues from the selection of candidates for the 
offices, to the definition of imperial policies, or to the reward of individuals. Second, I 
have also used other types of documents: private letters from the officials, memoirs, 
autobiographies, and travel narratives, as well as other books written by the officials such 
as literary works, manuals, geographical descriptions, maps, and treatises. 
My approach to the imperial mobility is two-fold. On the one hand, I seek to 
unveil the peculiar mindset of the people who were in charge of enforcing the imperial 
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mission in a wide-array of scenarios. I analyze how these mobile officials saw and 
understood the Spanish Monarchy, the other societies they dealt with, and their own role 
in these interactions. On the other hand, this dissertation also studies the nuts and bolts of 
government, how mobility and long-distance rule was actually possible, and what were 
some of the concrete effects of the officials ruling and of their experiences across the 
world. 
In order to answer these questions my dissertation combines a birds-eye 
perspective with a detailed look. I have paid attention to the whole of the empire, while 
showing also the activities of the imperial officials in specific circumstances. My 
dissertation looks at the political culture of the Spanish Empire and the consequences of 
imperial officials’ mobility from 1580 to 1700, when the imperial institutions were 
firmlly established and the empire had reached its largest territorial size. Moreover, this 
long duration allows us to see from a broad perspective the permanent dynamics that 
structured, stabilized, and made possible the empire. 
In order to present the workings of the empire in various places and time I have 
opted for a patchwork approach. I use cases scattered throughout the Spanish Monarchy 
in a long temporal arc. It was logistically impossible to track down the paths of the 
thousands of imperial officials dispersed throughout the world, or to cover the almost 
infinite locations. While there are some names and places that are repeated more often 
than others, I have not written detailed biographies, or exhaustive studies on various 
regions. Not only that the dissimilar and often incomplete nature of the sources does not 
allow me for such endeavors, but such approach risks fixating the empire and its 
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connections. Instead, I simultaneously look at multiple actors and places, showing the 
totality of the global Monarchy and the constant dynamics and flux within it. 
Most often, sources were produced in very specific local contexts and therefore 
the global linkages are disguised. In other words, officials (like any other person now and 
then) rarely were making global arguments or being explicit about their more profound 
ideologies and how they thought of the Monarchy. I have inferred such observations by 
looking at small pieces of evidence alongside each other and comparing them. When 
viewed in isolation, the many fragmented cases I present provide only a tiny glimpse into 
the mobility of the officials and its effects, but by putting together as many of these short 
blinks into the past as possible to complement each other, I am able to draw a 
comprehensive picture of the political culture of the early modern Spanish Empire. 
Moreover, since this is not a social history about the officials, I am not concerned with 
presenting statistics of the number of officials, how often they travelled, or how 
significant in numbers was their mobility. In this dissertation I provide a thick description 
of the practices and culture of mobility, and the breath of sources, places, and people that 
I present should serve as a counterbalance to questions that could be raised about the 
quality of the representation of these officials. 
In looking at the Spanish Empire through the lens of mobility, I follow Stephen 
Greenblatt’s methodological and theoretical suggestions for tackling such phenomena, 
whether in the early modern world or in contemporary times. In “A Mobility Studies 
Manifesto,” Greenblatt emphasizes that mobility is a crucial concept to understand how 
societies and cultures were articulated and constantly redefined. He briefly outlines some 
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of the main elements that, in his view, a study on cultural mobility should have.24  In the 
first place, he argues that we must think of mobility in a highly literal sense. It is 
necessary to look at the physical dimension of people’s movement, as well as to the 
logistics that made such movement and circulation possible, and their consequences. 
Additionally, he contends that we should be attentive to the tensions that emerged 
between the individual agency and the structural forces constraining it, how mobility was 
regulated, promoted, contained, and how it escaped out of the institutions. Moreover, it is 
worth paying attention to the dissenting voices that challenged the status quo. Also, he 
urges us to look at the “contact zones” in which cultural goods were exchanged, the 
places and moments in which different individuals met. Finally, Greenblatt also suggests 
that we should analyze the sensation of “rootedness:” how people perceived certain 
categories as fixed or permanent, and how they were confronted. 
In consequence, I investigate five major themes that impacted the mobility of 
officials and that defined the workings and governance of the Spanish Monarchy. 
Roughly, the dissertation can be divided in two parts; in the first two chapters I analyze 
some of the technological, social, and political conditions and settings that made possible 
the global mobility of the officials, and in the following chapters I look at some effects of 
such circulation in the ruling and political imagination of the empire. In Chapter One, I 
deal with physical and tangible aspects of the worldwide circulation of royal officials. 
After evaluating the notion of distance and its impact on the governance of the far-flung 
empire, I sketch some of the major patterns of Spanish mobility and how the Monarchy 
organized the circulation, and then study the logistics of travel and the new technologies 
                                                
24 Stephen Greenblatt, “A Mobility Studies Manifesto,” in Cultural Mobility: A Manifesto, ed. Stephen 
Greenblatt (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 250–253. 
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that enabled such movement, as well as how all this affected the imagining and material 
representations of the world.  
In Chapter Two, I argue that the engagement of the imperial officials with distant 
societies completely foreign to them was only possible thanks to a clever use of their 
personal networks of patronage. Patrons, clients, as well as brokers played a vital role in 
shaping the activities of the officials. Therefore, I look at some of these networks from an 
imperial perspective to shed light on how the culture of bounty and clientelism, which 
was based upon personal and local linkages, adapted to the global dynamics and new 
geographies, facilitating the government of the empire, even in regions thousands of 
miles away from the core of those networks.  
 In the third chapter, I explore the political significance of experience. It was 
deemed as one of the major attributes of a good ruler and imperial officials acquired it 
thanks to their mobility and by actually serving in different places across the world. I 
integrate the political theory with the actual practices of the officials to see how their 
expertise was gained, valued, and transferred across the different imperial locations—not 
only from Europe to America, but also the other way around—and how it spawned a new 
epistemological milieu that privileged direct and sensorial experience. 
In Chapter Four, I look at one particular experience of government: the repression 
of dissent. I analyze different scenarios of opposition to royal authority to contrast how 
officials acted and thought, incorporating and rejecting subjects. I study how a same 
official performed in two very distinct circumstances and locale, but more importantly I 
pay close attention to the circulation of political ideas. I trace the global mobility and 
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transmission of some of the tropes and stereotypes, as well as practices of government, on 
which royal officials relied for imposing royal authority.  
Finally, in the last chapter, building upon the previous themes I study the tensions, 
extents, and limits of Spanish imperial cosmopolitanism in order to illustrate how 
diversity was subsumed. I explore the officials’ self-perception as Catholic soldiers, as 
their own actions and the interactions with other people were read through the lenses of 
their Catholic identity, which also fostered a sense of Spanish exceptionalism. I also 
evaluate the global interactions on areas usually deemed ‘peripheral,’ expressing the 
unity and coherence of the polity despite its dispersion and diversity. 
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Chapter One: An Empire on the Move 
 
 
Qui navigant mare, enarrant pericula ejus. 
Los que navegan podrán contar los peligros 
del mar, dice el que mejor lo sabe. Y así , 
como hombre que por mis pecados he 
navegado, quise contar á vuestra merced los 
trabajos de mi navegación.1 
 
La distancia que hay desde Sevilla a Las 
Charcas causa horror.2 
 
 
The Spanish Empire was built upon movement. People, goods, and ideas 
circulated intensely within and without this far-flung early modern polity, which had 
possessions on every continent. The mobility of imperial officials was one aspect of the 
dense culture of circulation. Mobility was nothing new, however, either for the Spanish 
Monarchy or for other Mediterranean societies.3 Mediterranean culture had a long 
tradition of mobility and exchange dating from Antiquity, when the Phoenicians first 
sailed the Mediterranean and built their commercial empire. Nonetheless, the mobility of 
the early modern Spanish Empire represented something new. It transcended all of the 
                                                
1 Eugenio de Salazar, Cartas de Eugenio de Salazar, vecino y natural de Madrid, escritas a muy 
particulares amigos suyos (Madrid: Sociedad de Bibliófilos Españoles, 1866), 35. 
2 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 46b “Carta del doctor don Pedro de Navia, capellán del marqués de Villagarcía” 
(Santiago, October 14, 1657). 
3 There are several studies on the mobility of other early modern societies. For instance, Richard Kagan and 
Phillip Morgan have edited a collection of studies on early modern Jewish diasporas Atlantic Diasporas: 
Jews, Conversos, and Crypto-Jews in the Age of Mercantilism, 1500-1800 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2009). The case of the French empire is studied by Kenneth J. Banks, Chasing Empire 
across the Sea: Communications and the State in the French Atlantic, 1713-1763 (Montreal; Ithaca: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002). English movement has been analyzed by Alison Games, The Web 
of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560-1660 (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008). The Portuguese, the first and perhaps most mobile early modern empire has been 
studied by Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert, A Nation upon the Ocean Sea: Portugal’s Atlantic Diaspora and the 
Crisis of the Spanish Empire, 1492-1640 (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). The recent 
historiographical trend on Atlantic world points out the importance of movement of people, ideas and 
goods in this area, see Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan, eds., Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal 
(Oxford: New York; Oxford University Press, 2009); David Armitage and M. J. Braddick, eds., The British 
Atlantic World, 1500-1800, 2nd ed. (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009). See also the debate in Alison Games, “Atlantic History: Definitions, Challenges, and 
Opportunities,” The American Historical Review 111, no. 3 (June 2006): 741–757. 
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mental, geographical, political, technical, and scientific limits inherent in Ancient and 
Medieval times. 
In this chapter I will discuss aspects of Spanish mobility that made possible the 
Spanish Empire during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, overcoming major 
geographical challenges. After presenting the different types of people and movement 
across the empire. I will analyze the organizations, routes, and new technologies that 
facilitated such mobility. This chapter also discusses some of the conditions and 
consequences of the dramatic expansion of the period: what it meant for people to move 
across the Empire, their recognizing of difference, their experiences and new 
appreciations of distance, and how it all affected the development of a new concept: that 
of an early modern globalized world. 
Take for example the fascinating, and for the most part unknown, case of Pedro 
Ordóñez de Cevallos, a soldier, governor, merchant, priest, writer, and founder of cities 
(Fig. 1). Ordóñez de Cevallos left his native Jaén in Andalusia when he was only nine 
years old, only to return thirty-nine years later after having joined multiple expeditions 
and, according to his own account, having traveled more than 33,000 leagues across the 
five parts of the World: Europe, Africa, Asia, America, and Magallanica (current-day 
Australia).4 When he returned to Jaén, in the early years of the seventeenth century, 
Ordóñez de Cevallos penned his memoires. The book, entitled Historia y viage del 
mundo del clérigo agradecido don Pedro Ordóñez de Zevallos, and first published in 
                                                
4 Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos, Historia y viage del mundo del clérigo agradecido don Pedro Ordóñez de 
Zevallos a las cinco partes de la Europa, África, Asia, América y Magalánica. (Madrid: Juan García 
Infanzón, 1691), 392. 
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1614, exemplifies the scope and possibilities of mobility for members of the early 
modern Spanish Empire.5 
 
Figure 1. Portrait of Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos in Quarenta triunfos de la santissima cruz de Christo N.S. 
y maestro (Madrid: Luis Sánchez, 1614), fol. 1.  
                                                
5 Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos, Viage del mundo (Madrid: Luis Sánchez, 1614). There is a second edition of 
the book published in 1691 (see footnote 4), the one used in this dissertation. Ordóñez de Cevallos also 
wrote Quarenta triunfos de la Santíssima Cruz de Christo N.S. y maestro (Madrid: Luis Sánchez, 1614). 
Although there are some studies on the life and works of Ordóñez de Cevallos, most are based almost 
exclusively on his own works; thus, a deeper study of his life on the archives is much needed. Amongst the 
most important and recent works we have A. Vázquez de la Torre, “Un giennense que renunció a un trono: 
don Pedro Ordóñez de Ceballos,” Boletín del Instituto de Estudios Giennenses 2, no. 4 (1955): 115–143; 
Miguel Molina Martínez, “Aproximación a la vida y obra del jiennense Pedro Ordóñez de Ceballos,” 
Chronica Nova. Revista de Historia Moderna de la Universidad de Granada no. 16 (1988): 131–142; 
Miguel Zugasti, “El ‘viaje del mundo’ (1614) de Pedro Ordóñez de Ceballos o cómo modelar una 
autobiografía épica,” Iberoromania: revista dedicada a las lenguas y literaturas iberorománicas de Europa 
y América 58 (2003): 83–119; Miguel Zugasti, “Épica, soldadesca y autobiografía En el ‘Viaje del mundo’ 
(1614), de Pedro Ordóñez de Ceballos,” in Actas del congreso “El siglo de oro en el nuevo milenio,” ed. 
Carlos Mata and Miguel Zugasti, vol. 2 (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2005), 1781–1812; Fernando Escribano Martin, 
“El viaje del mundo de Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos,” Arbor CLXXX, no. 711/712 (April 30, 2005): 581–
594; Miguel Zugasti, “Pedro Ordóñez de Ceballos: Un viajero español por la India del siglo XVI,” Hola 
Namasté, revista de la embajada de la India en Madrid 1, no. 4 (2006): 13–27. 
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The book is divided into three parts. The first two are autobiographical, 
corresponding each to two phases of his life and demarcated by his ordaining in Santa Fe 
de Bogotá at the end of the sixteenth century, while the third one describes the travel 
routes and most salient things the author saw and learned during his travels. Ordóñez de 
Cevallos reveals a life of incessant movement. After coming and going between Europe, 
Africa, and America (where he held several government posts and served as a soldier), he 
unexpectedly circumnavigated the world, departing from Acapulco and returning to 
Pernambuco, a formidable adventure which he is allegedly the first man to undertake 
departing from America. After a failed return trip to Spain in which he was shipwrecked 
in the Caribbean Sea, Ordóñez de Cevallos left Mexico in hopes of reaching Guayaquil 
on the Pacific, but encountered stormy conditions that left him waylaid in the Philippine 
Islands. From there, he traversed Asia in order to preach the Christian gospel, hoping to 
convert the native population. In particular, he spent a lot of time and energy in the 
Cochinchina, where he would have converted the crown princess. Then, Ordóñez de 
Cevallos travelled through India and, later on, reached Africa. Although he wished to 
return to Europe, his fellow travelers persuaded him to set sail across the Atlantic to 
America. From Buenos Aires he returned to Guayaquil, and then, finally, Spain. 
Unquestionably, the fabulous and exceptional nature of the events narrated by 
Ordóñez de Cevallos, as well as the troubling lack of a chronology or chronological 
markers, raise some doubts about the veracity of his journey, especially the Asian 
portion.6 However, it is undeniable that he traveled a lot, even if not as much as he 
                                                
6 Miguel Zugasti thinks that the journey is, for the most part, veridical. Its narration, he argues, belongs to 
an “epic” mentality now foreign to us, as evidenced by the author’s consistent identification and description 
of historic characters and events. Zugasti thinks that many of the book’s incongruences are easily explained 
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claims. Most importantly, it is clear that he knew a great deal about the world and 
traveling in it. He had certainly read the many other travel accounts, descriptions, and 
notices that circulated profusely at that time, and had an awareness of what laid beyond 
the oceans. To be sure, Viage del mundo reflects the mindset of a time and a society 
permanently on the move, in which the Spanish Empire had become a truly a global and 
connected polity. 
Despite how striking Ordóñez de Cevallos’ trip was, however, he was not alone in 
this kind of experience. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, many people 
were curious and eager to know the world beyond their borders.7 The young Frenchman 
François Froger, for instance, claimed he had “deseado siempre con gran pasión ver 
tierras extrañas,” and when he was only 19 years old embarked on an expedition to the 
Strait of Magellan.8 Likewise, in 1586 Spaniard Simón Pérez de Torres left Seville for an 
astonishing journey that, according to his account, took him across America and Asia and 
back into Europe.9 Indeed, Christopher Columbus’ transatlantic voyage, and previous 
Portuguese explorations, inaugurated an era of movement that saw the Europeans spread 
out from the Mediterranean into far-away lands in Africa, Asia, America, and islands 
around the world. They settled, conquered, and ruled in regions mentally and physically 
                                                                                                                                            
by the fact that Ordóñez de Cevallos wrote the text many years after his travels took place. Zugasti, “Épica, 
soldadesca y autobiografía.” 
7 For studies of early modern travelers see, for example, Irving A. Leonard, Viajeros por la América Latina 
colonial (México, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1992); Antoni Maczak and Ursula Phillips, Travel in 
Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, U.K. ; Cambridge, MA: Polity, 1995); Carlos García-Romeral Pérez, 
Bio-bibliografía de viajeros españoles (siglos XVI-XVII) (Madrid: Ollero y Ramos, 1998); José Luis 
Martínez, Pasajeros de Indias: viajes transatlánticos en el siglo XVI (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1983). 
8 BNE, Mss/3165 François Froger, “Relación de un viaje que se hizo en los años 1695-1697 a las costas de 
África, Estrecho de Magallanes, Brasil, Cayenna e Islas Antillas, por una escuadra de bajeles del rey, 
mandada por el sr. de Gennes, hecha por el sr. Froger, ingeniero voluntario en el navío llamado El Halcón 
Inglés, en Amsterdam, herederos de Antonio Schelte, 1699; traducido al español en el mismo año en 
Madrid.” 1699, fol. 228. 
9 BNE, Mss/3181 Simón Pérez de Torres, “Discurso de mi viaje a la India,” n.d. 
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distant from home. These men and women, thus, developed a new conception of a distant 
and large, but at the same time united, world. 
This movement went beyond isolated and individual cases. Daviken Studnicki has 
recently studied the extensive mobility of the Portuguese. According to him, the 
Portuguese built their nation upon the Atlantic. He defined the Portuguese empire—“The 
Nation”— in terms of its diasporic community, consisting of Portuguese merchants, 
sailors, and traders who travelled around the world, establishing the empire’s outposts 
and selling its goods. Through the seventeenth century, this maritime community inserted 
itself into the networks of the Spanish empire in America; indeed, the Portuguese played 
an essential part in the development of such empire. According to Studnicki, they 
controlled much of the trading network in the Seville-Lima axis, particularly the slave 
trade. These men created an identity by moving across the Atlantic (and beyond). 
However, despite the movement and the large distances, they were able to maintain their 
ties to their homeland and formed Portuguese communities wherever they went.10 
Portuguese mobility existed for the most part in the form of enclaves. They infiltrated 
existing networks and societies and formed their own communities within these societies. 
Portuguese expansion contrasts with the manner in which Spaniards established their 
empire by attempting to fully carve out their own societies. Thus, in the case of the 
Spanish, a large-scale movement of imperial officials and authorities was required.11 The 
impressive mobility of all kinds of people, commodities, products, ideas, books, and 
objects across the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Indian Oceans proved 
                                                
10 Studnicki-Gizbert, A Nation upon the Ocean Sea. 
11 For a comparison in the settlement and establishment of Portuguese and Spanish Atlantic empires see 
Thomas Benjamin, The Atlantic World: Europeans, Africans, Indians and Their Shared History, 1400-1900 
(Cambridge, England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), chap. 4; Greene and Morgan, 
Atlantic History, chaps. 2 & 3. 
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to be crucial for the development of the Spanish Empire, which became a vibrant society 
in a state of permanent and incessant movement. 
Tamar Herzog has studied the mechanisms through which the many foreigners 
who circulated within the Spanish Empire became naturalized and accepted as Spaniards. 
Herzog argues that identities in the early modern Spanish world were formed in local 
communities, where people were defined as either “good” or “bad” vecinos, and based on 
that judgment were allowed and recognized (or not) to participate in the community and 
enjoy their rights and privileges. In Herzog’s analysis, the state and the king had little to 
do with this process: it was almost exclusively a local affair in which the ability of an 
immigrant to settle, own a house, and participate within the Spanish community were the 
main factors that determined that person’s inclusion or exclusion.12 In this formulation, 
identities in the early modern empire were defined only once people halted. However, I 
argue that other figures in the empire—such as the mobile imperial officials that this 
dissertation examines—defined their identity precisely through the process of movement, 
and very much in relation to the king and the Monarchy. 
Above all, it was imperial subjects’ capacity to serve the Monarchy anywhere in 
the world that defined them as members of the Spanish polity. Take for example the case 
of don Gabriel Niño de Távora. He was the son of don Juan Niño de Távora who had 
served as the governor of the Philippines from 1626 until his death in 1632. Like his 
father, don Gabriel dedicated his life to the service of the King, wherever he was needed. 
In 1634, after some years fighting the rebels in Flanders, he voyaged to New Spain from 
where, following in his father’s footsteps, he sailed for the Philippines. He spent several 
                                                
12 Tamar Herzog, Defining Nations: Immigrants and Citizens in Early Modern Spain and Spanish America 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003). 
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years in that archipelago and was even appointed governor of Terreñate, a tiny but 
strategic island in the Moluccas. In 1643 he moved back to Spain where he led a military 
company in the fight against the Portuguese in Badajoz and in Seville.13 In this case, then, 
the king and the Monarchy had much to do in the forging of don Gabriel’s identity. He 
never settled anywhere for long and his interactions with the local communities were 
limited. Instead of getting involved in the local networks of the community, he engaged 
in familial and imperial networks of service to the king.  
The case of the Niño de Tavoras was not, by any means, unique. There were 
many families that tied their futures to service to the king.14 This dissertation shows the 
ways in which the global Spanish empire was built upon the service of mobile people 
who tied their fortunes to the empire, and whose mobility (both geographical as well as 
social) was dependent upon their own networks and those of the monarchy. 
While thinking of this early modern mobility, it is important to fully take into 
consideration the extremely large dimensions, as well as the discontinuous territoriality, 
of the early modern Spanish Empire. As Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos put it, the 
possessions of the Spanish king were “un piélago.”15 In Spanish this word refers to the 
open and deep sea, both in its geographical and figurative senses. It seems to be a perfect 
choice for describing the Spanish Monarchy and how many of its inhabitants thought of 
it: the Spanish Empire was not only a large, immeasurable territorial empire; but it was, 
                                                
13 AHN, Estado, 1325, N. 16 “Relación de servicios del capitán y sargento mayor D. Gabriel Niño de 
Tábora” (Madrid, January 2, 1645). 
14 See, for example, Yuen-Gen Liang, Family and Empire: The Fernández de Córdoba and the Spanish 
Realm (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011). Familial service to the king is studied in 
more depth in Chapter Two. 
15 Ordóñez de Cevallos, Historia y viage del mundo, 405. 
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contrary to received wisdom, a maritime empire too.16 The limits and possibilities were 
not only marked and defined by grounded boundaries, but, as argued by Ordóñez de 
Cevallos, by the ocean: 
Que se dice que no hay reino ni provincia que toque en la mar, que 
en más de cuatro mil leguas por esta parte, y más de tres mil por la 
otra, que en todos tenga el gran Rey de España tierra y puertos, 
con pensiones para ello que se puede decir vasallaje, como en sus 
lugares he tocado.17 
 
Lauren Benton has emphasized the spatial developments of empires. Early 
modern empires, she argues, tried to impose their authority over extremely large and 
irregular territories. Therefore, empires were built upon diverse spatial and geographical 
formations, which were neither predictable nor unavoidable. These imperial geographies 
were historically contingent. The integration of these disconnected and distinct territories 
depended on empires’ ability to connect them. Therefore, Benton claims, empires’ were 
crafted and organized around specific enclaves and corridors that made possible the 
bringing together of the separate parts, and which usually followed natural paths.18 In this 
regard, the role of islands as intra-imperial—and often inter-imperial—bridges was 
fundamental.19 It was the ability to surmount and encompass the aquatic spaces what 
made the Spanish Empire the largest and most powerful polity of its time. 
                                                
16 Brian Patrick Jones argues in his doctoral dissertation for the importance of paying attention to the 
oceanic dimension of the Spanish Empire: “Making the Ocean: Global Space, Sailor Practice, and 
Bureaucratic Archives in the Sixteenth-Century Spanish Maritime Empire” (Doctoral Dissertation, 
University of Texas, Austin, 2014). 
17 Ordóñez de Cevallos, Historia y viage del mundo, 406. 
18 Lauren Benton, “Spatial Histories of Empire,” Itinerario 30, no. 3 (November 2006): 19–34. 
19 For a study of Havana, one of the most important Spanish island ports, and its connections with the rest 
of the world and its development, see Alejandro de la Fuente, Havana and the Atlantic in the Sixteenth 
Century (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008). Similarly, the Azores islands played a 
central role connecting Europe, Asia, and America: Jean-Frédéric Schaub, L’île aux mariés: Les Açores 
entre deux empires (1583-1642) (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2014). 
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Evidently, the unusually large dimensions and previously unseen characteristics 
of the early modern transatlantic and transpacific Spanish Monarchy were important 
challenges to individual mobility, and to the government of the polity. Therefore, it is 
worth considering first about the idea of distance to better understand the workings of the 
far-flung Spanish empire. 
 
A Distant Empire 
Distance was a central theme for the imagining and ruling of the Spanish Empire. 
Early modern inhabitants were aware of the long distances that separated them. For 
instance, Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos exposed the hazardous path through which people 
in America had to go when they went to the royal court in Spain to ask for rewards. They 
had to travel “por tierra y mar tres mil leguas, mudando muchos temples, con mucho 
riesgo de la vida, y con excesivo gasto de la hacienda.”20 In fact, Ordóñez de Cevallos 
was obsessed with the long distances separating the Spanish Empire, in which he 
frequently traversed. Miguel Zugasti notes that despite Ordóñez de Cevallos’s disdain for 
providing chronological information, he reiterates over and over the number of leagues 
he covered in his travels.21 Likewise, don Pedro de Navia, the chaplain of the marquis of 
Villagarcía who had been appointed as president of Charcas, worried by the uncertain 
fate of his patron, fretted that “la distancia que hay desde Sevilla a Las Charcas causa 
horror,” and that such journey was “tan larga jornada.”22 Certainly, the experiences of 
                                                
20 Ordóñez de Cevallos, Historia y viage del mundo, 424. A league is an archaic unit of length, and its value 
varies in each region. It often referred to the distance a person could walk in an hour, roughly three miles. 
21 Zugasti, “Épica, soldadesca y autobiografía,” 1783. 
22 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 46 “Carta del doctor don Pedro de Navia, capellán del marqués de Villagarcía” 
(Santiago, October 14, 1657) 
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these people, and their descriptions of foreign places as being far-off, were profoundly 
impacted by the idea and sensation of distance. 
Such long distances where, first and foremost, physically perceived by weather 
and climate conditions. The “muchos temples” that people experienced were perhaps the 
most evident signs of moving from one region to another. Ordóñez de Cevallos, for 
instance, described the peculiar and favorable weather of New Spain that made it a 
prosperous and healthy region.23 Weather not only determined the physical conditions in 
which people lived, but also impacted their behavior and morality.24 The author claimed 
that in the city of Bogotá there was “un clima particular que influye diferencias y 
disensiones entre las cabezas.”25 The captain Domingo de Toral y Valdés, who in the first 
decades of the seventeenth century served the king as soldier and in other posts in Europe 
and in Asia, and who travelled across much of the Middle East, was convinced that  
los hombres que pasan de España a aquellas partes de la India es 
mudar en ellos el natural, cosa general no atribuyendo a la 
mudanza de estado más que a la de diferente clima [...] Entiendo 
que los hombres en aquella parte no les queda ser ninguno de la 
condición que tenían en España.26  
 
People had to travel thousands of kilometers across the far-flung empire, and 
more importantly, they knew of the many implications of the far away positions. In a 
world where the location of political actors greatly defined their power, this 
understanding of proximity and its effect on political power was vital. Proximity to the 
center, to the King, defined the identity and political power of both individuals and 
                                                
23 Ordóñez de Cevallos, Historia y viage del mundo, 362. 
24 In the early modern world, as part of a humoralist conception of the human body, it was universally 
accepted that climate shaped the character of the people, see Rebecca Earle, The Body of the Conquistador: 
Food, Race, and the Colonial Experience in Spanish America, 1492-1700 (Cambridge, UK; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), especially 21-23.  
25 Ordóñez de Cevallos, Historia Y Viage Del Mundo, 417. 
26 BNE, Mss/6227 Domingo Toral y Valdés, “Relación de la vida del capitán Domingo de Toral y Valdés” 
circa 1634, fol. 196–196v. 
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institutions.27 Being distant from the King had many limitations. The governor of the 
Philippines, Santiago Vera, argued that the problems in such islands were more difficult 
because they were “en tierra tan nueva y distante de vuestra real persona.” Distance not 
only conditioned the timely and proper application of the king’s justice and law, but it 
presented logistical problems, too. News took a long time to arrive, and there was always 
the risk of losing the mail altogether. Thus, Vera, like many of his contemporaries, 
always wrote duplicates.28  
Not only was the news sent in duplicate; on some occasions, so too were 
individuals. In 1663, the count of Santiesteban, viceroy of Peru, concerned about the poor 
condition of Callao’s fortress and dikes, requested the Council of the Indies to send him a 
military engineer, ideally from Flanders or Italy, expert in building dikes. The viceroy 
also requested two experienced officials to assist the engineer. Santiesteban asked for two 
officials so the job could be completed promptly, but also “como si sucediese morir uno 
en el viaje, que haya otro que le sustituya.” The viceroy’s request seemed reasonable to 
everyone in the Council, which ordered the governor of Flanders, the marquis of 
Caracena, to find the three suitable officials right away so they could be dispatched as 
quickly as possible.29 I don know if the Flemish engineer and the two other officials ever 
set foot in Peru, but communications such as this one clearly reveal the prevalent 
consciousness of the distance that separated parts of the empire, and the hazards of 
                                                
27 Cañeque, The King’s Living Image, chap. 4; Alejandro Cañeque, “De sillas y almohadones o de la 
naturaleza ritual del poder en la Nueva España de los siglos XVI y XVII,” Revista de Indias 64, no. 232 
(2004): 609–634; Alejandra B. Osorio, Inventing Lima: Baroque Modernity in Peru’s South Sea Metropolis 
(New York, N.Y: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), chap. 4; Adolfo Polo y La Borda Ramos, “Identidad y poder 
en los conflictos por las preeminencias en el siglo XVII,” Histórica 31, no. 2 (2007): 7–42; Robert Darnton, 
“A Bourgeois Puts His World in Order: The City as a Text,” in The Great Cat Massacre: And Other 
Episodes in French Cultural History (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 107–144. 
28 AGI, Filipinas, 34, N. 75 “Carta de Santiago de Vera sobre situación general” (Manila, June 26, 1587). 
29 AGI, Lima, 297 “Sobre que se envien ingeniero y maestros de diques para reparar la fortificación del 
Callao” (Madrid, August, 1663). 
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transatlantic travel. They also speak of the generally unseen links between distant parts of 
the empire, such as Flanders and Peru, which might otherwise be considered as totally 
unrelated to each other. 
Nonetheless, people did not always complain about the distance. Sometimes it 
could be used to highlight local qualities, too. The admiral Jerónimo Bañuelos y Carrillo, 
a seasoned sailor and military man who sailed with a naval squadron to the Philippines, 
and later served as corregidor of Veracruz, wrote a treatise on the political situation of 
the Asian archipelago. He contended that even though Manila was “la más remota de 
España, y la más apartada para el auxilio de Su Majestad,” it was a well-provided city 
that boasted the greatest commerce in the world.30 Despite being far-removed from its 
sovereign, Manila had enough resources to overcome the limitations of distance, and 
thus, more reasons to be praised.  
The language of distance was deeply rooted in the political culture of the Spanish 
Monarchy. The idea of being distant from the king was expressed by everyone from the 
councilors in Madrid to indigenous people at the ends of the empire. Noblemen and 
plebeians articulated their demands and explained their needs by means of the physical or 
mental separation from the center of the empire, the king. The Indigenous people of 
Pampanga in the Philippines cleverly argued that they were “los más leales vasallos que 
en este último polo del mundo reconocemos el vasallaje de Vuestra Real Persona,” but 
nonetheless, “somos los que más vejaciones padecemos, los que más trabajos sufrimos y 
los que más desdichas lloramos.”31 The indigenous population shared the Monarchy’s 
political culture, and knew how to articulate their demands according to the needs, 
                                                
30 Jerónimo de Bañuelos y Carrillo, Tratado del estado del las Islas Philipinas y de sus conueniencias 
(Mexico: Imprenta de Bernardo Calderón, 1638), fol. 3. 
31 AGI, Filipinas, 193, N. 22 “Carta de los principales de Pampanga” (Manila, June 12, 1680). 
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actions, and structure of the empire. In fact, their arguments were similar to those of a 
Spaniard and member of Manila’s elite such as Juan Núñez. In 1598, Núñez bitterly 
complained against the governor of the Philippines, Santiago de Vera, for only favoring 
his recently-arrived circle of retainers, leaving aside the rest of the Spaniards’ society, 
especially those “soldados viejos” like himself, who had long ago settled in the islands. 
Núñez begged for greater protection and justice, that the king “se acuerde de los que en 
estas partes tan remotas estamos sirviendo a Vuestra Magestad.”32 Both the natives from 
Pampanga and the Spaniards from Manila used the fact of being distant from the king as 
proof of their greater loyalty, and as an argument for more and better protection, that is, 
greater rights and flexibility within the colonial society in which they lived. 
In 1662 the Council of the Indies stopped the appointment of Juan de Balboa as 
governor of Santiago de Chile. He had sufficient merits and experience to occupy the 
new position: at the time he was the governor of Santo Domingo in the Caribbean, and 
previously had served as the governor of Gibraltar. However, there were also damning 
accusations against Balboa while he was at the head of the government of Santo 
Domingo.33 Councilors were aware of the difficulties inherent in long-distance ruling. As 
Frederick Cooper has graphically described, empires had “long arms and weak fingers.”34 
Empires could be present in far-away places, and sometimes could appear as mighty and 
absolutely powerful, but on the ground, in each specific location, the empire’s actual 
capacity to rule had limitations. It was dependent on the capacity and willingness of local 
actors, and contingent to multiple negotiations and conditions that were liable to slip 
                                                
32 AGI, Filipinas, 35, N. 16 “Carta de Juan Núñez quejándose del gobernador” (Manila, June 24, 1598). 
33 AGI, Santo Domingo, 2, N. 71 “Sobre el nombramiento de Juan de Balboa y lo que conviene hacer con 
Don Félix de Zúñiga” (Madrid, October 15, 1658). 
34 Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 197. 
	
 33 
away from the empire’s authorities at the center. Accordingly, the councilors feared that 
if Balboa had truly committed any wrongdoings 
en la isla de Santo Domingo, que es la provincia de las Indias que 
está más cerca de la presencia de VM, estando más lejos de ella el 
reino de Chile, con mayor razón se podría recelar continuaría en 
ella en parte más remota y con mayor exceso.35 
 
David Garrett contends that distance was a positive key ingredient in the 
construction of royal authority. Studying the case of the late seventeenth-century 
viceroyalty of Peru, under the rule of Charles II, he argues that the gulf separating Cusco 
from Lima and Madrid was not necessarily an obstacle for the development of the king’s 
power. He points out that “subjects were quick to lament that distance left them 
vulnerable to abusive local officials,” which could suggest that it was a weak and 
ineffective political and judiciary system, at the whims of corrupt and hard-to-control 
authorities.36 However, because the political system was built upon a vertical and 
hierarchical judiciary structure that compelled people to appeal to a central authority in 
Madrid, the King and his Council had the final say on all disputes and legal matters and 
involved themselves in the local affairs of every city. Thus, these locations (Cuzco, Lima, 
and Madrid) were interdependent in handling administrative and political affairs of the 
empire. Moreover, the wide gap separating the three cities engendered a “temporal 
disjuncture, with royal government operating in a different time than local life, even 
when Madrid and Lima engaged directly in the politics of the highland cities.”37 The 
powerful but distant king, therefore, remained simultaneously outside of everyday life 
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36 David T. Garrett, “‘En lo remoto de estos reynos’: Distance, Jurisdiction, and Royal Government in Late 
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and ever-present. His authority, law, and legitimacy were acknowledged, while he was 
not held responsible of the exploitations and failures of the system. 
Arndt Brendecke has presented a similar argument.  In Imperio e información, he 
explores the use of data and information to rule over the vast Spanish empire, and 
explains how such information was acquired by officials. According to Brendecke, early 
modern knowledge can be defined according to two major paradigms. On the one hand, 
the king was thought as omniscient toward his distant kingdoms. On the other hand, he 
was blind and, thus, much in need of the counsel of others to hear and see at a distance. 
Informaciones from royal officials as well as from private subjects provided the king with 
eyes and ears over his out-of-reach holdings and subjects.38 Brendecke acknowledges that 
the information available at the imperial center was fragmentary, contingent, and 
reflective of particular interests who wrote to the king expecting favors. Yet, with 
numerous interests and informants acting at the same time and stepping on each other’s 
toes, and building upon the theory of checks and balances, Brendecke contends that there 
emerged a “triangle of vigilance” that helped the king maintain his grip on his far away 
possessions. The base of the triangle was constituted by the multiple and fragmented acts 
of vigilance, the sides by acts of communication, and the king was always at the top, 
constantly receiving pieces of information. In effect, the distant king, due to his 
“blindness,” was exonerated of any wrongdoings, while his central position and authority 
as judge (to punish and most importantly to reward) lent stability and cohesion to the 
Monarchy.39  
                                                
38 On the Informaciones de méritos y servicios, see Chapter Three. 
39 Arndt Brendecke, Imperio e información: funciones del saber en el dominio colonial español (Madrid; 
Frankfurt am Main: Iberoamericana; Vervuert, 2012), 253–266. There is an English edition of the book 
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The King’s physical and temporal distance, paradoxically, allowed for the 
stability and continuity of imperial rule. Nonetheless, as Alejandro Cañeque has 
explained, it was also necessary to make the king present, visible, and concrete in each 
and every one of his domains.40 Imperial officials fulfilled this duty. They acted as 
representatives of the Spanish king in each of his domains, no matter how distant they 
were from the court. The count of Castrillo, president of the Council of Indies and later 
viceroy of Naples, bluntly expressed his point-of-view that the officials going to America 
were not linked to the region, but on the contrary, “que vayan con la mira de volver a 
morir a su naturaleza.”41 It was fundamental that imperial officials on the ground not 
settle on those regions, rather, their dependence was to the distant king. It was necessary, 
therefore, to have imperial officials constantly on the move.  
 
A Mobile Society 
Mobility of people was hardly a phenomenon new to the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries or to the New World.42 Ida Altman, one of the leading scholars of 
early modern Spanish migration, has argued that in order to fully understand transatlantic 
migration we must examine the patterns of internal emigration in Castile that existed 
prior to and during the transatlantic migration. Moreover, we cannot look at the two 
                                                                                                                                            
Arndt Brendecke, The Empirical Empire: Spanish Colonial Rule and the Politics of Knowledge (Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, 2016). 
40 Cañeque, The King’s Living Image, chap. 1. 
41 AHN, Estado, 6402-2, N. 84 “Consulta del conde del Castrillo sobre que el licenciado Íñigo López Bravo 
no aceptó la presidencia de Quito” (Madrid, June 24, 1653). 
42 Nicholas Canny has traced medieval patterns of movement and how they changed and endured after 
Columbus’ voyage, Europeans on the Move: Studies on European Migration, 1500-1800 (Oxford; New 
York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1994). 
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periods of migration as isolated and disconnected events. Quite the contrary, they were 
related, mutually dependent, and had effects on both sides of the Atlantic.43 
It is worth noting that the movement of royal officials was just one among many 
other possible kinds of mobility, which often intertwined. With trade and economic profit 
standing at the center of early modern mobility, for instance, merchants, no less than 
government officials, moved profusely across the empire and beyond its borders.44 
Religious officials were amongst the most mobile individuals of their time.45 Religion 
served as a primary cause of people’s movement: it provided justification for most of the 
wars, imprisonments, and captivities. Likewise, officials related to the judiciary and legal 
system (lawyers, attorneys, judges, and oidores) circulated widely. Many scholars have 
identified a sort of cursus honorum, a path that these officials followed which determined 
their advancement.46 Diplomacy and foreign relationships also fostered movement, as 
                                                
43 Ida Altman, Emigrants and Society: Extremadura and America in the Sixteenth Century (Berkeley: 
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foreign officials traveled to and within the Spanish Monarchy, and ambassadors from the 
most varied places visited the Spanish realms.  
Many of the foreign relationships, however, revolved around war and military 
activities, which fostered a massive circulation of people and established routes, logistics, 
and patterns of movement.47 Throughout the seventeenth century, the Spanish Monarchy 
maintained many open flanks and engaged in military operations against all of its 
neighbors, sometimes simultaneously. Moreover, the Spanish military was also active 
beyond the empire’s borders and participated in many distant disputes. On several 
occasions, the king sent troops to support his European allies, especially the German 
Emperor. 
The war in Flanders, which lasted from 1566 to 1648, was perhaps the most 
important driving force of military movement during the seventeenth century: thousands 
of men of different social and geographical origin fought there. In fact, most of the 
imperial officials studied in this dissertation had some contact and experience with 
Flanders. Furthermore, the need to send troops and supplies to Flanders, avoiding French 
and English territories and their zones of influence, led to the development of the 
“Spanish Road,” which traversed most of Central Europe and relied heavily on Spanish 
possessions in Italy, as well as on Habsburg territories. Thus, the war in Flanders required 
                                                
47 Amongst the most recent and interesting works on the Spanish military and their impact on the Spanish 
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Económica, 2009). Also see, the database of military and naval appoitments Phillip Williams, ed., 
Nombramientos de oficiales del ejército y de la armada en la Monarquía Hispánica, 1500-1700 (Ministerio 
de Defensa, Secretaría General Técnica, 2014), CD-ROM. 
	
 38 
a huge mobilization of peoples across most of Europe.48 Moreover, the war in Flanders 
soon acquired a global dimension. Pedro Esteban Dávila, while serving as governor of 
the island of Tercera in the Azores in the 1620’s, contended that “hoy con la guerra de 
Flandes, y el poco seguro de la mar se pasa grande necesidad,” and further claimed that 
such a scenario made the Azores islands “una de las más principales fronteras que 
Vuestra Majestad tiene.”49 There was a clear global awareness both of the global 
dimensions of the empires, and of the global scale of the confrontation. The Dutch (a 
global empire in its own right) fought the Spanish everywhere they could, conditioning 
the politics in regions far away from Europe, such as the Caribbean, Brazil and Southeast 
Asia.50 
Another main military and political European destination was Italy. The political 
and military posts in Italy were greatly desired, which alsp stimulated the circulation of 
people serving there.51 Those posts shared the same prestige as the ones in Flanders and, 
therefore, the city council of Manila was pleased with the appointment of Juan Cerezo as 
governor of the Philippines because “siendo como es muy soldado, de la escuela de 
Flandes y Italia, donde ha militado y que tiene entendidas las materias de la guerra y 
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particulares con pretensiones en Milán apoyadas en servicios prestados en Flandes y otros puntos,” n.d.; 
AHN, Estado, 2261 “Documentos relativos a la provisión de varios gobiernos militares y capitanías de 
armas en el reino de Sicilia,”1618-1713; AHN, Estado, 2266 “Consultas del Consejo de Italia sobre asuntos 
relativos a la secretaría de Sicilia, su personal y algunos empleos,”1606-1689.  
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gobierno será en este el que han menester estas islas.”52 Likewise, as already mentioned, 
Spanish soldiers had to first reach Italy and the Duchy of Milan in order to march north 
into Flanders. Naples and the Mediterranean islands served as a hub for travel to the 
Middle East. Italy was one of the most vibrant and cosmopolitan regions of the early 
modern world. Many individuals, and not just soldiers, moved to and through Italy, so it 
is not surprising that Cristóbal Suárez de Figueroa set his novel El pasajero on the road 
from Madrid to Italy, where by coincidence a soldier, a jurist, a professor, and a 
goldsmith came together. They shared the same road and destination but had different 
motives.53  
Military activities were not, by any means, restricted to the European theater. 
Rather, subjects of the Spanish monarch engaged in military activities across the world. 
They fought against local opposition to Spanish rule (for example, the Araucanians in 
Chile), as well as against European enemies abroad (such as Dutch, French and English 
pirates and corsairs in the Caribbean). The Spanish were well-aware of the global 
reaching of their military power. Writer Cristóbal Suárez de Figueroa, despite not being a 
soldier himself, proudly boasted of the presence of the Spanish soldiers all around the 
globe, and did not withhold his praises: 
Testigos de lo que valen [los españoles] son innumerables trofeos y 
vitorias alcanzadas en todas edades. ¡Cuántas en España, cuando 
Gentiles con Romanos: cuántas en la misma, cuando Cristianos con 
Moros: cuántas en Francia, defendiendo la Religión y el bando 
Católico: cuántas en Alemania, apoyando contra injustas 
contradicciones tan justa pretensión como el diadema de Carlos: 
cuántas en Flandes contra sediciosos: cuántas en Italia amparando 
su libertad: cuántas en las costas de África: cuántas y cuán 
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prodigiosas en los distritos Orientales! ¿Quién no los tiembla? 
¿Quién no los estima? Témelos el Turco: ámalos el Preste Juan: 
respéctalos el Persiano, y cualquier Potentado los desea tener por 
amigos. Merecen pues a montones las historias, y apenas hay quien 
tome la pluma para celebrar parte de sus hechos. Los que piden 
infinitas lenguas son los esparcidos por regiones remotas, como por 
las Antárticas y Occidentales.54  
 
The center of the Spanish activities in North Africa was Oran.55 By the first years 
of the sixteenth century, the Spanish kings had conquered several territories key to 
assuring the Reconquista and which then served as a firewall against the Muslim 
kingdoms in the region. The African posassessions were basically military enclaves that 
served to protect the Christian population and to exert pressure over the Muslim enemies. 
They also were centers from where captives were rescued and traded off. Additionally, 
on some occasions, the North African territories were used as prisons to house unruly 
noblemen that had been exiled. Such was the case with the versatile and polemic Gabriel 
Fernández de Villalobos, the count of Variñas, who lost royal favor and was exiled to 
Oran by Charles II around 1695.56 
America was another critical destiny for the Spanish military. Although there was 
not a permanent standing army in the New World, there were several fronts in which 
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soldiers and officers served. On the southern frontier of Peru, a continuous ongoing fight 
raged against the Araucanians of Chile. The marquis of Santillán, councilor in the 
Council of the Indies, considered “aquella guerra por de tanto mérito como la de 
Flandes.”57 This war was so long, intense, and difficult that Chile was deemed the 
Flandes indiano, the American Flanders.58 In addition, many men served in the ports and 
in the garrisons, fighting against the pirates and corsairs that lurked around the Spanish 
American possessions looking for silver.59 These activities were considered to be on 
equal footing to other military actions across the empire. The baron of Sueiro petitioned 
to be appointed commander of the port of Callao, Lima as a reward for his many years 
fighting in Europe (from Germany to Italy, and of course, Flanders), which he presented 
as proof of his value and experience.60  
Along with this worldwide mobility of the Spanish military, it is noteworthy to 
mention that such military movement included many foreigners. There were men from 
almost every nation serving in the Spanish tercios, the Spanish infantry corps. In 1660, 
Juan de Soria Sagasta reported the recent arrival to Seville of the “tercio de napolitanos,” 
commanded by Manuel Carrafa and composed by “alguna mezcla de españoles, romanos 
y de otras naciones.”61 Likewise, there is the case of the Irishman Juan Ratheo, who 
served for more that twenty years in in Ireland, Flanders, and Sicily, where his son, 
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Jacinto Ratheo, also served as soldier.62 In the Philippines, the governor Juan de Taboada 
appointed the Portuguese Diego López Lobo as admiral of the islands’ fleet. The city 
council of Manila protested such nomination, reminding that foreigners were forbidden to 
hold any position and receive an encomienda.63 Similarly, Manuel de Ovalle was allowed 
to move into Callao and serve in the port’s prison. The king authorized such a move “no 
embargante que sea de la dicha nación portuguesa” as a reward for Ovalle’s nineteen 
years of service in the Philippines and for his captivity in Algiers after the ship in which 
he was returning to Lisbon was attacked by the Turks.64  
Henry Kamen has argued that the Spanish Empire was only possible because of 
its ability to assimilate peoples from different countries and nationalities. Castilians, it is 
said, were the organizers and catalysts of the foreign politics, economies, and militaries 
that were the real force behind the empire. It was the Genovese and Portuguese who 
sailed across the Globe, the Native Americans who defeated the Incas and the Aztecs, the 
Italians and the Flemish who financed the crown’s activities, and the Germans who 
fought the European wars.65 Although Kamen’s portrayal of the Spanish Empire 
understimates the mobility and preeminence of the Castilians, he is right in highlighting 
the usually overlooked role played by foreigners. 
It was not only Europeans who moved throughout the Spanish Monarchy. A 
substantial number of American subjects also crisscrossed the Atlantic to serve the king. 
The Peruvian Pedro Alfonso Flores y Montenegro, viscount of Peñaparda, is an example 
of a person who fully inserted himself into the crown’s service in the peninsula. He was 
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corregidor (the chief magistrate) of Córdoba in Andalusia, and Salamanca in Castile. The 
councilors of Castile even proposed him for the corregimiento of Madrid, the home of the 
imperial court.66 José Javier Ruíz Ibáñez and Gabriela Vallejo Cervantes have studied the 
case of the Mexican don Diego de Villalobos y Benavides who left New Spain and 
settled in Europe where he served the king as a soldier and official in many posts in 
Flanders and Castile. The study of the ways in which this not so-fully successful official 
incorporated into the royal service highlights Villalobos’ clever and continuous use of 
New Spanish networks in Europe, like when he mobilized the Mexicans residing in Spain 
as witnesses to obtain his hidalguía.67 
The circulation of Spaniards born or with experience in the New World—
indianos, as they were called at the time—beyond America was fundamental for the 
ruling of the empire. Jean-Paul Zúñiga has studied the largely overlooked voyages of 
Americans to Europe.68 He argues that although it was not significant in demographic 
numbers, the migration had a tremendous impact on the political culture of the 
Monarchy. His argument is two-fold. On the one hand, the presence of indianos and the 
information and knowledge of America that they brought with them was used by the 
Council of the Indies, an administrative unit composed of people who were mostly static 
and did not know America first-hand. Therefore, in order to give proper laws and 
directives for ruling such far-away, large, and diverse regions, the councilors depended 
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on the news and analysis of the indianos, as well as by the network of officials they had 
on the ground. Indeed, Arndt Brendecke argues that the imperial officials were in a 
permanent struggle to fully get a sense of America, which seemed so distant in so many 
ways. At the end of the seventeenth century, the president of the Council of Castile, the 
cardinal Diego de Espinosa, asked for a report on the Indies and its people. The 
clergyman Luis Sánchez, who had spent eighteen years in America, wrote the report and 
concluded that the Spanish were extremely cruel to the natives and that Spanish domain 
was a structural failure because the distance, large dimensions, and diversity of people 
made America almost impossible to grasp. An anonymous reader plainly synthesized this 
argument with a brief marginal note: “las Indias no se entienden.”69 The information 
provided by the Americans themselves or by people with direct contact and experience in 
the continent was absolutely crucial for transcending such knowledge gaps.70 
On the other hand, Zúñiga contends that the movement of Americans was an 
important symbolic act. It reinforced the bonds between the two continents, and indiano’s 
sense of belonging to a common and superior polity: the Spanish Monarchy. Zúñiga 
shows that, for Americans, going to Europe truly meant going back to the mother 
country. It was a renewal of the unifying ties. It built and reinforced an idea of 
hispanidad, which encompassed local nationalism, and which allowed for the inclusion 
of Americans, as well as Castilians, Aragoneses, Neapolitans, and many others. This later 
phenomenon, I argue, was also an expression of Spanish imperial cosmopolitanism, 
which allowed for the existence of multiple singularities simultaneously incorporated 
under the universal umbrella of the Spanish Monarchy. 
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Indeed, many men returned to Europe to continue their services. After a first 
experience in America, Ordóñez de Cevallos went back to Europe to resume his personal 
activities. The travels of León Pinelo, the famous writer, historian, and royal official, 
probably born in Valladolid, Spain, provide good examples, too, of the possibilities of 
imperial mobility. Pinelo first departed from Spain and crossed the Atlantic with his 
parents as a teenager in 1604. After spending some years between Buenos Aires and 
Córdoba he was sent to Lima in 1612 to study at the university. Ten years later he sailed 
back to Europe, where he settled and held chief positions like attorney of the Council of 
the Indies and judge of the House of Trade.71  
These men brought America and the other regions in which they lived with them. 
While in Jaén, Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos dedicated himself to preserving his memories. 
His book was an exercise in arranging and giving sense to his experiences in America, 
Asia, Africa, and even Europe. León Pinelo dedicated his life to the study of the Indies 
and to the organization of its knowledge. In a less intellectual, but far more visual and 
illustrative fashion, the oidor Juan Francisco Montemayor y Córdoba proudly placed in 
the chapel’s altar he built in Alfocea, Aragon, the image of the Immaculate Lady that he 
brought from Mexico. Likewise, the governor of the Philippines Sebastián Hurtado de 
Corcuera sent several paintings to decorate Basque churches.72 
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All this varied and extensive mobility needed to be regulated and organized. The 
Spanish Monarchy commissioned several institutions to this end. First of all, movement 
between kingdoms, even those ruled by the same king, was not considered a right, and 
nor was it free. Inter-kingdom movement required getting permission or a letter of safe-
conduct from the king. This was not a policy exclusive to the Spanish Empire, but was 
common practice everywhere. When, for example, the expert in Arabic language, Abel 
Mesi, went to North Africa he obtained a passport from the Muslim Moroccan king that 
allowed him to travel safely.73 
Permission to move—to go somewhere, but also to return—was usually given by 
any of the different Councils that ruled the empire and by the political authorities on the 
ground. Military movement, perhaps the largest type of movement within Europe, was 
mostly regulated by the Councils of the State, War and Navy.74 These institutions gave 
permissions to captains to draft people to form the companies, and those Councils also 
ordered the companies’ dissolution.75 
The Council of the Indies and its dependent House of Trade in Seville regulated 
the transatlantic movement.76 The laws stipulated that every person who desired to go to 
America had to be approved by the House of Trade. This institution kept records of all 
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the individuals who received permission to embark.77 The purpose was to keep tight 
control over who could go to America. It was essential that those going to America were 
good Catholics, as the Crown hoped to keep the New World free of other religions. At the 
same time, imperial officials could not move or leave their posts without permission 
(either from the Council or from the viceroys). They had to keep serving, even if they did 
not wish to; and they had to move if they were commanded to do so. The Council of the 
Indies constantly received requests from officials to move, either to another region in the 
same continent or to return to Europe. Although there was a great deal of illegal 
movement, Spanish officials were not part of it. They had to follow the official rules. 
Thus, the movement of officials was highly scrutinized and, for the most part, controlled 
and directed from the Spanish authorities. In addition, the House of Trade aimed to 
regulate every aspect of transatlantic travel, including types and number of ships and their 
crews; the routes used; and it provided vital knowledge of winds, currents and other vital 
geographical and astrological data. This institution became a major center of scientific 
and technologic development.78  
 
The Travel Routes 
Mediterranean travel had already been mastered by the time of the Catholic 
Kings, at the end of the fifteenth century. There were several Portolan charts (the nautical 
maps) that, along with magnetic compasses, guided the sailors around the Mediterranean 
Sea. Pilots and cosmographers had identified and knew well the geography, especially the 
                                                
77 Archivo General de Indias, Catálogo de pasajeros a Indias durante los siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII (Sevilla: 
Imprenta editorial de la Gavidia, 1940). 
78 Antonio Barrera-Osorio, Experiencing Nature: The Spanish American Empire and the Early Scientific 
Revolution (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2006). 
	
 48 
areas along the shores. There were several well-supplied and frequently traveled routes 
that linked the Mediterranean with other regions, such as the Silk Road that went to Asia, 
or the routes that went to Jerusalem, a key destination for pilgrims.79  
The Portuguese were among the first Europeans to overcome the limits of the 
Mediterranean. Since the fifteenth century they had been exploring the African coast, 
seeking gold as well as new routes to India and Asia that bypassed the Muslims who 
controlled access to these profitable markets.80 The tale of Fernão Mendes Pinto, who in 
the sixteenth century travelled to India and China, and took part in the first Portuguese 
expedition that reached Japan, illustrates the Portuguese leadership in transoceanic 
exploration at the time.81 The groundbreaking geographical and technological 
developments of this small Atlantic kingdom were at the core of the European 
expansion.82 Once the Portuguese left the Mediterranean basin, there began an era of 
scientific and geographical discovery that led to intense transatlantic movement that 
radically transformed the world.  
Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos, who as we have seen travelled extensively across the 
globe, provides detailed directions and information about the shipping route from 
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Portugal to Asia, called the carreira da India. The ships departed from Lisbon, stopped in 
Madeira, and then passed by the Canaries and islands of Cape Verde. From that point, 
going straight to the cape of Good Hope was not possible because of the strong winds and 
currents that could easily push a ship to the Brazilian shores, which is how, in fact, Brazil 
was first reached. Therefore, ships had to perform complicated maneuvers heading south 
until they viewed the islands of Tristán de Acuña, located in the middle of the Atlantic 
Ocean about 450 leagues from Good Hope. From there, the vessels could finally sail East 
to the Cape. Afterwards, the Portuguese ships sailed up the coast of East Africa to 
Mozambique, and crossed the Indian Ocean to Goa, in India, a journey that could last two 
months. The next destination was Malacca in Malaysia; and from that port, the rest of 
Asia and the archipelagos was accessible. For example, it was possible to reach the 
kingdom of Cambodia and its homonymous river, which was “tan grande como el 
Marañón, río que nace a las espaldas del Cuzco, en las sierras de los Andes.”83 It was also 
possible to reach the gulf of Cochinchina, although Ordóñez de Cevallos suggested 
prudence because of the many shoals and rocks that made it necessary to employ local 
pilots.84 From this region, the Portuguese city of Macao off the coast of China was a 
relatively short distance. And if one were to continue sailing east through the various 
islands, they would finally arrive at the Philippines Islands.85 Thus, the perception of a 
globally connected world was born.  
For its part, the Spanish Monarchy very soon took control of the transatlantic 
routes to America. Although the initial expeditions to the New World were left mostly in 
the hands of private entrepreneurs, it did not take long for the House of Trade to step in to 
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regulate the travel and to define the routes for the American voyage, or the carrera de 
Indias, as it was called at the time. For logistical and military necessity, the House of 
Trade organized the travel around two fleets that went to the two American viceroyalties: 
New Spain and Peru.86 
The fleet system consisted in grouping merchant and passenger ships in a convoy 
protected by a large and heavily armed naval squadron. The purpose was to prevent ships 
from sailing alone and unprotected, making them easy prey for foreign pirates and 
corsairs, and to provide mutual support in the case of emergencies.87 A fleet could be 
quite large, for example, in 1589 it was composed of 94 ships. Although the fleet system 
was rigid and slow, it proved to be successful (especially from the logistical and military 
point of view). Historian Pablo Pérez-Mallaína claims that crossing the Atlantic was, 
overall, a safe journey. According to his data, 17,967 watercrafts floated in the carrera de 
Indias between the years 1504 and 1640. Of those ships, only 412 (2.29%) were lost in a 
wreck, while 107 (0.59%) were taken by pirates or corsairs. Moreover, he notes that 
during the sixteenth century, enemies of Spain did not capture a single fleet, and the 
destruction wreaked by the most famous corsairs (like Francis Drake and Richard 
Hawkins) was minor and peripheral, despite the English propaganda.88 
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The traditional understanding is that one large fleet sailed from Seville and, once 
in the Caribbean, split into the New Spain and the Tierra Firme fleets. However, 
following Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos—who in the third part of Viaje del mundo provides 
a detailed account of the routes, length and times of the transatlantic trip—as well as the 
descriptions and studies of modern scholars, it is clear that the two fleets were organized 
separately.89 The fleet bound for New Spain was scheduled to depart each spring, to 
avoid the hurricane season, but typically departed in the summer, in July. The second 
fleet, bound for Tierra Firme, was supposed to depart in August, to arrive right after the 
end of the rain season, but usually left Seville in the spring.90 Both fleets departed from 
Seville and followed similar routes. They sailed either from the port of Cadiz or from 
Sanlúcar de Barrameda (where the Guadalquivir river empties into the sea). Thence, the 
fleet voyaged to the Canaries (about 230 leagues away), a leg of the trip that lasted eight 
to ten days and involved passing through rough waters. It was a necessary stop for 
gathering water, wood, and other provisions indispensable to cross the Atlantic. Next, the 
fleet sailed south until the point of Cape Verde, where it turned west to catch the Trade 
winds, blowing East to West. This part of the journey lasted around a month, before the 
fleet reached a small island in the Antilles, called the Desired (about 830 leagues from the 
Canaries). After reposting, the ships would either sail for another month across the 
Caribbean to Veracruz on the mainland, if the destiny was New Spain, or they would sail 
South to Cartagena, which was about ten days away, and from there reach the port of 
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Portobelo in Tierra Firme and the viceroyalty of Peru. However, most often the fleet that 
went to Tierra Firme followed a slightly different path, and instead of going to the 
Desired island, crossed the Atlantic along a route further south that took it to the Lesser 
Antilles, near Trinidad and close to current-day Venezuela. These were mostly deserted 
islands where the ships could resupply before sailing to Cartagena, which was about 
fifteen days away.91 
Both fleets followed a similar return route. After two or three weeks sailing on the 
Caribbean Sea, they reached the port of Havana. Then, they took the Westerlies, the 
constant winds blowing West to East, and passed through the dangerous stretch of 
Bahamas. Upon reaching approximately 40 degrees of latitude north, they plotted a 
course towards Spain, usually passing by the Azores, the Portuguese archipelago that also 
served as a stopping point for the carreira. This last leg of the trip took around a month. 
If nothing went wrong, the New Spain fleet that departed the previous summer would 
return by the end of the following summer, after fourteen or fifteen months at sea. The 
Tierra Firme fleet, if it sailed at the beginning of the year or in spring, at the latest, might 
return by the end of the same year, before winter, in a round-trip journey lasting ten to 
twelve months.92 
Once people crossed the Atlantic, the journey continued for those going to Peru 
and Asia. Those traveling to Peru left from Portobelo and after a short, but extremely 
difficult, passage through the jungles, “que es el más mal camino del mundo,” reached 
the city of Panama and the Pacific Ocean or Mar del Sur (Southern Sea), as it was 
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known.93 The ships going to Callao in Peru and the other ports on the Pacific coast sailed 
from there. Navigating north from Callao to Panama could only take from two to three 
weeks, benefiting from winds and currents. Going south was much more difficult and 
could take as long as two months of sailing.94 This is why, most of the time, to avoid long 
and difficult journeys, travellers would often sail south only to Paita (north of current-day 
Peru). Thence, they traveled south to Lima overland for about two hundred leagues in 
forty days. This was not an easy journey either, as it mostly went through hot and arid 
deserts.95 
Lima was the hub from which the rest of South America was reached. The most 
important and travelled route was the one to Potosí. From there one could follow several 
Andean roads to destinations as far away as Buenos Aires on the shores of the Atlantic. 
The easiest way to reach the mining center of Potosí was by sailing south for about forty 
days from Lima to Arica. Once there, it was only about one hundred leagues overland to 
Potosí. In 1657, don Felipe Obregón, a neighbor and councilor of Potosí, informed the 
newly appointed president of Charcas, the marquis of Villagarcía, that the cost of this 
journey (from Seville to Potosí) for a person with a small entourage could easily reach 
25000 pesos, an enormous sum.96 
Transpacific journey was organized around the Manila Galleon, connecting once 
a year the Mexican western port of Acapulco with the Philippine port of Cavite in the bay 
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of Manila.97 Due to prevailing winds, this was a relatively short journey of about two 
months. The return voyage was much longer and more complicated. The ships had to sail 
north towards Japan (passing nearby Guam, the largest island of the Ladrones or 
Marianas), where they could pick up easterly winds and currents of Kuro-shio (also 
known as the Japan current, the corriente negra or black current), and from there, after 
five to six exhausting months, hit the coast of Northern California, eventually following 
the coastline south to Acapulco.98 
Although circumnavigation of the globe was shown to be possible by Ferdinand 
Magellan’s sixteenth century expedition, it remained something exceptional, undertaken 
mostly by outlaws or enemies of the Spanish Empire. Magellan’s route went through very 
risky passages that Iberian pilots and authorities preferred to avoid. Moreover, because of 
the Treaty of Tordesillas between the crowns of Portugal and Castile, and the subsequent 
division of the world, Spanish ships were not supposed to pass through Portuguese 
territories, even when the two crowns were united from 1580 to 1640. However, in 
exceptional circumstances this ban was overlooked, as when a large fleet was sent to the 
Philippines in the 1610s to rescue it from the Dutch attacks. This socorro sailed the 
African route, through Portuguese domains, stopping for provisions in Angola and 
passing by the Cape of Good Hope.99  
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Most of the time, people in the Philippines could not go to Europe through the 
Indian and African routes dominated by the Portuguese. Even if one were to accept Pedro 
Ordóñez de Cevallos’ journey (from the Philippines to Cochinchina, India, Africa, and 
Brazil) as real, one would have to acknowledge that such journey would have been, at the 
very least, extraordinary and highly impractical, the product of individual adventurism 
and fortuitous events. Most people in the Philippines going to Spain took the eastern 
route, across Mexico, and sailed on the fleet from Veracruz. 
Despite the optimistic data and general picture provided by Pérez-Mallaína, 
sailing across the Atlantic was, without a doubt, a harsh and long journey and experience 
for a traveler. For Ordóñez de Cevallos it was a trip “con mucho riesgo de la vida, y con 
excesivo gasto de la hacienda.”100 He clearly knew what he was talking about: when he 
was sailing back to Spain, his ship ran aground on the shores of the Cape San Antonio, in 
Cuba, where it broke up. This was “una desgracia grandísima” that forced him to abort 
his plans and to sail to New Spain, where “'llegué con hartas tormentas, y tormento por el 
poco dinero.”101 Diego Portichuelo de Rivadeneyra, attorney of Lima’s Metropolitan 
church and fiscal of the Inquisition, could also testify to the perils of the transatlantic 
passage. His Relación del viaje y sucesos que tuvo desde que salió de la ciudad de Lima 
retells the string of misfortunes and accidents suffered during his journey on board a fleet 
of galleons from Lima to Spain in October of 1654. They suffered two major shipwrecks 
(one in the Pacific Ocean and another in the Caribbean Sea), an assault by English 
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pirates, and along with these setbacks, of course, the loss of much of the precious cargo: 
the American silver that was being delivered to Spain.102 
Not only were such voyages dangerous, long, and expensive, but life on board 
was not easy, regardless of the social and economic position of the traveler. Eugenio de 
Salazar was a lawyer and a writer from Madrid, who, after serving for some years in the 
Audience of Galicia and in Madrid, in 1567 was appointed governor of the Canaries and 
in 1573, oidor of Santo Domingo. Once in America he served in various judiciary and 
academic positions in Guatemala and in Mexico. Finally, in 1599 he returned to Spain 
where he was named councilor in the Council of the Indies. In a letter to a friend, Salazar 
described the penuries of the transatlantic journey; it is one of the most vivid and 
compelling testimonies of early modern mobility.103 
From the beginning, the author states that sailing the Atlantic was a wretched 
experience: 
Qui navigant mare, enarrant pericula ejus. Los que navegan 
podrán contar los peligros del mar, dice el que mejor lo sabe. Y 
así, como hombre que por mis pecados he navegado, quise contar á 
vuestra merced los trabajos de mi navegación.104 
 
In the pages that follow, Salazar develops his argument and narrates the struggles of his 
journey. He graphically calls the ship a “casa del diablo.” One of the most difficult 
problems to deal with was seasickness. He writes that it was difficult to hold down the 
scant, and most of the time rotten and stinky, food. The long duration of the journey 
brought many other problems. People became bored, frustrated, and scared from only 
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looking at the sea and sky for weeks without end. It felt like time ceased, especially in 
such tight physical spaces, where there was not enough room and people were literally 
squeezed together. For Salazar, most of his travel companions were not the friendliest 
people. The former oidor describes them as hustlers, dishonest, and troublemakers. 
Additionally, there was always the real risk of running into pirates and other enemies and 
being robbed, kidnapped, and/or killed. Reaching the Desired Island was truly a moment 
of joy in which they could leave behind, at least for a short time, the dreadful ship and the 
ocean, because “en la mar no hay que esperar que el camino, ni la posada, ni el huésped 
se mejore; antes cada día es todo peor, y más enfadoso con el aumento de trabajos de la 
navegación.”105 
Salazar also dedicated several lines to describe the harsh life and behavior of the 
pilots and mariners. Their duties and activities on board were truly tough to bear; these 
men were constantly risking their lives. Climbing to the top of the mast, handling the 
heavy lines, anchors, or sails required a high degree of coordination and strength. The 
slightest error could result in injury or even death. This maritime world appeared to 
Salazar fascinating and secretive. Crewmen spoke in an unintelligible dialect, and it 
seemed that they had their own language. Salazar admitted to his friend that he “estaba 
embelesado mirando esta ciudad y los ejercicios de la gente de ella, y maravillado de oír 
la lengua marina ó malina.” Salazar was also impressed by the seamen’s order and rules. 
They followed their own, very strict, codes and hierarchy; and whatever the captain 
commanded, was obeyed instantly, without question.106 
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Despite the difficulties and dangers, many people, especially pilots, did cross the 
Atlantic on multiple occasions. Such was the case of Tomás de Larraspuru, who first 
sailed in 1608, and by the time he retired had made the transatlantic journey thirty-six 
times, a truly amazing figure.107 But sailors were not the only ones that came and went. 
While don Cristóbal García de Bocanegra was acting as corregidor of Gibraltar, the king 
ordered him to go to America with the armada. It was a quick trip, and about a year and 
half later he was serving again in Gibraltar.108 Likewise, although the trip to and from the 
Philippines (either sailing East or West) was, undeniably, a long and exhausting one, it 
did not deter people from making it, and sometimes on more than one occasion. Fernando 
de los Ríos Coronel, who despite being fully aware that the Philippines was “tan apartado 
de los ojos de Vuestra Alteza donde con tanta dificultad se va y se viene,” made three 
journeys between the archipelago and Spain between 1588 and 1624.109 Ríos Coronel 
was not alone in this kind of imperial mobility; there were many others who moved 
widely. Pedro Esteban Dávila wrote to the King in 1622, while serving as the governor of 
the island of Tercera, in the Azores, asking to be favored with the governorship of 
Philippines, where he served as lieutenant for a couple of years since 1616.110 Esteban 
Dávila did not get such appointment, but in 1632, after spending some time between 
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Madrid and Lisbon, he was appointed governor of Buenos Aires, where he traveled after 
crossing the Atlantic for the third time. 
Of course, just like many other things in the early modern Spanish Empire, the 
system of mobility that I have briefly sketched was fragile and unstable. Much of the 
routes and patterns described were something rather desired and always theoretical, and 
subject to many changes. Navigation was imprecise and ships did not always reach the 
intended destination. Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos had such an experience when he tried to 
navigate to Guayaquil from Acapulco, but ended up in the Philippines.111 As Elvira 
Vilches points out, the Atlantic was a contingent space that was impossible to fully 
measure and fix. This characteristic impacted the way the Atlantic world was perceived 
(the places and their people) as well as how the imperial enterprise was carried out.112 
There were always great levels of uncertainty and unpredictability, and alongside, of 
possibilities. For example, the captain Simon Estacio da Silveira proposed opening a new 
path that would make it feasible to reach Spain from Peru in only four months. His 
planned route would cross South America by the Marañón River, avoiding the dreadful 
land passage of Panama.113 Today we know that such corridor would be impossible 
because there are no rivers that cross through the Andes, but in the still obscure 
geography of the early modern world such an idea was still a much-desired possibility. 
Actually, there were several easier, and many times informal and illegal, routes. 
For instance, despite prohibitions, for several decades a direct commercial route linked 
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Manila with Lima.114 Likewise, officials going to Potosí were advised to sail directly to 
Buenos Aires and from there, travel overland to the mining center, avoiding the above-
described Panama route.115 Similarly, when Pedro Esteban Dávila was appointed 
governor of Buenos Aires, he sailed straight from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro, where he 
arrived only two months later.116 Ordóñez de Cevallos confirms that such route was “muy 
buen viaje y muy breve,” but ships usually did not get permission to go through it, “por 
no descomponer la carrera de Indias.”117  
There were, indeed, several unofficial routes beyond the official ones, established 
in efforts to ensure the crown’s direct control and monopoly. The early modern world 
was more mobile and flexible than historians had previously imagined. Scholars are 
beginning to trace, reveal, and unpack the many interactions, connections, routes, and 
movements that linked, literally, the whole world. The work of David Wheat breaks 
ground in this regard. Exploring the many direct links that in the seventeenth century 
connected the West African coast with Mexico, Wheat shows that there was a vibrant 
traffic (mainly motivated by the slave trade and contraband) that connected these Atlantic 
shores and did not necessarily pass through Europe. In fact, there were sailors specialized 
in designing complicated routes linking, for instance, Luanda in Angola, and Veracruz, 
the door to the Caribbean and New Spain.118 
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In a further work, Wheat expanded his scope and demonstrated the links between 
the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean Sea. Through the study of the fate of eight 
Mozambican musicians that once belonged to the Portuguese captain-major Diogo 
d’Azambuja de Melo, and who in 1594 were taken by force by the governor of Havana, 
Juan de Tejeda, Wheat shows that the Asian and American regions were far more 
connected than previously thought, and that many people traveled between those places. 
He emphasizes the idea that there were many binding ports in which the carreira (the 
Portuguese route to Asia) met with the carrera (the Spanish route to America) and in 
which many contacts and exchanges took place. Wheat claims that the maritime routes 
and cycles have been studied in isolation and that the connections between the slave, 
military, political, and commercial routes have been overlooked. Moreover, Wheat argues 
that the connections triggered by the union of the Spanish and Portuguese crowns from 
1580 to 1640 have been underestimated, and debunks the classic portrayal of this union 
as mere formal connections at the top of the political and legal structures.119 Wheat 
actually illustrates Sanjay Subrahmanyam’s argument that the Portuguese and Spanish 
empires were in constant interaction and were, indeed, composite and connected 
empires.120 
There are, in fact, several testimonies of such entanglements between the 
Portuguese and Spanish empires, which ultimately implied a global connection. In this 
regard, the Philippines played a crucial role; it was a hinge that brought together and 
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united very different worlds and societies. In 1616 Francisco de Lucena (a Portuguese 
nobleman and member of the Council of Portugal) sent a set of six letters to the captain 
of Mozambique, Ruy Melo de Sampaio, by way of the Philippines. Thus, Lucena first 
delivered the mail to Juan Ruiz de Contreras, a Secretary in the Council of the Indies, 
who arranged the proper circulation of the letters. Not only does this show the channels 
that existed between the Iberian possessions in Asia; but, in the letters there is an openly 
stated desire for more communication between the Portuguese viceroy of India and the 
Spanish governor of the Philippines.121 Amidst this archipelago converged all sorts of 
peoples, goods, languages, religions, and news. In 1615 an unknown royal official 
transcribed news that arrived in the Philippines not only from India, but also from 
Constantinople and even Flanders. The news dispatches informed about the military and 
political disputes that were taking place around the Indian Ocean between the Dutch, the 
English, the Portuguese, and the native authorities.122 This official and the Spanish 
authorities were well informed about what was going on in Asia and around the world. 
Looked through this prism it becomes difficult to conceive the Philippines as a region on 
the periphery. Quite to the contrary, it appears to have been a nodal point that made 
possible the global Spanish Empire. 
 
The Technology of Movement 
Evidently, geographical knowledge and geography itself greatly determined 
movement. Greg Bankoff argues that it is imperative to take into account geographical 
and meteorological circumstances to have a complete understanding of the imperial 
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practices and culture because “not only did the prevailing winds set the routes and 
therefore the form and extent of the imperium, but they also established the beat or pulse 
at which it operated.”123 The impact of geography in shaping the trading routes, the 
imperial enclaves and corridors, and therefore, the nature of the empires themselves 
should come as no surprise. However, and contrary to Bankoff, I am not arguing for a 
geographical over-determination.124 
Empires and the people who built those empires had different choices and opted 
for one or some of them, leaving aside other legitimate possibilities. Let us not forget 
that, ultimately, geography is about politics, too.125 For instance, the predominance of 
Lima over Buenos Aires as the official American port during the seventeenth century did 
not have much to do with geography, but with historical circumstances. As we have seen, 
getting to the Atlantic port was a lot easier, and from there it was also easier to reach 
Potosí, the mining center and source of the much-coveted American silver. Lima, 
established at the dawn of Spanish presence in South America, became the center of the 
viceroyalty because of political arrangements that gave this city—where the imperial 
institutions had been set—the monopoly on trade, which was fiercely defended by the 
powerful merchant’s guild.126 Different empires had more than just one enclave or 
possible route in the same region. In the Caribbean, the French, English, and Dutch 
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established themselves in what Spaniards considered minor and unimportant islands at 
the time, like Guadeloupe and Martinique. Empires were never closed nor fixed spaces. 
As Lauren Benton argues, there are many incongruences and exceptions in the 
geography-empires relationship.127 The early modern Spanish Empire was an extremely 
large, yet well connected polity. Geographical limitations were overcome and different 
regions were integrated under the Spanish Monarchy. The empire was built upon a 
continuous effort to master the geographical challenges and take advantage of the 
possibilities that arose. 
One example of such constant curiosity occurred in 1638 when the influential 
writers, humanists, and royal officials don Francisco de Calatayud y Sandoval and don 
Lorenzo Ramírez de Prado wrote to the king about the discoveries and possible 
inventions of Alejandro Quintilio, “doctor en destilar aguas y sacar quintas esencias.”128 
Calatayud and Ramírez were excited about the possibility of making a small device that, 
carried on board of the ships, could convert seawater into fresh water. The advantage and 
possibilities of an invention like this were huge, as a shortage of fresh water “ha visto 
llegar a último extremo de congoja los navegantes” and was indeed one of the main 
limitations and dangers of early modern navigation. They asked the king to set up a 
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proper board (led by them and another person expert on maritime issues) to discuss and 
experiment with that invention.129 
Moreover, in that same consultation Calatayud and Ramírez also made reference 
to other inventions proposed by Fernando Ríos Coronel to the Council of the Indies and 
the House of Trade. Ríos Coronel, besides being an incessant traveler, was a curious man 
and avid inventor. He asked permission to take a glazier and a watchmaker with him to 
the Philippines, as there were none in the archipelago.130 Because of his many voyages to 
the Philippines he was well aware of the difficulties of long-distance navigation. Already 
by 1598 he had presented an astrolabe of his own making, and written a book on the 
methods and techniques to properly measure distance and improve the accuracy of 
navigation charts.131 Ríos Coronel’s inventions were warmly welcomed by the pilots and 
courtiers, but especially by scientists, such as the renowned cosmographers, geographers, 
mathematicians, and inventors Juan Bautista Lavaña and Andres García de Céspedes.132  
During the early modern era, sea-faring explorers began to overcame 
geographical limitations thanks to major technological and scientific advancements 
emanating from Europe, especially the Iberian Peninsula, since the sixteenth century, and 
which built on a foundation established by medieval, particularly Muslim, navigators and 
scientists. New inventions, the recovery and refinement of classical theories, and the 
adaptation of medieval techniques made possible the impressive early modern global 
mobility. In fact, for authors ranging from Francis Bacon, Fernando Botero to Andres 
                                                
129 AHN, Estado, 674, N. 2 Lorenzo Ramírez de Prado and Francisco Calatayud to Philip IV, April 28, 
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131 AGI, Filipinas, 35, N. 15 “Carta de Ríos Coronel sobre el astrolabio” (Manila, June 22, 1598). 
132 AGI, Filipinas, 36, N. 22 “Petición de Riós Coronel sobre sus instrumentos de navegación,” 1608. 
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García Céspedes, the hallmark of the Renaissance was the newfound capacity of men to 
transcend the natural and geographical limits that had restrained human mobility for 
centuries. Evidence that humanity had entered a new age of mobility, an age of widening 
vistas of discovery and conquest, was represented by the novel possibility of sailing 
beyond the Pillars of Hercules, enabling governments to spread the Christian faith 
beyond Europe’s frontiers (Fig. 2 & 3). 
 
 
Figures 2 & 3. Left, frontispiece of Andrés García de Céspedes, Regimiento de navegación (Madrid, Juan 
de la Cuesta, 1606). Right, frontispiece of Francis Bacon, Instauratio Magna (London, Joannes Billius, 
1620). Both images depict a ship sailing beyond the Pillars of Hercules, the former limits of European’s 
known world, representing the great technological advancements of the time and the global mobility in 
which Europeans embarked. Clearly, Bacon’s image and worldvision were much influenced by Spanish 
mobility and imperial expansion. 
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One of the main difficulties of transatlantic and transpacific navigation was the 
lack of qualified people who possessed good knowledge of the ocean, the winds, the 
maritime currents, and geography. Officials complained constantly about this issue. In an 
ironic and desperate move, in 1616, Spanish authorities commissioned Francisco de 
Tejada and Antonio de Zúñiga, the officials charged with preparing the armada that was 
set to sail to the Philippines, to look in Andalusia and Portugal for Flemish pilots experts 
in sailing the Indian Ocean. The Council of the Indies hoped to hire expert pilots to sail 
around the Philippines’s sea in order to check rising Dutch influence in that region.133 
Similarly, members of the Council consulted with other officials the possibility of 
drafting Neapolitan sailors to go to the Philippines.134 
Only a handful of Europeans had experience and knowledge of sailing in this part 
of the world.135 Europeans had to rely on local and indigenous knowledge in order to 
succeed. Francisco de Tejada openly admitted this situation stating that even the most 
experienced pilots “no saben que ha habido piloto de alguna nación natural o extranjera 
que haya hecho el viaje desde Europa a Filipinas sin valerse de los pilotos de las Javas y 
Malaca para la navegación del archipiélago de San Lázaro a Manila.”136 In fact, European 
                                                
133 While Zúñiga did not have any luck and was unable to find a proper pilot, Tejada uncovered some 
names: Joan Bayesa, who lived in Sanlúcar de Barrameda and who spent more than 12 years navigating 
around China’s coastline. Tejada also got notice of a pilot who had been in China 28 years and was 
currently living in Talavera de la Reina. Finally, he was able to meet in Seville with a pilot from Bruges 
who had sailed around Sundaland (southeast Asia), and who could take with him another Dutch pilot who 
had arrived recently from India. AGI, Filipinas, 200, N. 21 “Carta de Francisco de Tejada sobre pilotos” 
(Sevilla, February 22, 1616); AGI, Filipinas, 200, N. 15 “Carta de Antonio de Zúñiga sobre buscar pilotos 
holandeses” (Lisboa, February 8, 1616); AGI, Filipinas, 200, N. 14 “Carta de Antonio de Zúñiga sobre 
buscar pilotos holandeses” (Lisboa, February 6, 1616). 
134 AGI, Filipinas, 200, N. 31 “Oficio de Ruiz de Contreras a Antonio de Aróstegui sobre leva de marineros 
en el extranjero” (Madrid, August 3, 1616). 
135 One of those pilots was the Portuguese Morera who was famous for having sailed to Asia on several 
occasions. He vainly claimed that passing through the Strait of Magellan was, in fact, something quite easy. 
AGI, Filipinas, 200, N. 46 “Carta del marqués de Salinas sobre piloto portugués,” September 11, 1616. 




movement and expansion was built upon centuries of Western knowledge in combination 
with native expertise. It was the integration of such local perspectives into the European 
mental, political, technological, economic, and social structures that configured the early 
modern world. 
It is usual for historians to skip over the importance of technology in the 
development of the early modern world. As John Law claimed some years ago in his 
study on early modern Portuguese long-distance rulership, a full understanding of the 
practice of early modern power requires studying the social, technological, economic, and 
political developments of the society. He argued that the Portuguese, in order to assert 
their authority in India, needed to be able to communicate back and forth between the 
metropolis and the imperial regions. To overcome distance and geographic limitations 
they developed a complex network and system of communication that allowed for the 
movement of people, documents, and devices. Law connected the practices of social and 
political control with the technological advancements of the time. Further, he argued that 
scientific development cannot be considered only as mere consequence of the imperial 
expansion, but rather, had its own history and exerted an impact on the development of 
the Portuguese empire itself. For him, the social, political, and technological processes 
were deeply intertwined and cannot be seen isolated. 
Law also emphasizes that the global expansion of the Iberian monarchies was not 
mere coincidence or luck, nor a one-man adventure. In fact, the mastering of ships, 
astrolabes, cartographic maps, and the training of the pilots who could use and integrate 
all of them, was the result of many people’s efforts, a combined set of actions and tryouts 
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over many years.137 It is worth to bear in mind that, as Jean-Paul Zúñiga argues, “no 
circulation is ever random. On the contrary, it is always determined by a series of 
cultural, geographical and/or economic circumstances, as well as by specific power 
relations.”138 Therefore, the new developments were contingent upon the particularities 
and history of the Spanish Empire itself. A clear example of this was the journey of 
Christopher Columbus. Contrary to myth, Columbus was not alone in thinking that the 
earth was round. In fact, the spherical earth hypothesis had become established scientific 
opinion by that time. The major criticisms and doubts about his project had to do with 
Columbus’s scientific calculations about the size of the Earth and whether the mission 
could succeed. Many people supported and lobbied for Columbus, including some very 
powerful, rich, and intelligent men. His journey was not the result of a single man’s 
dreams, but a collective enterprise where the scientific, economic, and political ambitions 
of many people converged.139 The transoceanic journeys were made possible by a new set 
of political, social, economical, military, and technological conditions that paved the way 
for the development of new ships and weapons during the sixteenth century.140 
                                                
137 John Law, “On the Methods of Long Distance Control: Vessels, Navigation, and the Portuguese Route 
to India,” in Power, Action and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge?, ed. John Law (London; Boston: 
Routledge, 1986), 234–263. 
138 Jean-Paul Zúñiga, “Visible Signs of Belonging : The Spanish Empire and the Rise of Racial Logics in 
the Early Modern Period,” in Polycentric Monarchies: How Did Early Modern Spain and Portugal Achieve 
and Maintain a Global Hegemony?, ed. Pedro Cardim et al. (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2012), 126. 
139 Mauricio Nieto Olarte, Las máquinas del imperio y el reino de Dios: reflexiones sobre ciencia, 
tecnología y religión en el mundo atlántico del siglo XVI (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, 2013), 25. 
140 The Italian historian Carlo Cipolla made this point many decades ago. He contended that European 
global expansion must be understood as a consequence of Europe’s naval superiority since the 1500’s, 
when new sailing and weaponry technologies appeared. Such technology broke the long-lasting equilibrium 
between Europe and the East and gave predominance to the Atlantic navies over the rest of the world. Carlo 
M. Cipolla, Cañones y velas en la primera fase de la expansión europea 1400-1700 (Esplugues de 
Llobregat: Ariel, 1967). Indeed, the Chinese also had the technology for a global expansion, but decided 
not to use it, see Felipe Fernández Armesto, Pathfinders: A Global History of Exploration (Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006), chaps. 4–5. 
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The early modern transatlantic ship was, certainly, among the technological and 
scientific marvels of its day, upon which the development of the empire depended. A 
state-of-the-art and complex device, its hull construction and sail configurations, along 
with the top-notch technology that it carried enabled early modern navigators to plot and 
follow a course and survive over long journeys in the midst of unknown, vast, and stormy 
oceans.141  
Pilots and scientists were constantly trying to innovate and to come up with newer 
inventions that could make sailing and life on board easier, faster, and more comfortable. 
One of the major advancements was the improvement in the ability of ships (and their 
crew) to harness the wind and heavy seas. The development of the lateen or triangular 
sail, to supplement the classic square one, which seriously limited a ship’s ability to point 
into the wind, allowed ships to point more sharply. Crosswind sailing proved extremely 
useful outside the Mediterranean where wind currents were less constant and predictable. 
The caravel, undoubtedly of Portuguese origin and used by Christopher Columbus 
on his journey to America, was a small ship with a stout hull that dominated the Atlantic 
during the sixteenth century. Despite being a relatively fragile ship, the caravel could 
reach high speeds (up to 8 knots) and, more importantly, follow a course sailing 
reasonably close-hauled, as against as possible to the wind, and because of its size it 
could confidently get close to shores of unknown depths.142 The galleon, a much larger 
ship with three masts and a combination of sails that made it manageable in all kinds of 
winds, was a response to the increasing demand for ships with greater capacity to 
transport more people and goods. It also had military advantages, as it was able to carry 
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more and heavier weapons. It quickly became the predominant ship sailing the carrera de 
Indias.143 
Along with the ships, various tools developed in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries sharpened the science of navigation. In order to successfully complete a 
transatlantic journey, pilots in open sea needed to determine their ship’s location, speed, 
and direction.144 Directionality had been resolved to a great extent by the compass, an 
instrument invented by medieval Mediterranean sailors, which points the magnetic north 
and gives pilots an accurate—although not precise, because of magnetic deviations—
indication of the ship’s direction. 
Speed was a more complicated parameter to measure precisely. Knowing the 
speed, however, was essential to calculate the distance traveled, which was necessary for 
determining the ship’s location. Pilots calculated speed by throwing into the water a chip 
log, a long line with a number of knots tied at uniform intervals and a weight at the end, 
which stayed relatively in the same place while the ship moved away. Then, pilots let the 
line run and counted the number of knots that passed during a given time. This is why a 
ship’s speed is measured in knots per hour. Currents and the movement of the water also 
affected the proper calculation of the speed, but the main problem with this method was 
measuring the passage of time. Accurate clocks that could be transported onto the ships 
had not yet been invented. Time on board was calculated with hourglasses, devices that 
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usually measured thirty- to sixty-minutes intervals, and were known to be inaccurate 
because of the movement of the ship, weather conditions, and failure of sailors to turn 
them over in due course.145  
The location of the ship was even still a more difficult problem to overcome, for it 
depended on accurate calculations of the ship’s orientation, speed, and distance traveled. 
To determine a ship’s location and place it on a chart, one must determine two variables: 
latitude and longitude. The first refers to the ship’s north-south position, and the latter to 
its east-west position. The calculation of these coordinates on open sea, where pilots 
could only see water and sky, was made by the observation of the sky and by determining 
the position of the celestial bodies. It was the combination of new and ancient techniques 
and knowledge, which for centuries had been preserved and expanded by Christian, 
Jewish and Arab scientists, mainly at the Iberian universities. 
European pilots had been calculating latitude for centuries by looking at the Pole 
star and determining its altitude in degrees. Although it was an old technique, measuring 
latitude was difficult to do on open sea, especially with bad weather and a rocking boat. 
Also, when sailing south the Equator (where the sky changes) it was necessary to get new 
points of reference. Early modern pilots mastered this practice and, using astrolabes, 
quadrants, cross-staffs, and complex astrological charts, were able to calculate the 
altitude of the sun, moon, and stars. 
The calculation of the ship’s longitude was the most difficult issue to resolve, and 
it was not until the eighteenth century that this problem was completely solved. To 
measure the ship’s distance to a meridian point, it is necessary to use another variable: 
time. The Earth makes a complete turn (360°) every twenty-four hours, thus each hour is 
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equivalent to 15°. If we know the difference of time between two points, we can calculate 
the longitude that separates them by multiplying the time difference by 15.146 Therefore, 
pilots needed to calculate the time at their point of departure and at their point of location. 
They did the first by keeping a record of the hourglasses, which were turned over every 
thirty minutes; they calculated the second, the local time, by periodically looking at the 
sky and determining the altitude of the sun and the stars. 
In order to make all these calculations useful, pilots had to locate their ships on 
nautical charts. These are essential tools developed by cosmographers using extensive 
information, which began to be collected during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
Imperial policies and rivalries affected the collection of the information and the 
production of maps and nautical charts. Spanish officials sought to gather such 
information but keep it as secret as possible. Maria Portuondo has shown the tension that 
existed between the practical need for disseminating geographical knowledge of the New 
World, so pilots could safely and easily reach the American ports, and the imperial 
strategy of keeping this information secret and out of the reach of Spain’s enemies.147 
Cosmographers had to rely on information supplied by pilots and other travelers, 
and there was much tension between the mapmakers and the users. There were heated 
debates on how to better represent a spherical world on a two-dimensional map, and on 
the accuracy of geographical and astrological measurements. While cosmographers 
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criticized pilots for their lack of education and ability to follow their markings, pilots 
accused cosmographers of lacking experience at sea.148  
In fact, there was a great deal of geographical information circulating around the 
Atlantic and the rest of the World. Many people, like Ordóñez de Cevallos, moved and 
wrote about their travel experiences. All these early modern chronicles, travel journeys, 
descriptions, and maps put the European reader closer to the distant and diverse regions. 
Reading these accounts allowed for the experience of travel and movement while sitting 
at home. This was very important, not just for leisure, but also for imagining and 
governing the far-flung empire. 
 
Representing the World 
There were many representations of the new and distant worlds, whether in the 
form of texts or drawings. In this context there was an emergence of the maps and the 
cartographic arts as powerful tools to describe and represent the world with its various 
regions. It was the capacity of maps to represent time and space in one plane, as Mauricio 
Nieto Olarte states, that made the world accessible everywhere. Now it was possible to 
take a tiny Asian or Caribbean island to Madrid. It was possible to put the whole world in 
just one place.149 
The Spanish Empire was at the forefront of this modern project. In 1500, Juan de 
la Cosa, a major cosmographer, politician and conquistador who was part of Columbus 
enterprise (he was the owner of one the three caravels that reached America in 1492), 
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drew the first map including America. Moreover, as we have already seen, the impressive 
mobility that made possible and connected the global empire depended on elaborated 
nautical charts that could guide pilots and their ships to their destinations. Most of these 
maps were kept secret, destroyed, or were lost and, unfortunately, few remain. However, 
we know of their existence and their importance for navigation and for the ruling and 
preserving the empire. The works of Alison Sandman and Ricardo Cerezo Martinez show 
the complexities of mapmaking. They explain the process of production and 
commercialization of charts (both legal and illegal), the main actors, and the most 
important charts that were made.150  
Along with nautical charts, there were other graphic representations of the world. 
They were less technical, but not less significant or impressive. Richard Kagan has 
explored the visual representations of the cities of the New World by European artists and 
cosmographers, most of whom came from northern Europe.151 Like others, Kagan agrees 
that the discovery of the New World brought increasing attention to the production of 
maps, something that has been linked to the development of European science. 
Nonetheless, Kagan contends that the majority of this cartography was not as scientific 
and objective as its practitioners pretended. Most of the production consisted of “maps of 
experience,” maps depicting the world in terms of the local audience.152 Therefore, it is 
not surprising that in the European Atlases, American cities were often represented as far 
off and exotic. Usually, the drawings did not match reality. They did not reflect change 
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over time. Kagan shows how the same images were used time and again and had the 
effect of projecting immobility, and even backwardness, over America. As an example, 
one of Francis Drake’s companions made the first image of Santo Domingo in 1585 and 
it was published in 1588. Then it was repeated, without changes and supposedly 
representing contemporary Santo Domingo, in 1599, 1671, 1681, and 1683, almost one 
hundred years later!153 
Additionally, these representations of the world served not only to define 
America, but also Europe, both in discursive and scientific senses. When European 
cosmographers began to represent the New World there was not a developed cartographic 
science. There were not many scientific maps of Europe and Europeans were still 
developing the new (more technical) methods for representing the world, which radically 
differed from medieval conceptions of time and space. At the same time, old forms and 
traditions endured. A nice example is Juan de la Cosa’s map. It graphically represents the 
recent lands discovered by the Europeans in their new transatlantic adventures. However, 
he followed the medieval and Mediterranean cartographic tradition and could not avoid 
also drawing lines representing wind flows over the Atlantic, which were without any 
basis and useless for navigation.  
The definition of maps and boundaries and limits were subject to negotiations that 
were far from being merely about science or geography. As we have already discussed, in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it was impossible to determine longitude with 
precision. This was particularly important when Castile and Portugal were trying to 
define the position of the ambiguous line of Tordesillas. In a sharp study, Seth Kimmel 
shows how the Spanish Monarch cleverly used inaccuracy in order to support his 
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imperial projects. Because longitude was ultimately defined through political negotiation 
rather than scientific calculation—although it was set on a scientific language—it 
provided room for multiple interpretations. The cartographic limitations set the limits, but 
also the possibilities of imperial enterprises, and imperial officials could profit from these 
inaccuracies.154 Scientific and logistical limitations set, indeed, the limits and boundaries 
of the Spanish Empire and of its possibilities. This ambiguity provided the conditions for 
the emergence of more flexible and porous language and imperial political practices. 
Ricardo Padrón, in his study of maps and visual and textual representations of the 
world, argues that in the early modern period there were mixed conceptions of space. The 
cartographic revolution was taking place at that time and as a consequence, the abstract 
notion of space—which could be positioned on a two (or even three) dimensional 
graphic—was not yet the norm. It coexisted with a medieval conception of space, a linear 
one, mainly linked with distance and time.155 These particular conceptions of space, 
distance, and time endured for several centuries. Syvlia Sellers-García argues that in 
eighteenth-century Central America distance was still measured in terms of space and 
time.156 Therefore, Padrón claims, Europeans were not only learning to draw maps, but to 
think cartographically. This kind of thinking made possible during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries a rationalized perception of the world, and a desire to hold it under 
just one political system. As David Inglis argues, Iberian elites began to think in global 
terms, and to place themselves within the world. They started to develop a sense of 
                                                
154 Seth R. Kimmel, “Interpreting Inaccuracy: The Fiction of Longitude in Early Modern Spain,” Journal of 
Medieval and Early Modern Studies 40, no. 2 (2010): 299–323. 
155 Ricardo Padrón, The Spacious Word: Cartography, Literature, and Empire in Early Modern Spain 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
156 Sylvia Sellers-García, “The Mail in Time: Postal Routes and Conceptions of Distance in Colonial 
Guatemala,” Colonial Latin American Review 21, no. 1 (2012): 77–99. 
	
 78 
“universum,” of belonging to the world. This came, of course, hand in hand with imperial 
desires of universal rulership.157  
Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos’ narration of his journey is a great example of such 
yearning for global dominion. By fitting into one book his expedition across the world, he 
put the distant regions on an equal footing, as part of the same unity, which was Spanish 
and Catholic. The world was seen as encompassed by the imperial enterprise. Ordóñez de 
Cevallos’s experiences of mobility, and those of thousands of imperial officials, were the 
proof and the foundation of the global articulation of the Monarchy. Because of the new 
technological and geographical advancements, he and many others began to perceive the 
world as one large but connected entity over which it was possible to travel, connect 
people and nations, and rule as a Catholic empire.
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Chapter Two: Imperial Networks of Patronage 
 
  
Me escribió mi padre como entendía que se 
hablaba en aquél viaje y que sus hijos los 
tenía para servir a Vuestra Majestad.1 
 
El capitán don Francisco de Gorbalán es una 
persona a quien por vasallo del señor Duque, 
mi sobrino, y criado antiguo de su casa 
tengo muy particulares obligaciones de 
asistirle en cuanto le pudiere valer.2 
 
Señor. Un paje tengo a Vuestra Señoría que 
he criado en casa, de buenas costumbres y 
con habilidad de bordar. Suplico a Vuestra 
Señoría reserve lugar para honrarle y 
admitirle en su servicio pues hasta llegar a 
las Indias no ha de tener costo a Vuestra 
Señoría.3 
 
Quando no tuviera las calidades que vuestra 
señoría ilustrísima en la suya dice, bastaría 
ser de mano de Su Majestad para que para 
mi tuviera todas las que pueden imaginar y 
todas ellas las encierra el nombre de criado 
de Su Majestad sin distinción de lugar ni 
puesto mayor o menor.4 
 
In 1657, Phillip IV appointed the Galician don Mauro de Mendoza Caamaño y 
Sotomayor, marquis of Villagarcía, as president of the Audience of Charcas in the 
viceroyalty of Peru, and home to the famous silver mines of Potosí. Although at first, the 
marquis—who did not have any previous experience in government and service to the 
king, nor direct links with America—accepted this unsolicited nomination, he eventually 
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declined the post, mostly due to the negative of his wife.5 His temporary appointment, 
however, left an unusual trail of private documents that allows us to see the inner 
workings of the patronage system.6 Villagarcía kept a well-organized folder with the 
documents he received on this matter, from congratulatory letters from clients, patrons, 
and friends, to more personal missives discussing the pros and cons of the nomination; 
information and notices about the post, the region, and the travel; and correspondence 
with the Council of the Indies.7 In other words, the collection of papers reveals the 
marquis’s network of patronage, the people that constituted it, and how he benefited from 
his clients and brokers. Moreover, this particular case gives us a glimpse into the 
relationship between husband and wife, and the private assessments and negotiations 
surrounding the transatlantic journey. These documents also show how various people, 
from acquaintances of the marquis to complete strangers eagerly offered to become his 
clients, and how they helped him extend his network into America, a region completely 
foreign to him.8 
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network of clientage. María del Carmen Martín Rubio, El marqués de Villagarcía, virrey del Perú (1736-
1745) (Madrid: Polifemo, 2010), 37–38; Jaime Contreras, El Santo Oficio de la Inquisición en Galicia, 
1560-1700: Poder, sociedad y cultura (Madrid: Akal, 1982), 208–231. 
6 Although scholars of the early modern Spanish Empire have access to large and very rich archives, most 
of the documents held in them have an official origin or purpose. Personal and private documentation 
remain relatively scant. A major exception is Enrique Otte, Cartas privadas de emigrantes a Indias, 1540-
1616 (Sevilla: Consejería de Cultura, Junta de Andalucía; Escuela de Estudios Hispano Americanos de 
Sevilla, 1988). 
7 The labeling of the letters, as well as some side annotations, suggest that it was the marquis himself who 
organized and kept the letters. 
8 AHN, Estado, L. 210 “Cartas de enhorabuena a D. Mauro de Mendoza Camaño y Sotomayor, Marqués de 
Villagarcía, nombrado Presidente de Charcas.” 
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In this chapter I will discusshow networks of patronage worked and how they 
impacted the global mobility of imperial officials. Patronage networks were 
indispensable to itinerant officials who relied on their clients, patrons, and brokers—
whether they were Spaniards or natives from across the world—to help them govern 
distant regions by gathering resources and information, and implementing their 
objectives. I analyze how families built and sustained networks of imperial patronage and 
how they coped with the officials’ mobility. These personal networks, constructed upon 
kinship and local community ties, eventually extended globally and were embedded 
within the imperial networks of royal service and patronage, allowing the king to 
consolidate his authority. 
In recent years, historians have begun to acknowledge the centrality of the 
patronage system in configuring the government of the Spanish Empire. Patron-client 
relations were, perhaps, the most important mechanism holding the empire together, and 
making possible the preservation of the social order and the king’s authority. The 
personal ties of loyalty, based upon ideals of service and gratitude—as well as 
magnificence and gift giving—were essential to a hierarchical political system that was 
conceived as a political body, with the king at its center, as its head.9 In this regard, the 
language used by officials provides a map for decoding how patronage was articulated 
and understood. Thus, a careful and close reading of the texts is needed, paying attention 
to seemingly insignificant details, such as the words and manners used by people to 
communicate, the consistency of their use, and the moments in which some expressions 
                                                
9 Sharon Kettering, Patrons, Brokers, and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986); Salustiano de Dios, Gracia, merced y patronazgo real: la Cámara de Castilla 
entre 1474-1530 (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1993); Linda Levy Peck, Court Patronage 
and Corruption in Early Stuart England (London; New York: Routledge, 1993), 1–29; Cañeque, The 
King’s Living Image, chap. 5. 
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were privileged over others. Clients and patrons expressed their desires, gave orders, and 
requested or granted favors and bounty using a sophisticated and grandilocuent set of 
expressions.10 As a result, historians have begun to pay greater attention to the patronage 
networks interwoven into the daily lives of early modern people.11 
Most patronage studies of the period, however, focus on concrete and well-
defined geographical areas and are thus locally oriented. Theses dense local networks 
have been described largely in isolation from the wider network of connections spanning 
the empire. Furthermore, although it is accepted that outsiders, such as the constantly 
moving imperial officials, were quick to integrate or even to create their own local 
networks, a situation which the crown tried to avoid and prevent, the mechanisms by 
which people with little or no experience or knowledge of a society interacted with 
complicated local networks are seldom explained.12 
                                                
10 Antonio Feros, “Clientelismo y poder monárquico en la España de los siglos XVI y XVII,” Relaciones 
19, no. 73 (1998): 17–49; José Martínez Millán, “Introducción: La investigación sobre las elites del poder,” 
in Instituciones y elites de poder en la Monarquía Hispana durante el siglo XVI, ed. José Martínez Millán 
(Madrid: Ediciones de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 1992), 11–24. 
11 See, for example, Tamar Herzog, La Administración como un fenómeno social: la justicia penal de la 
ciudad de Quito, 1650-1750 (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1995), chap. 6; Christoph 
Rosenmüller, “The Power of Transatlantic Ties: A Game-Theoretical Analysis of Viceregal Social 
Networks in Colonial Mexico, 1700-1755,” Latin American Research Review 44, no. 2 (April 2009): 7–36; 
Yun Casalilla, Las redes del imperio; José Martínez Millán, “La articulación de la Monarquía Hispana a 
través del sistema de cortes,” Fundación no. 12 (2014): 32–64; Christoph Rosenmüller, “‘Corrupted by 
Ambition’: Justice and Patronage in Imperial New Spain and Spain, 1650–1755,” Hispanic American 
Historical Review 96, no. 1 (2016): 1–37. 
12 James Casey argues that the king appointed viceroys with strong local connections, which ensured a 
successful government, because “a viceroy who was a complete outsider and who could not or would not 
get involved in personal dealings, was heading for financial and emotional disaster.” Although he is mostly 
thinking on Spain, this leaves the question open regarding the American case in which, most oftenly, the 
newcomers had none or very few linkages. James Casey, “Some Considerations on State Formation and 
Patronage in Early Modern Spain,” in Patronages et clientelismes, 1550-1750: France, Angleterre, 
Espagne, Italie, ed. Charles Giry-Deloison and Roger Mettam (Villeneuve d’Ascq; London: Centre 
d’histoire de la région du Nord et de l’Europe du Nord-Ouest; Institut Francais du Royaume-Uni, 1995), 
109. Moreover, some scholars have argued that the eighteenth-century Bourbon Reforms aimed to rein in 
local elites’ power, who during the previous centuries had taken over the political and judiciary structures 
of American government, weaking the authority of the king, see Mark A. Burkholder and D. S. Chandler, 
From Impotence to Authority: The Spanish Crown and the American Audiencias, 1687-1808 (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 1977). 
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The key to this swift integration, I argue, rested in the imperial and global nature 
of those networks. On the one hand, most imperial officials nurtured multiple connections 
that transcended local frontiers and linked them with far-away provinces, most 
importantly with the royal court, but also with other regions of the empire. On the other 
hand, these officials also relied on the established official networks of the empire. 
Imperial officials, by combining personal and imperial networks, were able to gather 
information about people and events across the globe, and exert their own influence on 
them. Thus, the operation of the empire rested upon communication among a diverse, 
overlapping collection of networks linking distant and geographically disconnected 
regions. The quantity and quality of knowledge managed by government officials, and 
the ease and swiftness with which they transmitted the information from one side of the 
empire to the other, speaks to the sophistication of system. When officials stepped foot 
for the first time on distant and strange land, already they had in place a web of contacts 
and knowledge that shaped their behavior. 
Moreover, as several scholars have already pointed out, these networks 
strengthened the power of the king and his authority in this far-flung polity. The monarch 
was the primary source and distributor of the favors and gifts, regardless of the many 
intermediaries that might intervene. By the seventeenth century, the king had become the 
most important and major patron, progressively displacing the nobility, which also grew 
dependent on his favors.13 Service to the king became the door to royal bounty, and in the 
                                                
13 Feros, “Clientelismo y poder monárquico,” 36–41; Antonio Feros, Kingship and Favoritism in the Spain 
of Philip III, 1598-1621 (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 264; Antonio 
Terrasa Lozano, “Por la polémica gracia del Rey Universal. Las mercedes por servicios de Felipe III en el 
reino de Portugal: debates y conflictos,” in Servir al Rey en la monarquía de los Austrias, ed. Alicia 
Esteban Estríngana (Madrid: Sílex, 2012), 303–304; Kettering, Patrons, Brokers, and Clients, 224, 232–
237; Sharon Kettering, “The Decline of Great Noble Clientage during the Reign of Louis XIV,” Canadian 
Journal of History/Annales Canadiennes d’Histoire 24, no. 2 (August 1989): 157–177. This is not to say 
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seventeenth century almost the whole of society took part in one way or another in 
serving his majesty. In this way, more and more individuals, families, and networks 
became linked to the Monarchy, their economic, social, and political development, as 
well as their identities, directly depended on their service to the king across the vast 
empire. 
In this chapter, the practices of patronage will be analyzed in close detail. First I 
will study the connection between patriarchy and patronage, and the internal negotiations 
and configurations within the family of a mobile official. Then, I will look at the insertion 
of families within the imperial structures of patronage, the global articulations of those 
familial and imperial networks, and finally, the reliance of officials on clients, brokers 
and patrons for governing. The culture of patronage can only be understood by looking at 
pieces of evidence of its actual social practice, and by examining its language—jargon, 
expressions, titles, etc.—which isolated and out of context, would lack any meaning.14 
Clifford Geertz coined the term “thick description” to describe an ethnography that 
decodes the “stratified hierarchy of meaningful structures” that give sense to human 
actions, from twitches and winks to parodies. These actions are never fully coherent or 
rational, but acquire a meaning within their cultures. One must reason abstractly from the 
peculiar and incomplete cases in order to form a thick description of what lies beneath 
them. This methodology allows for exposing the “webs of significance” in which humans 
                                                                                                                                            
that there was a weakening or elimination of the power of the nobility, but that it was incorporated into the 
royal and imperial apparatus. In fact, the political system was based upon the idea of multiple poles of 
power. See, Hespanha, La Gracia del derecho, 307–310.  
14 In this regard, it is important to follow Sharon Kettering’s admonition to study the actual practices of 
patronage, and not look solely to the language deployed, because “patrons and clients sometimes wrote one 
thing and did another.” Sharon Kettering, “Patronage in Early Modern France,” French Historical Studies 
17, no. 4 (1992): 851. 
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beings live.15 Patronage, which was firmly enrooted in the major political activities as 
well as in the daily and quotidian familial interactions, constituted one of these webs spun 
by men and women, which articulated human actions and gave them sense. Patronage, 
was essential and constitutive of the early modern Spanish culture. Its patterns and rules 
defined relationships and behavior, and fundamentally shaped society. These 
asymmetrical patronage relationships affected every sphere of life in the early modern 
Spanish world, from economics to politics to culture to, evidently, the personal and 
intimate lives of subjects. 
 
The Networks of the Marquis of Villagarcía  
The news of the 1657 appointment of the marquis of Villagarcía as president of 
Charcas circulated immediately. Although don Mauro normally resided in Galicia with 
his wife and family, at the time he was staying in the imperial court where, in the 
company of his son, don Antonio, he served as a representative of Galicia in the Cortes, 
General Assembly, of Castile. It did not take long before letters from all parts of the 
peninsula began to arrive in Madrid. Villagarcía had himself informed many people about 
his nomination, while others received the news through other channels, including short 
letters, local gossip, and informal talk. Unfortunately, their ephemeral nature makes such 
documents difficult to locate, and thus many of the personal exchanges are unavailable to 
contemporary historians. 
Between October of 1657 and January of 1658, the marquis received at least 
forty-four letters, seventeen of which were informative and pragmatic (i.e., related to 
business and travel affairs), and twenty-seven were congratulatory letters from his circle 
                                                
15 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 5, 7. 
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of friends, relatives, and clients.16 As was common, the letters—especially the 
celebratory ones—were written in a language that would seem dense and stilted by 
today’s standards. The correspondents expressed joy for the unsought appointment, and 
wished him well in his upcoming endeavor. In several cases, people lamented, in 
dramatic tones, that the office was so far away from Spain and, thus, “habérsenos de 
alejar tanto Vuestra Señoría.”17 As discussed in the first chapter, the notions of distance 
played an important role in the imagination of the inhabitants of the Spanish empire, and 
many truly feared it. The list of people who congratulated the marquis was long and 
varied, suggesting the range and variety of Villagarcía’s relationships. He took part in 
several patronage networks, acting sometimes as patron and others as client.  
The correspondence of the marquis makes evident the importance of the ties of 
paisanaje (fellow countrymen) in his life and career. Most of don Mauro’s 
correspondents were from Galicia. They appear to have been his friends and comrades. 
Such was the case even with the important and powerful cardinal Sandoval, archbishop of 
Toledo, who was born in Santiago de Compostela in 1589, around the same time as the 
marquis. The two men had common childhood and adolescent experiences, and were 
probably related.18 Sandoval was the first person to congratulate the marquis by letter, 
and in the missive addressed him in reverential terms, even calling him “Señor mío.”19 
However, it is highly unlikely that the most important cardinal of Spain was a client of 
                                                
16 For a list of all the letters see Appendix 1. 
17 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 3 Benito de Aguiar, “Enhorabuena de don Benito de Aguiar, camarero del 
cardenal Sandoval” (Toledo, October 9, 1657). Likewise, the nun Juana de San Miguel begged the marquis 
to carefully evaluate if such long and complicated journey was worthy. AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 14 
“Enhorabuena de sor Juana de San Miguel” (Vista Alegre, October 25, 1657). 
18 Don Mauro was born in Villagarcía in 1594, and both Sandoval and Villagarcía were related to the 
Galician Ossorio family. 




the marquis. In this case, an expression such as “my lord” did not indicate a relationship 
of clientage; instead, Sandoval was using the rhetoric of patronage to signal respect and 
familiarity.20 Theirs was a bond of friendship. The fact that patronage was expressed 
using a language of friendship—and also, the other way around, as in the above-
mentioned case—further complicates our understanding of these bonds. As Sharon 
Kettering, a historian of seventeenth-century French patronage, notes, patronage and 
friendship were closely related, but different types of personal relationships. While 
patronage could evolve from friendship, not all friends engaged in patronage, nor were all 
clients friends. Moreover, friendship was less dependent on obligatory favors and 
retributions.21 Nonetheless, as will be seen shortly, the early modern practices and 
understandings of friendship spawned powerful ties that provided legitimacy to the whole 
political system. 
The culture and language of patronage also informed family structure. It was the 
father—the head of the family—who held the role as first patron.  The father was duty-
bound to take care of and reward the other members of his family. In this respect, 
patronage was closely related to patriarchy. According to Kettering, “the role of the 
patron was modeled on that of the patriarchal father [...] and the role of client on loyal, 
                                                
20 Also, the servants of the cardinal rushed to congratulate Villagarcía, showing that the acquaintance of 
these men also meant a relationship with their retainers. Aguiar, “Enhorabuena de don Benito de Aguiar”; 
AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 5 “Don Diego de Vera, secretario de cámara del cardenal Sandoval” (Toledo, 
October 9, 1657); AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 21 “Enhorabuena de Don Rodrigo de Mandía y Parga, obispo 
de Siria, maestre escuela de Salamanca” (La Comarca, October 31, 1657). 
21 Sharon Kettering, “Friendship and Clientage in Early Modern France,” French History 6, no. 2 (1992): 
139–158. As it will be shown in the next chapter, Neostoicism was at the core of early modern Spanish 
thought and friendship was deemed as one of the most important, valuable, and pure of the relationships for 
the Stoics. See Cicero, On Friendship (various editions). On early modern friendship see Maurice Aymard, 
“Friends and Neighbors,” in A History of Private Life, ed. Roger Chartier, vol. 3: Passions of the 
Renaissance (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press, 1989), 447–492. 
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obedient family member and servant.”22 Bianca Premo has defined patriarchy as the 
“belief that multiple individuals—male and female, young and old— were naturally 
subordinate to an authority figure, usually a male based on the hierarchical model of the 
Western family.” The basic structure of patriarchy, in which an authority figure watched 
over his dependents, shaped power relations throughout the empire, not only in the 
family, but it structured the whole of the Spanish Empire, “with the king taking the role 
of father.”23  
Early modern societies were built upon pacts among elite men, which helped to 
foster the rule of the men and the father and the submission of women and children.24 
Through these arrangements, men attempted to control families, as well as material 
resources and the paths to political positions and authority. The king as “father” was an 
ideological construction sustained by his ability to reward and protect his “children.” 
                                                
22 Sharon Kettering, “Patronage and Kinship in Early Modern France,” French Historical Studies 16, no. 2 
(1989): 430. 
23 Bianca Premo, Children of the Father King: Youth, Authority, & Legal Minority in Colonial Lima 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 9–10. A similar argument was conveyed by Julie 
Hardwick for the case of France, The Practice of Patriarchy: Gender and the Politics of Household 
Authority in Early Modern France (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998). 
However, Kimberly Gauderman argues against the use of the concept of patriarchy, which tends to depict 
the power and authority of men as unchallenged, while also presenting women as powerless and completely 
dominated. In her view, patriarchy is not helpful for understanding the social and familial dynamics of the 
early modern Spanish world, in which power was, in fact, decentered, and subject to multiple and constant 
negotiations; Women’s Lives in Colonial Quito: Gender, Law, and Economy in Spanish America (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2003), 11–15. 
24 Sarah Hanley, “Engendering the State: Family Formation and State Building in Early Modern France,” 
French Historical Studies 16, no. 1 (1989): 4–27; Julia Adams, “The Rule of the Father: Patriarchy and 
Patrimonialism in Early Modern Europe,” in Max Weber’s Economy and Society: A Critical Companion, 
ed. Charles Camic, Philip S. Gorski, and David M. Trubek (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 
2005), 237–266; Aurelio Espinosa, “Early Modern State Formation, Patriarchal Families, and Marriage in 
Absolutist Spain: The Elopement of Manrique de Lara and Luisa de Acuña y Portugal,” Journal of Family 
History 32, no. 1 (2007): 3–20. Carole Pateman contends that eighteenth-century European philosophers 
proposed a new model of society, forged upon a fraternal patriarchy in which men killed the ‘father’ and 
stripped him away from his political power. Women became subjugated by men because they were men, 
and not because they were fathers. Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, Calif: Stanford 
University Press, 1988), 77–115. This particular form of patriarchy appears clearly in pre-Revolutionary 
Mexico. The horizontal ties and relations among relatively equal men (more than the vertical links) served 
to configure and express the Mexican “social logic of masculinity,” see Steve J. Stern, The Secret History 
of Gender: Women, Men, and Power in Late Colonial Mexico (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1995), 152–189. 
	
 89 
Thus, patriarchy was the ideology behind the hierarchical society, while patronage—and 
the bonds it generated—was both an expression of such hierarchies and a political 
mechanism that facilitated such an unequal society and prevented social conflict and 
unrest from boiling over.25 
Some of the strongest and most important ties of patronage appeared among 
neighbors and kinsmen. Relatives of the marquis of Villagarcía soon manifested their joy 
for the nomination. His nephew, the marquis of Arcos, who was also an imperial official 
serving in the African fortress of Ceuta, wrote a warm letter celebrating the 
appointment.26 It is important to note that family was understood in a very broad sense 
rather than in the narrow contemporary conception of parents and children. Members of 
the family included, of course, the grandparents, but also the uncles and aunts, the 
cousins, the nephews, and, very importantly, the in-laws. Moreover, there was an 
awareness of the familial branches and connections. Even very distant relatives were 
thought of as part of the family.27 No doubt the family was the primary source of identity 
in the early modern Spanish world, as well as the most immediate source of assistance 
and patronage. 
                                                
25 José María Imízcoz argues that patronage was concomitant to inequality and one of the most effective 
mechanisms of social control, “La relaciones de patronazgo y clientelismo. Declinaciones de la desigualdad 
social,” in Patronazgo y clientelismo en la Monarquía Hispánica (siglos XVI-XIX), ed. José María Imízcoz 
and Artola Renedo Andoni (Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco, Servicio editorial, 2016), 19–28. 
26 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 22 “Enhorabuena del marqués de los Arcos y de Tenorio, señor de la casa de 
Sotomayor, gobernador y capitán general de Ceuta” (Ceuta, October 31, 1657). 
27 Alida Metcalf, while recognizing the difficulty of defining precisely ‘family,’ distinguishes between the 
larger family and the household. The latter refers to the people actually living together in the same space 
and at the same time. Family is a more ample concept, as it includes people who might have left the 
household, and even kin not biologically related. Alida C. Metcalf, Family and Frontier in Colonial Brazil: 
Santana de Parnaíba, 1580-1822 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), 13. Likewise, Naomi Tadmor 
unravels how people in eighteenth-century England spoke and thought of their families. She departs from 
polarizing and simplifying perspectives that have defined families as either ‘nuclear’ or ‘extended,’ to 
argue, instead, that there existed simultaneously contrasting understandings of what a family was. Naomi 
Tadmor, Family and Friends in Eighteenth-Century England: Household, Kinship, and Patronage 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001).  
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Nonetheless, we should differentiate familial relationships from patronage 
relationships.28 Kettering contends the two are easily confused but distinct; patronage, 
like family, involved  “overlapping, personal bonds, but clientage was a separate 
relationship in a kinship-dominated society.” While these two linkages relied on the same 
language and values, and in many ways clienteles acted as artificial kinship, not every 
family tie evolved into patronage, and not all of the clients were kin. Moreover, whereas 
kinship was an involuntary, permanent, and formal relationship that imposed obligations, 
patronage was “informal, voluntary, [and] often impermanent.”29 
The marquis’s private correspondence allows us to explore his private 
relationships, and in doing so, analyze how the culture of patronage and mobility defined 
them. Among the collection of letters, two are written by the marquise, doña Antonia de 
Caamaño Mendoza (niece of don Mauro and lady of Rubianes), to her husband.30 In the 
exclusively male world of Spanish imperial officialdom, letters by women are rare; only 
men held offices, and mostly men wrote the official documentation.31 However, on this 
                                                
28 José Martínez Millán criticizes the false and simple equation of family networks with patronage ones, 
and those studies that claim to be about patronage, but which really are genealogical. “Las investigaciones 
sobre patronazgo y clientelismos en la administración de la Monarquía Hispana durante la edad moderna,” 
Studia Historica. Historia Moderna no. 15 (1996): 103.  
29 Kettering, “Patronage and Kinship in Early Modern France,” quotations in 409 and 432. 
30 Doña Antonia was the daughter of José Caamaño y Figueroa and Ana María de Caamaño y Mendoza, 
sister of don Mauro. RAH, Salazar y Castro, 9/294, f 233 “Costados de Antonio de Mendoza Sotomayor, 
Camaño y Camaño, Andrade y Camaño, II marqués de Villagarcía.,” n.d. 
31 Nonetheless, this is not to deny that noblewomen played also an important role in the networks of 
patronage and they also could act as patrons and brokers, see Sharon Kettering, “The Patronage Power of 
Early Modern French Noblewomen,” The Historical Journal 32, no. 4 (December 1989): 817–841. 
Likewise, many women wrote to the king asking to be rewarded claiming benefits in their condition of 
widows, daughters, mothers, or sisters. See, for example, AHN, Consejos, 4409, N.185 “Doña Maria de 
Guzman, viuda de Juan del Castillo, merced de 45 mil pesos de por vida” (Madrid, October 23, 1583); 
AGI, Indiferente, 759 “Refiere los servicios del marido, padre y suego de doña Jacinta March de Castelví” 
(Madrid, March 16, 1636); AGI, Santo Domingo, 2, N. 47 “Sobre la pretensión de la condesa de Peñalba” 
(Madrid, August 17, 1654); AHN, Consejos, 13619, N. 39 “Petición de doña María de Peralta y Cárdenas a 
la reina” (Madrid, March 31, 1675). For other examples of private letters from women see Otte, Cartas 
privadas de emigrantes a Indias; M. Mónica Ghirardi and Jaqueline Vassallo, eds., tres siglos de cartas de 




occasion we can gain a sense of how a woman understood the transatlantic journey, the 
networks that she established, and how she influenced the official’s mobility. These 
documents are powerful and illustrative portrayals of the internal negotiations and 
challenges for a couple facing such passage, as well as the familial nature of patronage, 
and how patronage culture was also shaped by family interactions and negotiations. Since 
the available letters expose the progression of the marquis’s decisions with regards to his 
journey, it is further possible to get a sense of how much his wife and closest retainers 
influenced his resolution to step back and reject the post he had initially accepted. 
Before analyzing the marquise’s letters, it is worth looking at the role played by 
the marquises’ chaplain, the Inquisitor don Pedro de Navia. As already noted, early 
modern families encompassed many more members than just those related by blood, or 
even inhabiting under the same roof. Such was the case of this confessor, who despite not 
being a direct relative to the Villagarcías and living in a different town, he greatly 
impacted on the family’s development. Patronage and spiritual bonds could be as forceful 
as kin. In the early modern world the chaplains, confessors, and/or spiritual advisors were 
figures of special importance. They were present everywhere, from the noble households 
to the most humble villages. However, we still know very little about them. While there 
are some important works on the royal confessor, there is almost nothing written on the 
large number of private and domestic confessors.32 The royal confessor was one of the 
                                                
32 On the king’s confessors, and specially on their involvement in Spanish politics see Henar Pizarro 
Llorente, “El control de la conciencia regia: El confesor real Fray Bernardo de Fresneda,” in La corte de 
Felipe II, ed. José Martínez Millán (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1994), 149–188; Jaime Contreras Contreras, 
“La conciencia real: ¿confesor o ministerio?,” in Política y cultura en la época moderna (cambios 
dinásticos, milenarismos, mesianismos y utopías), ed. Alfredo Alvar Ezquerra, Jaime Contreras Contreras, 
and José Ignacio Ruíz Rodríguez (Alcalá de Henares: Universidad de Alcalá de Henares, 2004), 491–505; 
María Amparo López Arandia, “El confesionario regio en la Monarquía Hispánica del siglo XVII,” 
Obradoiro de historia moderna no. 19 (2010): 249–278; María Amparo López Arandia, “El guardián de la 
conciencia. El confesor del rey en la España del siglo XVII,” in Iglesia, poder y fortuna: clero y movilidad 
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closest and most influential advisers to the king. Not only did he have intimate and daily 
interactions with the monarch, but he was the conscience of the king. As his moral guide, 
his duty was to remind the king of what was just and fair, and judge him according to 
divine law.33 Because the king impersonated the polity, there was nothing private about 
the king’s actions. Thus, the royal confessor was also a political advisor, and he had the 
right and duty to counsel the king in all of his decisions. These were no minor powers. 
Not surprisingly, royal confessors participated in and developed their own networks of 
patronage, and actively took part in the government of the empire.  
From our knowledge of the king’s confessor role, we can extrapolate the 
functions of the domestic chaplains. Almost every noble household had a chaplain in 
residence who became a major component of their family. Chaplains were not only moral 
advisors, but also political and economic agents. In fact, of all the marquis of 
Villagarcía’s kept letters, the first two were written by his chaplain, who was also 
archdeacon of Mendo and canon at the cathedral of Santiago, where he resided. The first 
letter was addressed to the marquis, while the second was to doña Antonia. In those two 
letters, the importance of the chaplain as an advisor to both of the spouses was clearly 
manifested. He was the lady’s confidant, and also her interlocutor in front of her husband. 
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Additionally, don Pedro de Navia acted as the couple’s administrator and took care of 
several of their businesses. 
In his first letter to the marquis, on October 7, don Pedro de Navia openly 
expressed his doubts and confusion about the marquis’s decision to embark on the 
journey. He worried about the possible harmful consequences to doña Ana and their 
children. In a clear manifestation of their high degree of intimacy, the chaplain also told 
the marquis that “no sé lo que sentirá de él mi señora la marquesa, pero entiendo se 
conformará siempre con el dictamen de vuestra señoría.” He felt with the liberty, and 
perhaps the obligation, of speaking on behalf of the marquise. Moreover, don Pedro 
confirmed that the lady, who had remained in their town of Vista Alegre in Galicia while 
the marquis went to the Cortes in Madrid, had received the letters don Mauro wrote her. 
He was an intermediary between the spouses and affirmations like, “por el suyo [the 
marquise mail] incluso sabrá vuestra señoría que [she] goza salud,” even suggest that he 
had access to their communications.34 
The following day, the chaplain wrote to the marquise.35 In this letter he also 
discussed his fears and perplexity about the marquis’ appointment. He told her about the 
rumors that were hastily circulating in the city of Santiago. Everyone had an opinion of 
whether don Mauro should or should not go to America. Some affirmed that this was a 
position of such importance that it could not be turned down, while others (amongst 
whom was don Pedro) feared the journey because Las Charcas was “lo más lejos que 
tiene las Indias.” He also had talked with the canon don Sancho de Arango and with don 
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Santiago” (Santiago, October 7, 1657). 
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Francisco de Gayoso—who had just arrived in town and was a guest of the first. They too 
discussed the pros and cons of the post, and whether the marquise should go with her 
husband, to which the chaplain affirmed, “vuestra señoría era tan rendida a la voluntad 
del señor marqués y tan madre de sus hijos que haría lo que su señoría dispusiese.” Once 
again, the chaplain appeared not only as the interlocutor, but as the public voice of the 
marquise. 
Moreover, such an affirmation expressed the ideal role of the woman in a 
patriarchal society. She was expected, as a wife and as a mother, to follow her husband’s 
commands. It was a consolidation of the figure of the father as ruler and patron, and of 
the wife as his retainer. Nevertheless, this arrangement was never something closed or 
absolute, as there was a lot of room for negotiation. In fact, the wife was also the first and 
most important counselor of her husband and had a major influence on his decisions.36 
Thus, Navia reassured the marquise that even though she had to comply with her 
husband’s resolutions, “debe proponerle todas las dificultades que se le ofrecieren,” and 
that she should lay down her arguments as smoothly and kindly as possible “para saber 
aprovecharse de la ocasión y conseguir lo que puede llevarle.” 
Doña Antonia followed the advice of her chaplain, and wrote a carefully crafted 
letter to her husband. Using very flowery language, she exposed her reticence to 
undertaking the transatlantic journey and to the post the king had granted him. She began 
her missive addressing him “dueño mío” (owner of mine) and emphasizing that she will 
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always obey and follow him. She reminded him of old promises, which she still stood by 
and was prepared to fulfill: 
cuando hablamos acá que iría a Indias contigo, siempre diré lo 
mismo pues para mi ninguna cosa me puede parecer de 
conveniencia sin ti, ni de trabajo en tu compañía, y así vuelvo a 
decir lo mismo y que yo no tengo más libertad ni gusto que 
obedecerte y acompañarte aunque sea al cabo del mundo como 
en fin lo es esto que si hacemos la jornada le tomaremos de una 
punta a otra.37 
 
It is worth highlighting the tone in which she wrote. She addressed him as “tú,” in 
the most informal way. Most likely, she was the only person who did that. In a context in 
which protocol mattered deeply and was highly regulated, not even powerful men like 
cardinal Sandoval could address him that way.38 Despite at first calling him “my owner” 
and stating the hierarchy within the family, she also spoke to him as an equal. Moreover, 
in various passages of the letter she called him “amigo mío.” Friendship was, indeed, the 
strongest bond of a couple. In a world in which many feelings and emotions were not 
considered private, but belonged to the public sphere, friendship and love were not 
necessarily romantic values. Instead, they were the basis of social and political contracts. 
Alejandro Cañeque argues that the early modern understanding of friendship, which 
involved “mutual good will, trust, and well-wishing,” was founded on the Aristotelian 
discourse in which “friendship gives rise to and sustains the most long-lasting political 
bonds.” Very importantly, this relationship was not only among equals, but it could also 
involve people with different degrees of power. Therefore, political love and friendship—
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Greeks used the same word, philia, for referring to these two concepts—bound rulers and 
ruled, and ultimately legitimized the king’s rulership.39 
As we can see, the concept of friendship sustained patronage culture and 
language. Patronage was ultimately understood as a relationship of friendship in which 
people made and owed favors to others. By calling him her friend, the marquise was 
making evident their profound bond and mutual dependency. Even couples were 
expressed and shaped in terms of patronage. The patron-client relationships truly 
structured the whole of society, beginning with the family itself. It encompassed more 
than the relationship between rulers and ruled, but determined the organization of society 
and how people were jointed and linked. Patronage, an expression of the patriarchal 
society, was a manner of understanding human relationships that permeated all human 
activities. 
The marquise’s words of obedience were immediately followed by a request to 
listen to her opinions. She affirmed, “también gustarás de que te diga los reparos que se 
me ofrecen, no para otra cosa que para que los peses y luego elijas a tu voluntad.”40 It 
was her duty to offer counsel to her husband, and it was his right to act and decide 
according to his own will, to follow what he thought was best after having carefully 
deliberated. This was another expression of the Spanish political culture being put into 
practice within the most basic unit of society. The way in which doña Antonia offered her 
advice clearly resonates with the early modern conception of the king’s authority and 
obligations. It was accepted that the monarch had absolute power, but this did not mean 
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that he could do whatever he wanted without restraint. To the contrary, the king was 
expected to listen carefully to his councilors before making any decision.41 
The marquise expressed several objections to embarking on the transatlantic 
enterprise. She complained about the long distance, writing “esto es a lo último de la 
Indias, como se ve por los mapas.” Because the journey would be taxing for their 
younger children, they would have to be left alone at home, and they would only have 
don Pedro de Navia to look after them. Even if they were to bring with them their eldest 
son, Antonio, she would be worried about his safety on such long voyage, and still would 
miss the rest of the family, which probably she would not see ever again. In a truly 
dramatic tone, the marquise claimed that “esto te confieso me quiebra el corazón.” 
Furthermore, there were economic complications. They would have to find someone to 
manage their estates, and it was very likely that in their absence their farm would not 
profit as much, and “cuanto se adquiera por allá se perderá por acá.” She also admitted 
that she did not have the strength she once had. This entire scene anguished the marquise, 
“solo pasar por la imaginación quita el juicio.” Doña Antonia, sought counsel and solace 
in no other than don Pedro de Navia. She had spoken to their chaplain who “como padre 
y amigo habla lo que siente.” Once again, friendship and counsel, now from the retainer 
and spiritual advisor appear deeply intertwined in these networks of patronage. Finally, 
she begged the marquis to go back home to see her and to leave things properly arranged. 
It was already more than three years that he had been away and since they had seen each 
other. In a last attempt to make him change his mind, she told her husband to use her poor 
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health condition as an excuse to leave the court, and even to reject the nomination and to 
request another office, and it would not matter if it was of lesser value.42 
A week later, the marquise wrote a second letter revealing, with even bitter words, 
her disillusion with her husband’s determination to accept the post and go to Las Charcas, 
while at the same time, she reassured “que lo que tú ordenares y dispusieres ejecutaré con 
gusto porque no tengo otro que el tuyo.” She lamented that don Mauro had not received 
her first missive with her concerns on the matter. Doña Antonia reprimanded him for 
rushing to his decision, and that he should have taken more time to think it over. She 
continued with her objections and, now in a more aggressive tone, told him that no one 
believed that such was a proper position for him and that “cuantos oyen que se te ha dado 
este puesto se ríen de pensar que nos había de pasar por pensamiento el ir allá.” She 
definitely did not want to go. Thus, she offered him a way out: although he had already 
said yes to the king’s offer, he could always say that even though he much wanted to go 
to the Indies to serve the king, he could not do it because of the marquise’s sicknesses 
and poor health condition, and because none of their relatives approved the journey. She 
also told the marquis that he could negotiate with the Council to trade off the post for 
another one in Spain, or to find the way to place their son Antonio in some office.43 
The marquis of Villagarcía took the words of his wife very seriously. He labeled 
the first letter with the following title:  
De la marquesa con las advertencias y reparos tan prudentes y 
cuerdos como suyos y de su capacidad y consejos hablando en 
la ida a la Presidencia de Las Charcas. Debo ver con toda 
veneración y estimación muchas veces esta carta.44 
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In order to make an informed decision, he needed to receive the best possible advice, and 
no one seemed to be in the better position to counsel him than his best friend, his wife. 
The words don Mauro and doña Antonia exchanged should not be understood as the 
expression of romantic or idyllic feelings. Instead, they were an expression of their 
friendship, which as we have seen, was a political bond that sought the mutual good. Let 
us not forget that there are many aspects to marriage, and many reasons why people 
chose to marry.45 Just as almost any other early modern marriage, the Villagarcía’s union 
was instrumental. The marquis married his niece not necessarily because he felt in love 
with her, but it was a social, political, and economic arrangement. Therefore, the 
language and expressions of love and friendship did not only refer to private feelings, but 
also to their bond of patronage. 
The opinion of the marquise mattered to her husband, and they were not empty 
words when he affirmed that he ought to read the letters several times and with 
veneration. Although at first he had accepted going to the Indies, and was making plans 
to do so, he retracted at the last minute. On February 8th, 1658 the secretary of the 
Council of the Indies, don Juan Bautista Sáez de Navarrete, urged the marquis to get his 
official title of president of Las Charcas as soon as possible because he should embark in 
the fleet to Tierra Firme that was soon to depart.46 A week later, the marquis replied that 
he had no problem in getting the title, but that he found it difficult to embark in the 
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upcoming fleet. As much as he desired to serve and obey the king, he claimed that he 
needed to go home first, to see his wife and children. Furthermore, he expressed his 
worry over his personal finances and his estates, because being so far away could damage 
his interests. Finally, don Mauro argued that he had very young children who could not 
go with him, and he had to find someone to whom entrust their care and education.47 
Even though at no point the marquis mentioned the communications with his wife, it is 
clear that Villagarcía truly read the letter and objections of the marquise several times. 
All of the arguments he presented were the ones that doña Antonia had given him. 
The secretary Sáez de Navarrete wrote the marquis back saying that, although 
since the moment of his appointment he had had enough time to go to Galicia and make 
all the needed arrangements, the Council could understand his reasons to delay his 
journey, and that he would be allowed to embark in the next year’s fleet. Nonetheless, the 
Council commanded him to clearly state if he was certain to travel or not.48 Don Mauro 
answered in the most ambiguous way, saying that his wish was always to serve and go 
wherever he was ordered, but that he could not assure anything as he was ignorant of 
God’s designs and of the future contingencies that could happen, which could not only 
complicate, but make impossible his travel. Therefore, he would accept, humbly and with 
resignation, if the Council decided to appoint someone else for the post.49 Several months 
later, the marquis wrote the secretary to find out what had been the Council’s decision on 
the matter. It seems that after his vague answer, he did not receive any other 
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communications.50 Sáez de Navarrete’s reply was rather curt. After summarizing the 
marquis’s motives for not traveling and his request for the Council to intercede for him 
and to be appointed butler of the Queen, the Council just informed him that don Luis de 
Baraona Sarabia, judge in the High Court of Valladolid, had been appointed for the 
presidency of Las Charcas and that he had accepted it. No further explanations or 
indications were given.51 
The unusual correspondence of the marquis of Villagarcía allows us to peek into 
some of the familial tensions that officials could face when accepting offices in distant 
places and had to move across the world. These private documents challenge and 
complicate our understanding of early modern patriarchy and the agency of women.52 In 
fact, the rule of the father, even of someone as powerful as a nobleman, was much 
conditioned by others, and particularly by his own spouse. The obedient and submissive 
wife could rely on subtle methods to impose her will, and she did not even need to be 
physically with him. While it is undeniable the preeminence of the figure of the father, 
some women could have opportunities to impact on their husbands by maneuvering the 
same tools and practices that solidified men’s power, those of counsel, friendship, and 
patronage. Familial negotiations affected the activities of royal officials, whose global 
mobility, and ultimately the rule of the empire, was permeable to what intimate actors 
thought, said, and did. Indeed, families and imperial service were tightly bound. 
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Familial and Royal Service  
Throughout these letters the importance of looking for an office for Villagarcía’s 
eldest son, don Antonio, is constantly mentioned. There were two major explanations for 
this goal. First, it is assumed that the personal, social and political improvement of the 
marquises’ offspring depended on what his father could obtain for him. In the early 
modern Spanish world a person’s fate was very much related to his family. The second 
one is that a person’s advancement was tied to the service to the king, even in the case of 
the noblemen. By the seventeenth century the Spanish monarchy had managed to get hold 
of the power and to control the traditionally unruly noble families, which had become 
entwined with the imperial institutions, networks, and projects. Royal service, in the most 
varied of posts and places, provided a sense of identity to many men and families who 
identified themselves with the Spanish king.53 Indeed, several years later, don Antonio 
served as royal ambassador in Genoa and Venice, then occupied a seat in the Council of 
War, and finally, after rejecting the viceroyalty of Peru, was appointed viceroy of 
Valencia. His son José Antonio followed this path, too. After serving as ambassador in 
Venice and as the last viceroy of Catalonia, he was appointed viceroy of Peru in 1735. He 
accepted the nomination and finally a Villagarcía crossed the Atlantic. After his term, and 
on his return voyage, he died.54 
The case of this Galician family was one among many examples of families 
linking their fate to the royal service, and growing under the shadow of royal patronage. 
                                                
53 Raffaele Puddu argues that the military—where convened people from different social and geographical 
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política en los siglos XVI y XVII,” in Servir al rey en la monarquía de los Austrias, ed. Alicia Esteban 
Estríngana (Madrid: Sílex, 2012), 11–50. 
54 Martín Rubio, El marqués de Villagarcía, 31–51. 
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Yuen-Gen Liang has studied the ways in which members belonging to the lower strata of 
the powerful and influential Fernández de Córdoba’s clan tied their destinies to the 
Crown. Several of them served in different posts ranging from Oran to Navarra during 
the fifteenth century. Liang shows the complex networks of political patronage that 
allowed this mobility. Moreover, he emphasizes that the king depended on men whose 
lives were spent defending the monarchy’s interests in order to construct and preserve his 
empire. The author focuses on the extremely tricky familial arrangements that, on the one 
hand, allowed the consolidation and preservation of the Fernández de Córdoba’s 
patrimony, and on the other, weakened some of the members of the clan. They were 
forced to look for opportunities outside their family business and commit to the royal 
service.55 
Halfway through the seventeenth century, this pattern had consolidated. More and 
more members of the nobility (mostly the youngest or illegitimate children) engaged with 
imperial patronage, and linked their lives to the future of the empire. They were willing 
to serve in far away provinces and work for the imposition and consolidation of the 
king’s authority. The Fernández de Córdoba, indeed, continued strengthening their ties to 
the Spanish Empire. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries many men and 
women of this clan crossed the Atlantic. Some settled permanently in America, while 
many others returned to the Peninsula.56 One of the most representative figures was 
Diego Fernández de Córdoba, marquis of Guadalcázar, who between 1612 and 1629 
served as viceroy of the two American viceroyalties. Alongside him traveled many 
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members of his family, who held diverse offices, always appointed by him.57 As will be 
discussed shortly, the viceroys had their own entourage they needed to reward, and upon 
which they depended to effectively govern. 
One of Guadalcázar’s closest retainers was his nephew Luis Fernández de 
Córdoba y Arce.58 Like his uncle, he came from Córdoba and was a member of the city 
council. He travelled to New Spain where his uncle appointed him governor of Tlaxcala. 
While in Mexico, he joined the navy that sailed to the Philippines, led by Alonso Fajardo. 
After he returned to Mexico, Guadalcázar named him governor of the fort of San Juan de 
Ulúa. In 1622 he followed his uncle to Peru. There he was in charge of the defense of the 
Port of Callao against the attacks of the Dutch corsair Jacques l'Hermite. Later, in 1625, 
his uncle appointed him governor of Chile where he put an end to the defensive war and 
reassumed the offensive against the Araucanians.59 Meanwhile, in 1624, by power of 
attorney, he got married in Cuzco to doña Juana de Arce y Tordoya, descendent of a 
prominent family of beneméritos, and lady of the village of El Carpio, in Córdoba, 
Spain—where she was born. Thanks to this Peruvian marriage, don Luis Fernández de 
Córdoba y Arce became lord of a village in his Andalusian hometown. In 1630, he 
returned to Spain where he continued to seek royal patronage, although this time he did 
not depend directly upon his uncle. No doubt he had royal favor, as three years later he 
was accepted into the Order of Santiago. Moreover, the Council of the Indies interceded 
for him and suggested the king could grant him a nobility title, and employ him in any 
                                                
57 Ibid., 169. 
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office.60 These kinds of recommendations were effective, and between 1638 and 1644 
don Luis was the governor of the Canary islands. After all this extensive mobility 
throughout the empire, he did not wish to remain idle. In 1646 he requested the king to 
name him royal ambassador in Genoa.61 This official had built his fame and fortune, 
while helping to lay a foundation for the Spanish Empire in the most far-away and 
apparently disconnected regions, and simultaenously, relying on family and patronage 
ties and networks. 
In such a patriarchal society, illegitimate children had certainly less opportunities 
to access resources within their own families and thus they had to look for external 
sources of favor. The need to become inserted within the imperial networks of patronage, 
and bonded with the Spanish monarch by serving him and expecting his reward, is clearly 
illustrated by the life of Pedro Esteban Dávila. Born around 1584, Dávila was the natural 
son of don Pedro Dávila y Enríquez, marquis of Las Navas, and of Jerónima de Ocampo 
y Milano, a domestic of the marquis’s mother.62 Despite being an illegitimate child, he 
grew up under the permanent protection and guidance of his father. He lived in the 
paternal home (in the town of Las Navas del Marqués, nearby the famous Phillip II’s 
monastery of El Escorial) where he was educated and benefitted from the company of 
men like the famous writer Lope de Vega—a retainer of the marquis who served him as 
his secretary, and years later wrote the comedy El marqués de las Navas.63 Nonetheless, 
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Pedro Esteban Dávila could not inherit his father’s wealth or titles, so he was forced to 
look for opportunities in the royal service. 
Dávila began his services and his personal quest for fame and fortune in the 
Spanish army in Milan, from where he passed to Flanders. The Twelve Years’ Truce, 
from 1609 to 1621, was a period of military inactivity, so he returned home to Las Navas. 
There were few options for him to engage in the royal service, so he remained 
“arrinconado y sin ninguna recompensa de mis servicios, comiendo y sustentándome de 
lo que mi padre me daba.”64 Dávila could not sustain himself alone. He needed the 
protection of his father and the king. In 1616 he learned about the large fleet that was 
being organized to sail to the Philippines under the command of Alonso Fajardo to 
support and defend that archipelago.65 The young Esteban Dávila saw in this dangerous 
journey an opportunity for self-betterment.66 His father, too, urged him to embark on this 
enterprise and strengthen his ties with the king, saying “que sus hijos los tenía para servir 
a Vuestra Majestad en las ocasiones de riesgo.”67 Before joining the fleet, he asked to be 
appointed the future governor of the Philippines. He requested the support and 
intermediation of Juan Ruiz de Contreras, secretary of the Council of the Indies, and who 
was handling the preparation of the fleet: “pues soy hechura de vuestra merced le suplico 
                                                
64 Esteban Dávila, “Carta al Rey Nuestro Señor por su Consejo de Estado y Guerra,” fol. 86v–87. 
65 AGI, Filipinas, 37 N.30 “Peticiones de aprobación de nombramientos hechos por Pedro Esteban Dávila,” 
June 28, 1616; AGI, Filipinas, 37, N. 32 “Petición de Pedro Esteban Dávila sobre su ocupación,” August 
23, 1616. This is the same navy that, from New Spain, joined Luis Fernández de Córdoba y Arce. On the 
arrangements and logistics of this navy, see AGI, Filipinas, 200 “Documentos sobre las armadas de socorro 
de Ruy González de Sequeira y de Alonso Fajardo de Tenza.” 
66 Few men were willing to embark on the fleet and it was necessary that the duke of Medina Sidonia one 
night and by surprise “echó la red” to, literally, capture sailors in his town of Sanlúcar de Barrameda. AGI, 
Filipinas, 200, N. 83 “Carta de Francisco de Tejada sobre juntar marineros” (Sanlúcar de Barrameda, 
October 24, 1616). 
67 Esteban Dávila, “Carta al Rey Nuestro Señor por su Consejo de Estado y Guerra,” fol. 87. 
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los esfuerce y me haga esta merced.”68 He failed to receive the nomination, but sailed 
anyway to the Asian archipelago in May of 1617.69 He would later affirm that “pasé por 
todo porque no era tiempo, ni ocasión de rehusar.”70 He knew his situation was rather 
precarious, and that he would have to cling to every opportunity to obtain salary and 
royal favor.71 
Not long afterward, Dávila was back in Europe. His father, once again, vigorously 
mediated for him. He wanted to secure the future of his son. First, the marquis requested 
a salary increase for his son in the army of Flanders, the most reputed of the war theaters 
and which promised better opportunities.72 The king responded favorably, granting him 
an entretenimiento (bonus) of 100 escudos a month.73 Some years later, the marquis, 
using all the resources and contacts at his disposal, requested again for his son, and once 
more, found the favor of the monarch, Phillip IV, who wrote to the infanta Isabella Clara 
Eugenia, sovereign of the Spanish Netherlands. The recently enthroned king claimed, 
“Vuestra Alteza sabe la calidad desta persona y casa del marqués y lo que merece.” The 
king, well aware of his obligations and role as bounty giver, personally interceded in 
favor of the marquis’s petition, “he querido encomendarlo mucho a Vuestra Alteza 
asegurándole que será para mí esto de particular gusto.”74 In a clear example of how the 
networks of imperial patronage worked to obtain reward in a composite monarchy, the 
absolute monarch was not giving a direct order, but a suggestion to his great-aunt —
                                                
68 AGI, Filipinas, 200, N. 56 “Carta de Pedro Esteban Dávila pidiendo la sucesión de Jerónimo de Silva” 
(Las Navas, September 22, 1616). 
69 AGI, Filipinas, 200, N. 195 “Carta de Diego de Castro Lisón sobre personas que han quedado en la 
armada” (Cadiz, May 15, 1617). 
70 Esteban Dávila, “Carta al Rey Nuestro Señor por su Consejo de Estado y Guerra,” fol. 87v. 
71 His salary was set in 150 escudos a month that mounted 1636 ducats a year, not an insignificant amount 
at all. AGI, Filipinas, 200, N. 131 “Sueldos de la armada de Filipinas,” 1616. 
72 AHN, EST, Leg. 1482, N. 40 “El Marqués de Las Navas por su hijo,” n.d. 
73 AHN, EST, L. 258, f. 215v. “Don Pedro de Avila” (Madrid, July 5, 1618). 
74 AHN, EST, L. 259, f. 235. “Marqués de Las Navas” (Madrid, December 15, 1622). 
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which, nonetheless, she accepted. It is interesting to note that not even a ruler like Philip 
IV could issue a direct order to her. Although, theoretically, she was a subject of the 
Spanish King, she acted as an independent ruler.75 The marquis also pressed to get his 
son admitted into the Order of Santiago. Because of his illegitimate origin, such an honor 
was difficult to achieve; but it was not impossible. The process of gaining admission 
started around 1616 and indeed got stuck for several years. It was tough to prove the 
noble and clean ascendency of don Pedro’s mother. However, in 1621, a short side 
note—most likely written by the king—appeared that ordered the issue resolved 
immediately since Esteban Dávila had to sail as soon as possible to govern the Tercera 
island in the Azores.76 
The protection and favor of the marquis of Las Navas had succeeded. In the same 
year don Pedro was allowed into the Order of Santiago and he also was given a 
preeminent post in a strategic port, where ships from the East and the West Indies 
converged. When his father died, Pedro Esteban Dávila lost his most important supporter 
and provider. Thus, in the most pitiful tone, he begged the king for his protection: 
no tengo otra cosa de que me sustentar, si no de mi sueldo. 
Cuando mi padre, que dios tiene en el cielo, vivía, suplía esta 
necesidad. Hoy señor tengo solo a Vuestra Majestad, a quien 
suplico humildemente se duela de mi, y no permita que pida 
limosna para comer haciéndome merced de mandar que no me 
cese el sueldo de castellano de este castillo.77 
 
Although he was resorting to a commonly practiced rhetoric of neediness—by which 
petitioners of royal favor claimed to be poor and in a miserable condition, and left to the 
                                                
75 On the government of Isabella Clara Eugenia and her husband, the Archduke Albert see Luc Duerloo, 
Dynasty and Piety: Archduke Albert (1598-1621) and Habsburg Political Culture in an Age of Religious 
Wars (Farnham, Surrey, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012). 
76 Pérez-Mínguez, Un castillo y varios castellanos, 134–137. 
77 BNE, Mss/801, f. 133v-136v Pedro Esteban Dávila, “Carta al Rey Nuestro Señor por los Consejos de 
Estado y Guerra” (Tercera, August 20, 1625), fol. 136. 
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mercy of the magnanimous king—it is also true that he had no other option than relying 
on royal patronage. The king now was the only father to him. Being an imperial official, 
and linking his destiny to that of the empire was posited as the only way to survive.  
Don Pedro surely knew how to navigate the imperial networks of patronage and 
gain royal reward and protection, even after his father died. He did not hesitate in 
reminding the king, as well as other patrons, of his services and of his condition of 
retainer. In the midst of his confrontation with Manuel Docanto and the local Portuguese 
elites in Azores, he wrote to don Baltazar de Zúñiga, councilor of State, hoping to obtain 
some kind of reward, that “como hechura suyo espero en Dios de procurar merecerlas.”78 
Similarly, he wrote to the councilors of War and State affirming to be “hechura de la 
mano de vuestras señorías.”79 He also sought support from the marquis of Castel 
Rodrigo, captain-major of Angra, “como a hechura y criado de vuestra excelencia.”80 He 
was conscious that it was indispensable to lobby, and to knock on as many possible 
doors, in order to be prized and secure his position. Indeed, after his term in the Azores 
ended abruptly, and not on the best terms, he managed to be appointed governor of 
Buenos Aires.81 His alleged military expertise and experience dealing with smugglers 
made him a fit candidate in the midst of the Dutch offensive in South America and the 
rise of illegal trade through the Atlantic port.82 
                                                
78 BNE, Mss/801, f. 3-4 Pedro Esteban Dávila, “Carta escrita a D. Baltazar de Zúñiga” (Lisboa, July 16, 
1622). On the government of Pedro Esteban Dávila in the island, and his heated quarrel with the Portuguese 
local elites see Schaub, L’île aux mariés, 127–171. 
79 BNE, Mss/801, f. 39-42 Pedro Esteban Dávila, “Carta al Rey Nuestro Señor por sus Consejos de Estado 
y Guerra con el alférez Francisco Cerezo despachado por el marqués de Cropani” (Tercera, June 26, 1623), 
fol. 28v. 
80 BNE, Mss/801, f. 38-39 Pedro Esteban Dávila, “Carta al marqués de Castel Rodrigo” (Tercera, June 9, 
1623), fol. 38. 
81 His successor in the archipelago was no other than Íñigo Hurtado de Corcuera, see p. 121 
82 The government of Pedro Esteban Dávila in Buenos Aires was not exempt of controversy. He had major 
confrontations with the bishop of Buenos Aires as well with Andrés León Garavito who travelled with him 
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Furthermore his immersion in familial networks continued unabated. While 
serving in the Azores, he had the help and support of Antonio Correa Dávila, a native of 
those islands, “pariente de la casa de mi padre,” and for whom he requested a royal 
thanks and recompense.83 Familial networks of patronage continuously converged with 
the networks of imperial service and patronage. Although Esteban Dávila, as any other 
member of the nobility, was very conscious of the importance of his lineage and family—
he proudly affirmed, “que no siempre tendrá Vuestra Majestad hijos del Marqués de las 
Navas que enviar aquí”—he did not have the means to reward his clients directly.84 The 
best he could do was to intercede with the king on behalf of them. Almost any reward a 
person could offer was expressed in relationship to imperial service. Everyone and 
everything turned upon the imperial axis, and, progressively, the king had become the 
ultimate provider of favors.85  
 
                                                                                                                                            
from Europe and was commissioned to take the residencia of the outgoing governor, Francisco de 
Céspedes, See AGI, Escribania, 892A “Residencia de Pedro Esteban de Avila,” 1638; Oscar Trujillo, “‘La 
Mano Poderosa’: los gobernadores de Buenos Aires y los juicios de residencia. (mediados del siglo XVII)” 
(presented at the X Jornadas Interescuelas/Departamentos de Historia, Escuela de Historia de la Facultad de 
Humanidades y Artes, Universidad Nacional del Rosario. Departamento de Historia de la Facultad de 
Ciencias de la Educación, Universidad Nacional del Litoral, Rosario, 2005): 
http://www.aacademica.org/000-006/518. Nonetheless, it seems that he came out unscathed from all the 
accusations. In 1642, he was living in the island of Santa Catalina in the Caribbean. BNE, Mss/2374, f. 637 
- 639v. “Relación del suceso que tuvo Francisco Diaz Pimienta, general de la Real Armada de las Indias, en 
la isla de Santa Catalina” (Madrid, 1642), fol. 639. Apparently, his relative Luis Enríquez de Guzmán, 
conde de Alba y Aliste, who at the time was viceroy of Peru appointed him as governor of Laicacota. He 
would have died in 1657. Molina, “Dávila, Pedro Esteban.”  
83 BNE, Mss/801, f. 77v-79 Pedro Esteban Dávila, “Carta al Consejo de Guerra sobre la consignación” 
(Tercera, November 10, 1623). 
84 Esteban Dávila, “Carta escrita al Rey Nuestro Señor por sus Consejos de Guerra e Indias con Fernando 
de Sosa, general de la flota de Nueva España,” fol. 13. 
85 Antonio Feros argues that during this time the king’s power reached its peak. The monarchy achieved 
this not by eliminating the many private networks of patronage, but instead, by relying on them, and by 
centralizing on the crown the capacity to reward. Thus, noblemen became dependent on royal favor. 
“Clientelismo Y Poder Monárquico,” 36–40. Sharon Kettering conveys a similar argument for the French 
case, where the king consolidated his power outside Paris by controlling over the nobility’s patronage. 
Kettering, “The Decline of Great Noble Clientage during the Reign of Louis XIV.” 
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Patronage Networks in a Global Empire 
As we have seen, networks of patronage were not constrained by geography. The 
marquis of Villagarcía’s large network of clients provided him resources, information, 
and even contacts that the proposed president of Las Charcas alone could not obtain. In 
fact, at the time of his appointment he had few American connections and little 
knowledge about America or the post in which he had been selected to serve. His 
chaplain, don Pedro de Navia, bluntly affirmed that “aquí no hay persona alguna que 
haya estado en las Indias para poder informarme,” and that he was “sin ninguna noticia 
[...] como le sucedió al señor marqués cuando se le propuso.” Proof of his ignorance was 
that Navia, at first, believed that his friend doctor Peña, who was serving as bishop of 
Quito, would be very pleased to have the marquis so close.86 Of course, Quito and La 
Plata were more than two thousand miles apart. He did not know much about America, 
other than the circulating generalities, clichés, and especially, gossip. Mobility of people 
came along with a circulation of knowledge.87 He said, “me aseguró persona suya” that 
don Francisco de Nestares Marín, the current president of Las Charcas, and whom 
Villagarcía was to replace, had already sent to his relatives in Spain over 500,000 pesos, 
something which the marquis could never do because Nestares “es muy mañoso y vuestra 
señoría apenas lo será para adquirir tanto.”88 Navia was accusing the current president of 
being cunning, a surprising judgment of someone who historians have portrayed as a 
champion of the fight against corruption. Nestares Marín had been sent to Potosí with the 
                                                
86 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 44. “Carta de don Pedro de Navia a la marquesa de Villagarcía.” On the ideas 
of distance see Chapter One. The Galician Alonso de la Peña y Montenegro was bishop of Quito since 1653 
to his death in 1687. He is most famous for writing a manual for doctrineros, the priests in charge of the 
evangelization of the native Americans. Alonso de la Peña Montenegro, Itinerario para párrocos de indios, 
ed. C. Baciero (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1995). 
87 The circulation of experiences and knowledge is studied in more depth in Chapters Three and Four. 
88 “Carta del inquisdor don Pedro de Navia, arcediano de Mendo y canónigo de Santiago.” 
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explicit mission of investigating a massive swindle by which millions of coins containing 
much less of the required silver were minted.89 
Therefore, in order to overcome his ignorance and lack of direct personal 
connections, don Mauro wrote to some of his clients who could serve as brokers, and 
contacted others who could offer what he needed. Sharon Kettering contends that brokers 
were essential intermediaries in the patronage system by enabling patrons to reach out to 
other clients and resources. Nonetheless, a broker was not a mere go-between, but 
supplemented the exchange with his own resources. Brokers themselves had clients of 
their own, and, suggests Kettering, it was that preexistent network which secured them 
patronage and qualified them as brokers. Brokers were not “created” by their patrons, 
although they could have been raised and protected by them.90 While Kettering studied 
the French case, much of her conclusions serve to illustrate Spanish patronage, despite 
the latter being much larger, complex, and sophisticated. Thanks to a clever use of 
Spanish and native brokers, Spanish officials accessed information and resources from all 
over the world that otherwise were inaccessible to them, facilitating their mobility and the 
rule of the empire. 
The captain don Mauro de Pardiñas Villar de Francos—who was based in Cadiz 
and conducted some of Villagarcía’s business, like the trade of indigo—soon became the 
marquis’s intermediary and his door into American networks.91 Although the 
                                                
89 Eduardo Dargent Chamot, “La ‘ceca’ de Potosí y la circulación de monedas de plata falsificadas en el 
virreinato peruano (siglos XVI-XVII),” Diálogo Andino - Revista de Historia, Geografía y Cultura Andina 
no. 38 (December 2011): 75–84; Kris Lane, “Corrupción y dominación colonial: el gran fraude a la Casa de 
la Moneda de Potosí en 1649,” Boletín del Instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana “Dr. Emilio 
Ravignani” no. 43 (2015): 94–130. 
90 Kettering, Patrons, Brokers, and Clients, 42–44. 
91 Some years later the son of this captain, Juan Isidro Pardiñas, crossed the Atlantic, accompanied by his 
retainer Alonso Barragán, to serve as governor of Nueva Vizcaya. AGI, Contratacion, 5446, N. 19 
“Licencia a Juan Isidro de Pardiñas” (Cadiz, April 17, 1684). 
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communication between Villagarcía and don Mauro had been scant over the previous 
months, Villagarcía reactivated it by reaching out to his client. Pardiñas replied promptly 
and was eager to serve. After reaffirming his bonds to the marquis and his family, and 
justifying his past silence because “no debemos los criados introducirnos con los dueños 
sin causa legítima,” he congratulated the marquis for his appointment and offered his 
valuable services.92  
Evidently, his location in an Atlantic port city gave this client and broker a 
privileged position, and he tried to make the most of such a situation. First of all, he 
invited the marquis to stay at his house in Cadiz before his departure. More importantly, 
he soon began to collect information about Charcas, the best travel routes to the city, and 
the inner workings of the royal institutions. The next day he wrote again, now with 
practical information.93 Pardiñas asserted that the best way to get to Charcas was via 
Buenos Aires, and not by the official path that went with the fleet through Panama.94 
Moreover, he proposed a way of traveling that would not cost Villagarcía anything. He 
assured him, that if requested properly, the marquis could obtain royal permission to sail 
to Buenos Aires in a bajel de visita, a single ship that would cross the Atlantic alone. 
Pardiñas guaranteed the marquis that if he got the permission, he could contact people 
who would prepare the ship and provide the crew at no cost, “esto se entiende dejándole 
embarcar en la nave sus haciendas.” In effect, Pardiñas was proposing to partake in, or at 
least to facilitate, smuggling merchandise into America. The offer suggests how easily a 
new imperial official—supposed to defend the king’s interest, which included, especially 
                                                
92 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 19 “Enhorabuena del capitán don Mauro de Pardiñas Villar de Francos” (Cadiz, 
October 28, 1657). 
93 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 20 “El capitán don Mauro de Pardiñas Villar de Francos propone el medio que 
puede haber para hacer el viaje a Las Charcas” (Cadiz, October 29, 1657). 
94 On the travel routes and logistics see Chapter One. 
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in that region, preventing illicit trade—could insert himself into the contraband networks 
operating in the Atlantic. This case exposes the occasional contradictions between the 
imperial and private networks, and how sometimes officials used their own resources in 
order to better rule and enhance imperial power, while in other occassions those same 
networks could weaken royal authority. In other words, imperial mobility and rulership 
were impossible without officials reliance on their retinues, which at the same time 
opened the door to the possibility of illegal practices. 
Captain Pardiñas also wrote a client of his own, don Francisco de Soto Guzmán.95 
Soto Guzmán had resided for a time in Charcas but was back in the Peninsula; as a result, 
he had a first-hand knowledge of the region that Villagarcía was supposed to govern. At 
the request of Pardiñas, Soto Guzmán wrote a document containing detailed information 
on the travel routes, time, and costs, and confirmed that the most comfortable, shortest, 
and cheapest route was through Buenos Aires. Soto Guzmán also gave advice on the 
procedure that the marquis should follow to obtain the license to sail directly to that 
port.96 The information provided by Soto Guzmán is truly impressive. Not only did he 
know the days and leagues that had to be travelled, but he also identified people serving 
at various posts who should be contacted. In this way, Soto Guzmán and Pardiñas were 
smoothing and guiding the formation of the marquis’ networks in the New World, even 
before he set foot on the continent. 
Moreover, Soto Guzmán provided examples of officials who in the past had 
received permission to sail directly to Buenos Aires, such as don Juan de Palacios, who 
                                                
95 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 38 “Carta de don Francisco de Soto Guzmán al capitán Mauro de Pardiñas” 
(Posada, November 3, 1657). 
96 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 39 “Papel de don Francisco de Soto Guzmán Con Información Sobre El Viaje a 
Charcas,” November 3, 1657. 
	
 115 
went as Inspector of the Audience of La Plata and sailed from Lisbon around the year 
1638, and don Pedro de Baigorri, who at that time was the governor of Buenos Aires and 
had departed from Cadiz in 1652.97 Displaying his knowledge of many American actors 
and their interests, Soto Guzmán also recommended getting in touch with the court agent 
of don Francisco de Nestares Marín, the outgoing president of La Plata, because that 
official was also seeking a permission to travel directly from Buenos Aires to Spain. Soto 
Guzmán was not sure who this agent was (he believed that it was Nestares’s nephew, don 
Jacinto de Nestares Marin, canon in Palencia), thus he suggested asking the secretary of 
the Council of the Indies, don Juan Bautista Sáez Navarrete, for the name of the agent. 
Unsurprisingly, some days after writing this document, which Pardiñas forwarded 
to the marquis, Soto Guzmán wrote to Villagarcía and offered his services. He begged 
“me admita por muy siervo suyo y que como a tal me mande cuanto gustare.”98 The 
network of patronage and the list of clients of don Mauro de Mendoza Caamaño y 
Sotomayor continued to grow. Such is an explicit example of how new patronage 
relationships were formed. José Martínez Millán argues that patronage usually was not 
established by a written document, or in an explicit or formal manner. Rather, it typically 
followed the request of a favor from a potential client to a potential patron.99 In this case, 
Soto Guzmán asked to be accepted as a client after he had served the marquis and before 
having received any reward, just with the hope and promise of future bounty. He had 
                                                
97 Soto Guzmán also gave the marquis a short economic and political treatise in which he expounded the 
many reasons for allowing two ships a year to arrive into the port of Buenos Aires. According to him, this 
was the only solution to ensure the proper supply of the region, as well as to provide the neighbors of that 
region the possibility of selling abroad their goods. “Apuntamientos de las razones que se deben representar 
para que se despachen por lo menos dos navíos de registro.” 
98 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 40 “Papel de don Francisco de Soto y Guzmán sobre lo que se debe representar 
para pedir navío de registro para ir a la presidencia de Los Charcas por Buenos Aires” (Cádiz, November 
11, 1657). 
99 Martínez Millán, “Introducción: la investigación sobre las elites del poder,” 21. 
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many interests in America, and certainly having the President of Las Charcas as a patron 
would be of great advantage.100 The culture of patronage gave meaning and articulated 
the Spanish Monarchy. Two persons with different origins, goals, and even locations 
interacted and engaged by means of the language and mutually benefitial practices of 
patronage, and in the long run made feasible the global empire. 
Nonetheless, the marquis of Villagarcía did not rely only on Pardiñas and Soto 
Guzmán. His position and large network gave him access to more people, resources, and 
information on the far-away region. Don Gómez Dávila, the designated future corregidor 
of Potosí, wrote the marquis as soon as he found out about don Mauro’s nomination. 
Dávila rushed to present himself, to offer his services and obedience, and to establish a 
relationship with his soon-to-be superior.101 Likewise, don Felipe Obregón y Cereceda 
was a vecino and city councilor of Potosí who at the time was also in Madrid to represent 
that city and its guild of azogueros, mercury miners.102 The azogueros were a powerful 
and rich collective, who, through the use of azogue (mercury), refined the silver extracted 
from the mine and produced silver bars. Although we do not know for sure how these 
two men met, we can plausibly assume that news of Villagarcía’s appointment was 
circulating in the court and that Obregón was eager to contact the new president and 
bring him into his network, or at least, not to antagonize him. Because the Crown 
controlled the production and transportation of the mercury, and one of the most 
important duties of the president of the Audience of Charcas was to distribute this 
                                                
100 Soto Guzmán was, indeed, invested on the transatlantic trade. In 1662 he was prosecuted for financing 
an illegal shipment into Buenos Aires. He was accused of being a front man for English and Dutch 
merchants who smuggled goods into the South American port AGI, Escribania, 1029B “El fiscal con 
Francisco de Soto y Guzmán,” 1662. 
101 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 7 “Enhorabuena de don Gómez Dávila, corregidor nombrado de la Villa 
Imperial de Potosí” (Sevilla, October 16, 1657). 
102 AGI, Charcas, 416, L.5, f. 154v - 155 “Carta del secretario del consejo al presidente y jueces oficiales de 
la Casa de Contratación de Sevilla” (Madrid, April 24, 1657). 
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mineral, the miners and the president of Charcas had a close but tense relationship.103 
Obregón also gave detailed information on the length, difficulty, and costs of the two 
possible routes (either through Panama or Buenos Aires) to the province of Charcas.104 
Additionally, he wrote a letter with extended information on the mining center of Potosí, 
its history, population, weather, the available veins to work, its royal offices, and even its 
bakeries.105 
In his report to the marquis of Villagarcía, Felipe de Obregón also outlined the 
duties of the president of the Audience, noting that he would have to live seven months in 
the city of La Plata (where the Audience resided), and five more in Potosí in order to 
oversee the distribution of mercury, the collection of the king’s money, and the dispatch 
of the silver to Lima. He hinted that in such a post Villagarcía could make up to 150,000 
pesos—a truly large sum, to be gained not on salary, evidently, but “en las cosas que a 
Vuestra Señoría tengo referido por menor.”106 All this on top of  “las comodidades que en 
aquél reino puede tener el sr. don Antonio,” the son of the marquis.107 Although what 
Obregón was referring to exactly remains cloudy, it is safe to presume that he was 
engaged in shady activities. Once again, the new president, who had not even departed 
from Spain, was being exposed to, and invited to take part in, private businesses and join 
                                                
103 The miners received a fixed amount of mercury based on the expected amount of silver that it was going 
to be refined. Héctor Noejovich has found that the consumption of mercury does not match the silver 
produced—especially around these years—, and it all indicates that there was a major fraud to the Crown 
finances, in which were involved the miners, as well as the imperial authorities in charge of handling the 
mercury. Héctor Omar Noejovich, “El consumo de azogue: ¿indicador de la corrupción del sistema colonial 
en el virreinato del Perú? (siglos XVI-XVII),” Fronteras de la Historia 7 (2002): 77–98. 
104 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 31 “Papel que me dio el sr. don Felipe Obregón, vecino de Potosí, del viaje a 
Charcas,” 1657. 
105 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 34 “Noticias de la Villa Imperial de Potosí, su cerro, minas y todo lo 
concerniente a ellas y a su riqueza,” 1657. 
106 The salary of the president of Las Charcas was set in 5,000 pesos, Recopilación de leyes de los reynos 
de las Indias, vol. 1 (Madrid: Boix, 1841), 167. 




existing local networks. Obregón was keen to ally with the person responsible of 
overseeing the mining production, and who could facilitate several of his illegal practices.  
In another letter to the marquis of Villagarcía, the captain Mauro de Pardiñas 
remarked that if the right buttons were pushed, there should not be a problem gaining 
permission to sail to Buenos Aires. He argued that the processing could be expedited if 
the marquis were to be commissioned also to conduct a residencia to the outgoing 
governor of Buenos Aires, don Pedro Baigorri. The captain affirmed that the excesses of 
Baigorri were well-known and that the secretary of the Council of the Indies, don Juan 
Bautista Sáez Navarrete, sought to punish the governor. According to this informant, 
Sáez Navarrete would be especially interested in helping out with this case because 
Baigorri had previously conducted a harsh residencia against his predecessor, who 
happened to be “hechura del señor secretario.” Nonetheless, all this had to be done as 
smoothly and swiftly as possible, as the secretary was a “ministro en quien se debe 
presumir no caben venganzas.” Furthermore, the secretary was also “deudo de la persona 
que actualmente está sirviendo la presidencia de Las Charcas” (don Francisco de 
Nestares), and thus, Sáez Navarrete wanted to satisfy Nestares’s desire of returning as 
soon as possible to Spain. Pardiñas also suggested that it would be greatly beneficial to 
get in touch with the President’s agent in Madrid, whom Pardiñas had already identified 
and knew his whereabouts.108 
The culture of patronage influenced all the activities of the monarchy and its 
officials. Favoring or punishing someone was never an “objective” or “clean” decision; 
rather, it was determined by a complex calculus involving multiple parties in the imperial 
                                                
108 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 27 “El capitán don Mauro de Pardiñas dice las conveniencias que hay para que 
solicite navío para ir por Buenos Aires” (Cadiz, November 26, 1657). 
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networks of patronage, in which the activities of one person in one side of the empire had 
effects over the other end of the Monarchy. This was especially evident for someone like 
the secretary Sáez Navarrete who, because of his high position, stood at the epicenter of 
the imperial networks and maintained contact with patrons and clients throughout the 
empire.  
In that same letter, Pardiñas also advised Villagarcía paying attention to what the 
Jesuit priests were doing. He told him that in the following days about 60 priests were to 
depart on a direct ship to Buenos Aires. The license for this vessel had been granted 
thanks to the deeds of father Julián de Pedraza, who was “noticioso y mañoso como 
teatino,” and who was always looking for an opportunity to get special permission to 
open traffic to those provinces in order to send people and goods.109 The networks of the 
religious orders were large and had great influence. As a result, a person like the marquis 
of Villagarcía could greatly benefit from them. Martín de Lezava, the Provincial of the 
Jesuits in Castile, was a client of the marquis and one of his chaplains. In his 
congratulatory letter, he offered to write to the Superior of the Jesuits in Charcas and to 
the rectors of the various Jesuits schools in the region telling them of the “grandes 
obligaciones que deberán de servir a Vuestra Señoría.”110 
These examples show how imperial networks, both secular and religious, could 
intertwine. Circulating around the empire were innumerable actors and networks, each 
constantly pressing for the greatest possible advantage. Network deals (at least 
preliminary ones) could be made thousands of miles from the place where they would 
eventually be enforced, and were not necessarily contingent on local realities. In the case 
                                                
109 Ibid. 
110 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 24 “Enhorabuena del Padre Provincial de la Compañía de Jesús de la provincia 
de Castilla” (Santiago, November 3, 1657). 
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of the marquis of Villagarcía, many of these transactions occurred at the royal court. 
There were many global networks hinged throughout the Spanish Empire, and especially 
in Madrid, as the royal court was a major political, social, cultural, and economic hub. In 
that city, various networks, individuals, agents, friends, and enemies from all across the 
empire came together to exchange knowledge, goods, and services, thereby shaping the 
development of the global empire, and determining the fortunes of local actors who were 
thousands of miles away from Spain, but who kept an eye and ear on what was happening 
at the court. 
Nonetheless, because of the large scope of the networks and of the many centers 
that actively made up the empire, these interactions occurred not just in the imperial 
capital but in many other unexpected regions as well.111 In fact, even the Phillipines, 
which took several months to reach from Madrid, was perfectly integrated and connected 
to the whole of the empire. Let us examine, for instance, the case of the captain don 
Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera who in 1644, after his term as governor of the 
Philippines, became the subject of an unusually harsh residencia (judicial review).112 
Almost immediately after his successor, don Diego de Fajardo, arrived in Manila, the 
investigations began. Hurtado de Corcuera had received special permission for leaving 
the archipelago without having to be present during his residencia, as long as he provided 
the due bond in deposit. Don Sebastián thus presented three guarantors, “los más ricos de 
                                                
111 On the decentered nature of the Spanish Empire see Cardim et al., Polycentric Monarchies; Christine 
Daniels and Michael V Kennedy, eds., Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas, 
1500-1820 (New York: Routledge, 2002). 
112 The complete residencia is in AGI, Escribania, 409A, 409B, 409C, and 409D. However, because of 
their bad condition it has been impossible to consult all of the legajos. Nonetheless, the extraordinary 
duration and complexity of this process has left an important trail of other sources (mostly letters) that I 
have been able to study. 
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México.”113 Evidently, there were many linkages and connections between the Asian 
archipelago and New Spain, and it should not come as a surprise that the governor of the 
Philippines relied on three of the richest men of Mexico to pay his bond. Although I have 
not been able to identify these men, we can assume they were merchants involved in the 
lucrative Asian trade who had profited from their partnership with Hurtado de Corcuera. 
Fajardo claimed that the security money could not be deposited in New Spain, and 
if Hurtado de Corcuera wanted to leave the archipelago he would have to deposit the 
money in the Philippines. Moreover, only four days after he initiated the residencia, the 
new governor contended that the accusations were extremely serious (especially the loss 
of the island of Formosa to the Dutch) that he could not allow don Sebastián to leave the 
island, and that he had to be put in jail.114 Also, the amount of the alleged money owed to 
the Royal Treasury by Hurtado de Corcuera and his retainers kept growing until it 
reached an exorbitant sum.115 What the former governor believed was going to be a 
relatively easy process turned into a severe prosecution. Despite his bitter and constant 
complaints, Hurtado de Corcuera was to remain in prison several years until the Council 
of the Indies revised the case and he and his retainers were finally allowed to return to 
Spain, where he continued to serve the king in various prestigious posts.116 In fact, in 
                                                
113 AGI, Filipinas, 22, R. 1, N. 1, f. 135-135v. Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera to Philip IV, “Pide que se le 
deje embarcar,” August 24, 1644, fol. 135. 
114 AGI, Filipinas, 22, R. 1, N. 1, f. 130-132 Diego de Fajardo, “Sobre residencia de Corcuera,” December 
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1658 the residencia was still open and subject to debate in the Council.117 The unusual 
length of this trial clearly speaks to the intricacy of the process, as well as to the spite 
from Fajardo and many others against Hurtado de Corcuera. 
This residencia, no doubt, shook the social and political structures of power in the 
Philippines. Scholars have rightfully seen in this process a response of the local elites to 
Hurtado de Corcuera (unanimously portrayed as a stubborn and overly proud governor) 
and a change in the power balance. According to William J. McCarthy, the bitter and 
long trial exposes the polemical and corrupt nature of Hurtado de Corcuera’s government 
(and basically of almost any Philippine governor) that produced a long list of enemies for 
the governor.118 Likewise, Antoni Picazo Muntaner argues that Hurtado de Corcuera built 
a powerful and dense network in the Philippines, which allowed him to rule and profit 
financially. However, those same networks also generated several antagonisms. The 
many opponents of the governor (mainly the city council and the bishop of Manila) had 
weaved their own competing patronage networks. The arrival of Diego Fajardo left 
Hurtado de Corcuera powerless. Picazo Muntaner contends that the governor’s foes saw 
with the trial an opportunity to turn things around, which they quickly seized. Things 
changed so dramatically that the network built around don Sebastián completely 
disappeared after his incarceration.119 
In fact, Hurtado de Corcuera himself was conscious of the enemies he had made 
as governor of the Philippines. He knew that many saw him as a bad governor and had 
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Corcuera,” Revista Hispanoamericana. Revista Digital de La Real Academia Hispano Americana de 
Ciencias, Artes Y Letras 3 (2013): 11: http://revista.raha.es. 
	
 123 
transmitted their complaints to the court and the royal councilors.120 He accused the 
Manila city council of being behind the charges—libels, according to him—and of 
preventing him from receiving a fair trial.121 He claimed that the animosity against him 
was consequence not of bad government, but instead of good government and attempts at 
government reform. He claimed that in defending the Crown’s interests, he had made 
enemies with a class of self-serving officials who did not have the best interests of the 
Monarchy in mind. His enemies wanted to get him out of their way so they could undo 
his accomplishments, because they “querrán otro gobernador que será bueno para ellos, 
será malo para el servicio de Vuestra Majestad.”122 
That Hurtado de Corcuera had many antagonists during his tenure should not 
come as a surprise. These sorts of disputes were common in the early modern Spanish 
world. It was not unusual for the local elites to face off with imperial authorities, and that 
Spanish officials and administrators fought amongst themselves.123 What is rather 
peculiar is the ease and promptness by which Diego de Fajardo allied with the former 
governor’s enemies. He could have easily acted in a very different way, just like most of 
the officials throughout the empire, who conducted residencias and did not find any 
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illegality in their predecessors’ activities.124 Indeed, that was what usually occurred, and 
these trials were often just a formality. The newcomers rapidly adapted to the new society 
and kept the networks and power relationships mostly intact. 
It could be surmised that the character of Hurtado de Corcuera or the blatant 
evidence of his misdoings forced the new governor to act against his predecessor without 
any hint of indulgency. However, after a lengthy process and many appeals, most of the 
accusations against Hurtado de Corcuera were discharged. In fact, his tenure does not 
appear any more corrupt or problematic than that of many other government officials 
throughout the empire. Ultimately, the Council of the Indies decided that he, as well as 
his clients and family, had been treated with unusual and excessive harshness, and 
therefore, nullified the residencia.125 
Perhaps the explanation for Fajardo’s behavior can be found thousands of miles 
away, in the Azores. Around 1628, don Diego de Fajardo was appointed governor of the 
strategic fortress in the island of Tercera, in the Azores. On that occasion he replaced no 
other than Íñigo Hurtado de Corcuera, brother of don Sebastián.126 Therefore, when 
Fajardo went to the Philippines, he clearly knew whom he was going to replace. This 
was, at the least, the second time in which he had crossed paths with a Hurtado de 
Corcuera. We can safely presume that when Fajardo arrived in the Philippines, he was 
not neutral about his predecessor. He had already forged an image of the governor, 
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especially in a moment in which people defined themselves primarily in terms of family 
and kin. So, if Fajardo had some kind of aversion to Íñigo Hurtado de Corcuera, this 
could have reflected negatively on his brother. Fajardo might have been predisposed to 
ally with Hurtado de Corcuera’s enemies. 
In fact, this was Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera’s reasoning. Since the beginning 
of the episode, he had claimed that the origin of the persecution and bad treatments 
against him were the old quarrels that Fajardo had carried on with his brother, which had 
given him “más bríos y peor voluntad para conmigo.”127 And years later, when don 
Sebastián was back in Spain and appealed the residencia to the Council of the Indies, he 
presented as his first argument to nullify the trial that “Diego Fajardo era su enemigo 
capital con dependencias antiguas, desde don Íñigo de Corcuera y el dicho don Diego, 
sobre que hubo grandes pleitos.” Furthermore, according to Hurtado de Corcuera, his 
successor never hid such enmity, and “manifestó don Diego Fajardo esta enemistad con 
palabras en el viaje que hizo a Manila.”128 
While difficult to prove these personal connections and motivations, which have 
distant origins in both time and location, they should nonetheless not be underestimated. 
History is often decided by small details, imperceptible to later historians. Personal likes 
and dislikes, no doubt, lay behind many historical events, even if they are hard to prove. 
Historians seldom can find sources that directly speak to the internal motivations, 
predilections, fears, or aversions of their historical subjects; we usually only get to see 
their effects. It is difficult to fully explain the reasons behind Fajardo’s evident aversion 
                                                
127 Hurtado de Corcuera to Philip IV, “Dando Cuenta de Su Prisión Y de Los Malos Tratos Que Recibe,” 
fol. 144. 
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towards Hurtado de Corcuera, but it is also clear that Fajardo did not act in the dark. He 
was well aware of who he was going to find in the Philippines. These mobile officials, 
even if located in South East Asia or the middle Atlantic, were well connected with the 
rest of the empire. Although they were constantly moving from one post to the other and 
crossing oceans and continents, their patronage networks kept them in contact with 
people all over the empire, and allowed them to lobby for their causes, and to make allies 
and enemies, even before reaching their destinations. The way in which the newcomers 
inserted themselves into local societies was not only determined by local conditions, but 
also by the royal officials’ imperial networks, and they operated in many different 
centers. 
Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, a patriarch and patron on his own right, also 
relied heavily on these networks of global range. While serving in the Philippines and 
other parts of the empire, he maintained contacts with members of his family, his patrons, 
and his retainers. They were his informants, brokers, and lobbyists. Some of them were 
part of his entourage and moved with him. For instance, when Hurtado de Corcuera was 
still serving in Panama and had been appointed governor of the Philippines, his brother 
Íñigo, who was stationed in Madrid, requested on his behalf that more men were sent to 
the Asian islands.129 Moreover, during the residencia Íñigo represented Sebastián in the 
court and actively tried to get him out of jail.130 From Berguenda, the family’s hometown 
                                                
129 AGI, Filipinas, 40, N. 51 “Petición de Íñigo Hurtado de Corcuera de más gente para su hermano” 
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130 AGI, Filipinas, 2, N. 172 “Relación del último estado que tiene la residencia de Sebastián Hurtado de 
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in the Basque Country, a nephew wrote letters asking the king to properly reward don 
Sebastián, and to give him license to end his government in the Philippines and to return 
to Spain, and also complained about don Jerónimo de Bañuelos y Carrillo, who in 
Mexico had published a book in which he criticized don Sebastián’s government.131 
Several years later don Pedro Hurtado de Corcuera, in his will, left several jewels to his 
uncle Sebastián, who was the head of the family and holder of its state.132 Likewise, don 
Sebastián was a client of his uncle, don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, count of Corzana.133 
He was a close and direct relative, but belonged to a more prestigious branch of the 
family. On several occasions he stood up for don Sebastián, providing protection and 
granting him access to the royal court. In 1638, Corzana wrote to the Council of the 
Indies to defend his nephew’s government in the Philippines, and to dismiss the many 
criticisms that Hurtado de Corcuera’s enemies were spreading and had reached the 
court.134 In 1656, when the former governor was back in Spain, the count asked him to 
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look over the education of Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, his grandchild and the future 
third count of Corzana, and to administer his estate.135 
Don Sebastián’s relatives interceded for him, but he also protected them and 
incorporated them into the royal service. When in 1659 the captain was in charge of the 
organization of the defense of the Principality of Asturias, don Sebastián asked 
permission to appoint as his lieutenant one of his nephews who had been with him the 
past three years, a petition to which the king agreed.136 Likewise, another of don 
Sebastián’s nephews, don Pedro, accompanied him to the Philippines and became his 
closest and most trusted assistant.137 The Hurtado de Corcuera’s familial ties remained 
strong despite the distance and time that separated them. Those locally based bonds 
quickly adapted to the global and imperial scenario, and this family, rooted in the deep 
Basque Country, was able to extend its networks in places such as Madrid, North Africa, 
the middle of the Atlantic, and as far as the Philippines. 
 
Patronage and Local Rulership  
Despite the significance of the imperial networks of patronage, the trial of 
Hurtado de Corcuera did expose the various local Philippine actors who aligned in 
different networks, either as enemies or friends of the polarizing governor. There were 
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those who opposed the official and testified or presented charges against him, as well 
against his relatives and clients. Judiciary records also show the many people—royal 
officials, judges, soldiers, or merchants—who became retainers of the governor.138 
Religious institutions, too, were part of the network. The Jesuits greatly profited from 
their linkage with the governor, and in fact, were among the few allies that stayed by his 
side during his residencia by helping him to communicate while in jail, and to hide and 
smuggle jewels.139 
Among all Hurtado de Corcuera’s clients, there is one that deserves particular 
attention: Manuel Chunquian.140 He was a “Sangley”: a Chinese person living in the 
Philippines. During the governor’s residencia, Chunquian was accused by other Sangleys 
of wrongdoing, namely, exploiting other Chinese and making illegal profits, all under the 
protection of the governor, his patron. There are two lawsuits against Chunquian: the first 
was an accusation promoted by Bartolomé Huico, a Sangley carpenter; the second 
contained the charges against Chunquian and Sucsi, another Sangley accused of being a 
servant of the first one, presented by the Sangley merchants Toyoc, Quiqua, and 
Gomo.141 
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Manuel Chunquian served as a broker between the governor and the large and 
extremely important Chinese population in the islands. As already mentioned, brokers 
were important figures in the patronage system, as they provided patrons with resources 
otherwise inaccessible to them. Chunquian acted as a necessary intermediary for reaching 
and controlling the Sangleys living in Manila. Hurtado de Corcuera put him in charge of 
the collection of taxes on Chinese games and festivities.142 Moreover, it seems that the 
governor relied on him to organize and move thousands of Sangleys from Manila to 
Calamba, a town about 100 miles South, where they were forced to work.143 Evidently, 
for Hurtado de Corcuera, as well as for any other governor, it would have been 
impossible to access the Chinese population without intermediaries. Language alone was 
a major barrier, but above all, Spanish authorities did not have the cultural, social, or 
political resources to impose their authority on, or to negotiate by themselves with, the 
Sangleys. The situation with the Sangleys was not an isolated case, but intrinsic to 
Spanish political culture. Across the world, the Spaniards relied on native intermediaries, 
whether Andean curacas, the Muslim Q’adis, or Italian noblemen.144 
During the trial, Chunquian acknowledged that he was a retainer of the governor, 
and that he only followed orders, having no more authority than that granted by the 
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Spanish official.145 This Sangley, however, who apparently did not even speak Spanish 
and required an interpreter during his trial, was able to act as a broker not because 
Hurtado de Corcuera put him in charge, but because of his networks and influence upon 
the Chinese.146 It was this previous condition that made the Sangley valuable and that got 
him the governor’s protection and favor. In the two proceedings, it was claimed that 
Chunquian was always surrounded by a large entourage of Sangleys who did as ordered. 
He built a powerful network and was obeyed by the Sangley merchants, who had to pay 
him a commission.147 He and his circle, in an exhibition of their growing power, began to 
use the “don” before their names, so he demanded that the other Chinese called him don 
Chunquian.148 
Perhaps the most important attribute of Chunquian, which was sanctioned by 
Hurtado de Corcuera, was his role as judge of the Sangleys. The three Sangley merchants 
affirmed that Chunquian was in charge of the administration of justice among the 
Sangleys. They argued that such a position was outrageous and against all law because 
Chunquian had not been baptized and was an infidel, and thus could not intervene in the 
matters of Christians. So, they claimed, he illegally judged the many baptized Sangleys of 
Manila. The carpenter Bartolomé Huico also acknowledged the legal authority that 
Chunquian had upon the Sangley community. He accused the governor’s retainer of 
eliminating any menace to his authority by wrongfully prosecuting the most notable 
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Sangleys. After seizing them, he ordered either to banish them or to send them to 
forcefully work in the galleys or in the foundry.149 
These examples speak to the complicated nature of power and rule in the 
Philippines and other areas of the Spanish Empire. While Spaniards held sway over the 
upper jurisdiction and oversaw the government of all subjects (even the Chinese, who 
technically were not subjects of the Spanish king), lower levels of jurisdiction also 
existed, and native communities retained much of their autonomy. The Spanish Empire 
was in fact built upon the confluence and overlapping of varied and asymmetric systems 
of justice and government. Spaniards could not (nor did they wish to) impose one unique 
and absolute law upon everyone.150 This was particularly true in the Philippines where 
the Chinese outnumbered Spaniards, and retained much of their culture, religion and 
customs, and linkages with China. 
The charges against Chunquian also expose the various competing networks that 
existed within the Chinese community, and which could engage with the Spanish 
networks. It is very telling that a carpenter who apparently was not rich and did not have 
any major social or political influence made the principal accusations against Chunquian. 
It is most likely that he was only serving as an intermediary and following the directives 
of Hurtado de Corcuera’s adversaries. However, the charges presented by the three 
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merchants seem to be motivated by their own disagreements and disputes with 
Chunquian and his retainers. In fact, most of the accusations are directed not at 
Chunquian, but to one of his alleged servants, a Sangley named Sucsi, who emphatically 
rebuffed all the accusations. He denied he was Chunquian’s servant or relative, or even 
that he had known him prior to their arrival in the Philippines. He contended that he was 
from the Chinese region of Santuo, while Chunquian was from Cheboy, and they had 
lived far away from each other. 
Sucsi acknowledged that he knew the plaintiffs well. They were his “enemigos 
capitales,” ever since the previous year, when those merchants had a discussion and a 
fight with one of his nephews. Moreover, he affirmed that the merchants, along with the 
other witnesses, were anayas while Sucsi was a chincheco, two very different Chinese 
ethnic groups.151 The tensions between these two factions dated from long ago, and most 
likely had their origin in China, as the Spanish governor of the Sangleys, the sergeant 
Andrés de Cueto, confirmed.152 Quite interestingly, in his defense Sucsi provided the 
testimony not only of many Sangleys, but also of several Spanish officials who assured 
they knew him, and who expounded on the “bad nature” of the anayas. The captain Juan 
de la Barrera confirmed that he had never heard that Sucsi and Chunquian were relatives, 
but he could attest to the vindictive and arrogant character of the anayas. This captain 
spoke from his experience as he had served as lieutenant of the company that guarded the 
Parián (the Chinese borough).153 Through these transactions, Spanish and Sangleys 
coexisted and interacted, although sometimes these relationships could break down and 
end up in violent scenarios. Hurtado de Corcuera’s behavior vividly illustrates these 
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tensions. While he could lead a vicious and brutal repression against the revolted 
Sangleys, and annihilate almost its entire population, he could also protect and take a 
Sangley as one of his closest allies and servants.154 
That a governor of the Philippines relied on a Sangley for ruling should not come 
as a surprise. It was part of the prevailing political culture in which the impossibility of 
governing without retainers was acknowledged. Imperial officials became patrons of a 
wide array of actors, including of course, several native leaders who acted as brokers 
between Spanish authorities and local societies. Yanna Yannakakis has studied the key 
role of native intermediaries in Oaxaca, Mexico. For instance, Felipe de Santiago and 
Joseph de Celis were two late seventeenth-century Indigenous leaders defined as ladinos; 
they were bicultural, skilled in Spanish language and customs, and often dressed in 
Spanish clothing. They served to connect the Spanish and the native worlds and helped, 
on the one hand, to preserve indigenous autonomy, and on the other, to secure Spanish 
rule and diminish possible outbursts by native populations. These native leaders were 
caught in between the pressure from the local Spanish governor and priests, the most 
concrete manifestations of the imperial authority, and pressure from the Indigenous 
community, who demanded greater autonomy and wished to be relieved of the heavy tax 
burdens and exploitations.155 Similarly, Steve Stern, in his classic study on colonial Peru, 
defined the position of such indigenous leaders as a “tragedy of success,” in which they 
were capable of negotiating better native terms while simultaneously supporting colonial 
rule. They were, in many regards, the enforcers of colonial rule at the local level.156 
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Imperial official’s dependency on native brokers was so acute that in 1657 the 
governor of Tucumán (in present-day Argentina), Alonso Mercado y Villacorta, was 
persuaded into officially recognizing the Spaniard Pedro Bohorques as an Inca ruler. The 
fascinating story of Bohorques—usually described by contemporaries and scholars alike, 
as a trickster, swindler, or a conman— is well known.157 Despite being a “native of 
Granada, and that he has resided for thirty years in these kingdoms, of the age of fifty, 
white and blond,” he managed to insert himself among the indigenous societies of the 
Calchaquí valley.158 In less than three years he had manipulated and convinced of his 
high-sounding plans the natives, the missionary priests, the principal citizens of the 
province, and the governor of Tucumán. He made great promises to all of his 
interlocutors, and they all believed him. He knew what people desired and wanted to 
listen. Bohorques promised the American natives freedom and a return to the yearned 
pre-Spanish status quo; while simultaneously, he offered Spaniards an alternative path to 
convince and rule people who for a long time had been reluctant to any Spanish contact, 
as well as obtaining from them information on how to get to the Paititi, the mythical land 
of gold. Evidently, these were opposed promises, but it seems that Spaniards and 
Calchaquíes believed and trusted him to some degree. 
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Bohorques was able to make these promises because of his cosmopolitanism and 
profound knowledge of both worlds. He moved from Spain to America in 1620, and 
somehow convinced two viceroys to each authorize him to organize expeditions into the 
jungle in search of the Paititi. Both expeditions ended up badly, especially the last one, 
after which the viceroy imprisoned him in Valdivia, Chile. During these campaigns, 
Bohorques served as a royal official and worked to extend and confirm Spanish power 
throughout the region, while also looking for his personal profit. In between of his 
adventures, he got married to Ana Bonilla, a woman of indigenous ascendency. After all 
these years wandering around, this man got acquainted with indigenous population and 
culture. Most importantly, he learned to speak Quechua, the native Inca language that 
became lingua franca throughout the Andes.159 When Bohorques arrived in Tucumán, 
after fleeing out from jail, he convinced the Calchaquíes that he was an Inca, the heir of 
the last native rulers of the Andes. We do not have any sources to know for sure what this 
people thought of him, but at the least they saw on him an opportunity, and played along. 
They accepted Bohorques as their leader, despite the physical evidence that he was far 
from being a native. 
Bohorques’s abilities as a broker gave him legitimacy in front of both groups. 
Indigenous’ confidence on him was the main reason for being accepted by the Spanish 
authorities, who argued that his manners were “easy and accommodating to the nature of 
these people, that we have conferred and judged to be right and quite pleased to abide by 
the will of experienced and reasonable people of this province.”160 Ana Maria Lorandi 
contends that Bohorques “was unlike other conquistadors in trying to integrate himself—
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not merely as just another Indian, but as a leader capable of conducting the people to a 
new destiny.”161 He was eager and capable of integrating into the Indigenous world, and 
apparently, to be accepted by them. Nevertheless, this cultural mobility had its costs. 
Bohorques found soon that belonging to the two worlds could mean, at the end, 
belonging to none. In fact, soon after the viceroy of Peru, the count of Alba de Liste, 
received news of Bohorques presence and activities in Tucumán he ordered to stop and 
incarcerate this man because “nada de lo que tiene entre manos puede ser bueno un 
hombre que no ha cabido en el mundo.”162 Bohorques easiness to merge with the natives 
could be useful and sometimes praised, but it raised suspicion, too. Living in-between the 
fissures of the two worlds, finally crushed him. 
Rulers, certainly, needed to rely on brokers and clients in order to govern. In 
Milan, the governors developed a refined and large court that became the center of 
Spanish power. There, governors’ favor was distributed among the local elites, who acted 
as brokers, and tied the local resources and societies to the Spanish Empire.163 Alejandro 
Cañeque has shown how important was the capacity of New Spain’s viceroys of 
providing posts on their circle of retainers. Their political activities and success were 
greatly dependent on having loyal clients occupy key positions in order to assure 
obedience and the fulfillment of their orders and policies. Moreover, the viceroys, as 
major patrons, needed posts and rewards to distribute among their clients. This situation, 
evidently, generated much tension because of the abuses that could occur, and the 
discomfort among the members of the local elites who felt they were being displaced. 
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Furthermore, many feared that the viceroys, if not fully controlled, could appear as 
powerful as the distant king. Thus, reining in their capacity to reward and ensuring that 
the king remained the primary source of favor and bounty became a priority.164  
In a society defined by the culture of patronage, having access to posts that could 
be given to clients was, no doubt, a valuable prerogative. The miner Felipe de Obregón, 
in his information on Potosí to the marquis of Villagarcía, listed the government posts 
that existed in the province. He distinguished between two kinds of corregimientos: those 
provided by the king and those given by the viceroy. He also noted that if any of the 
holders of those and other offices died, it was the president of La Plata who appointed 
someone temporarily.165 Such was an appealing prerogative. Throughout the seventeenth 
century the viceroys constantly fought to maintain the privilege of having posts at their 
disposal to grant and distribute at their will, something that the crown hesitated to allow 
because it justly feared that such policy could lessen the king’s authority. 
A height of this tension between the crown and the viceroy occurred in 1678. The 
king, worried by the excesses of the viceroys and their entourages, and pressed by the 
beneméritos’, the local descendants of the conquistadores, constant claims for greater 
access to royal bounty, issued a Royal Decree forbidding the viceroys to provide any 
posts at all. The monarch reserved this prerogative for himself only because in theory he 
would favor the local elites. It was not a very sophisticated attempt by the Crown to put 
an end to the viceroys’ common practice of using such privilege to appoint their clients 
and family, despite the numerous orders prohibiting it. Nonetheless, it was an impractical 
and unrealistic decree. The crown realized that it was impossible to bypass the viceroys 
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who, despite the ban, continued providing posts “temporarily.” They needed to do so in 
order to successfully rule and administer the viceroyalty.  To rule without the capacity of 
making appointments was unfeasible.166 
Only two years after this prohibition the king reversed his opinion. In 1680, don 
Melchor de Navarra y Rocafull, duke of La Palata, who was going to Peru to serve as its 
viceroy, presented a memorial in which he requested that the American viceroys were 
allowed to provide up to twelve posts among their clients, servants, and relatives. He 
argued that his predecessors had been forbidden to do so because if they favored their 
entourages, the large number of beneméritos would feel aggravated by being displaced 
and not properly rewarded. In an extremely honest passage, La Palata acknowledged the 
validity of that argument and the need of rewarding the local elites, but he also observed 
that it was impossible for the viceroys to obey such prohibition and “no pudiéndolo 
observar ningún virrey se mira esta transgresión como cargo ordinario de residencia que 
no pudiendo servir para la enmienda, aprovecha para la multa.”167 He bluntly claimed 
that a good ruler needed to reward his clients, and the efficacy of his government relied 
on having a large retinue that could inform and assist him. This was so essential that not 
even the threat of a negative residencia would deter these officials from engaging in the 
practices of patronage. 
Truly, the imperial official was pointing out a common practice. Viceroys were 
constantly placing in posts the many clients and relatives who travelled with them. This, 
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the Crown and the Council of the Indies were very well aware of, but could not fully 
control. For instance, forty years before this memorial, the marquis of Mancera, at the 
time the viceroy of Peru, wrote a letter justifying the appointment of his only child, the 
twenty-year old don Antonio de Toledo, as governor of the port of Callao. He claimed 
that he did so because in Peru there were not any fit persons for that important post—
although, ironically, he also praised the abilities of Isidro Coronado who had been the 
governor, and now was his son’s assistant. Mancera also argued that when his 
predecessor, the count of Villardompardo, appointed his own son, don Gerónimo de 
Portugal y Torres, to that post, it proved to be a good decision, and it was a good example 
to follow. The Council of the Indies responded in an ambiguous way. Because that 
appointment was expressly forbidden it was not right to formally approve and confirm it. 
However, because Mancera’s predecessors had given offices to their family and retainers, 
it would be unjust to reprehend the viceroy. Thus, the Council, without making any 
formal commitment that could be detrimental in the future, concluded “se puede tolerar el 
haber nombrado a su hijo, escribiéndole sin aprobar el nombramiento.”168 
Navarra y Rocafull argued that because of these precedents, continuing with the 
prohibition to the viceroys of providing offices to their clients, and fining and sanctioning 
those who transgressed the laws, only lessened the authority and prestige of the office of 
the viceroy. Because no viceroy could govern without fulfilling his duties as patrons, he 
argued, it was necessary to allow and formalize their prerogative to provide some posts. 
Trying to find a balance between the demands of the beneméritos and the viceroy’s 
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retinue, he asked to have twelve posts at his free disposal. The Council opposed this 
proposal and suggested the king continue following the reiterated royal decrees that 
forbade such practices. Otherwise, it might anger and upset the local population who 
were constantly pressing to get the king’s reward. The Council also feared that it would 
be harder to control the excesses of the viceroy’s clients, who would feel more protected 
and prone to abuse the Indians. However, one of the councilors, don Tomás de Valdés, 
expressed a contrary opinion. He agreed with don Melchor that because of “la calidad de 
sus personas y decencia de su puesto,” it was impossible for the viceroys not to bring 
with them “criados y allegados.” Therefore, they would always have to, finally, break the 
law. He suggested allowing the viceroys to provide eight posts, instead of the twelve 
requested by Palata.169 
Charles II decided not to follow the Council’s advice and instead accepted the 
request of the duke of La Palata, ordering that the viceroys of Peru and New Spain would 
each be allowed to provide twelve posts—even first-class ones—to their clients and 
relatives.170 This was an open recognition of the importance of the patronage system upon 
which the smooth functioning of the polity rested. Although there were many downsides 
to granting the viceroys such privileges, it was also true that the prevailing political 
culture made it unthinkable that a viceroy would travel alone and that he would not 
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reward his clients and family. The scenario of an ungrateful and non-magnificent patron 
was, ultimately, even more undesirable. It underscored the foundations of the early 
modern Spanish monarchy. 
Patronage culture and networks were the lifeblood of the Spanish political system. 
They were central for the ruling of the geographically disperse possessions of such a far-
flung empire. Officials relied permanently on these networks not only for ensuring local 
rule, but also for gaining access to information, resources, and even people, which were 
distant (geographically and socially) to them. Thanks to these networks, officials (and 
their families) engaged with the rest of empire. The constant itinerancy of these men 
would have been impossible without the support of these networks, which facilitated the 
immersion of the foreign officials into the local dynamics and integrated them into 
different societies. 
The networks of patronage proved to be extremely flexible. These locally based 
bonds— intimately linked to friendship and kinship—adapted to the new circumstances 
of the global empire, and to the intense mobility of the imperial officials. While 
patronage was founded upon personal and direct relationships between two people, it 
made possible the linkages between the many scattered centers of the empire, and the 
strengthening of the royal authority across the world. Certainly, these networks helped to 
consolidate private structures of power (whether that of the marquis of Villagarcía, the 
miners of Potosí, the smugglers of Buenos Aires, or the Sangley merchants in the 
Philippines) whose interests did not always coincide with those of the monarchy. 
Although it might seem counterintuitive, in the long run the dispersion of power and the 
circulation of the officials did not weaken the king; quite to the contrary, because of his 
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monopoly over royal favor, the monarch’s authority was cemented, and he emerged as 
the undisputed fount of political power.
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Bien sabe Vuestra Excelencia que la 
experiencia es maestra de la ciencia.1 
 
La verdad solo puede juzgar dellas quien ha 
visto y tocado con las manos lo que hay y ha 
pasado en estas provincias.2 
 
In the first days of June 1626, the 75-year old don Juan de Oñate died in 
Guadalcanal, province of Seville. Death reached this intrepid man thousands of miles 
away from America and his native Zacatecas, and from the territories of New Mexico, 
which by the turn of the sixteenth century he had conquered.3 Although at first, the 
presence of this former soldier and governor in the Spanish small town of Guadalcanal 
might come as a surprise, it becomes much more understandable when we view him not 
as a conquistador, but look instead at his lesser-known activities as miner and 
businessman. Oñate had gone all the way to Guadalcanal after being commissioned by 
the king to inspect the mines in that region. At that time, he was perhaps one of the 
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1953); Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, 1530-1888 (Albuquerque: Horn & 
Wallace, 1962); Stan Hoig, Came Men on Horses: The Conquistador Expeditions of Francisco Vázquez de 
Coronado and Don Juan de Oñate (Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2013). For a genealogical study 
of Juan de Oñate and his Basque heritage see Donald T. Garate, “Juan de Oñate’s ‘Prueba de Caballero’, 




richest men in the world—and not as a result of his endeavors in New Mexico, for which 
he is best known today. In fact, it was after his involvement in this troubling (and to 
many extents, failed) New Mexican enterprise that he returned to Zacatecas, where he 
resumed his previous business and fully and successfully devoted himself to improving 
the production of his inherited mines. In 1607, faced off against other conquistadores and 
officials who mobilized against him, Oñate was forced to resign as governor of New 
Mexico. He was accused of being cruel, despotic and incapable of handling the new 
settlements. In the following years he was punished by the Crown and was banished from 
the New Mexican territories. He was forced to settle again in Zacatecas, which at that 
period emerged as one of the world’s major centers of silver production.4 
Therefore, it made perfect sense when, in 1624, Philip IV appointed Oñate—who 
had traveled to Spain to appeal the sentences against him—as Visitador General de minas 
y escoriales de España, the General Inspector of Spain’s mines.5 In selecting him the 
monarch was not relying on Oñate the seasoned conquistador or former governor, but on 
Oñate the expert miner. The goal of such appointment was clear: the crown hoped to 
increase silver production in the Iberian Peninsula, which in previous decades had 
stagnated. Almost certainly there was no one in Spain with greater direct experience of 
silver mining than Oñate. In accepting the position, Oñate requested to bring six Mexican 
Indians, experts in mining, to assist him.6 It is hard to imagine a European team capable 
                                                
4 For a study of the mining industry in Zacatecas see P. J. Bakewell, Silver Mining and Society in Colonial 
Mexico: Zacatecas, 1546-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
5 Beerman, “The Death of an Old Conquistador,” 307. Oñate was partially vindicated and was monetarily 
reimbursed by the crown, but the banishment was maintained. Nonetheless, Oñate’s recent appointment by 
the king clearly shows that he had regained royal favor. 
6 Simmons, The Last Conquistador, 193; Zumalde, Los Oñate en México y Nuevo México, 75. 
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of outmatching the mining experience and expertise of Oñate and his Native American 
crew. 
In this chapter, I will examine the concept of ‘experience’ in the ruling and 
administration of the Spanish Empire, how experience was achieved and transmitted, and 
how the experience of the mobile officials in diverse locations shaped and validated their 
actions in other regions. Not only did officials move physically, but there were also 
several notions of what a good imperial official ought to do circulating intensely across 
the imperial space. Their former services on political matters, military affairs, or 
economic and financial endeavors, gave credence to their future activities in other regions 
and context, and served also as a blueprint for other officials who found themselves in 
similar circumstances, despite the physical and temporal distance. 
Officials appointed by the king gained experience on the ground by serving in 
their posts. Their actual practices of power and authority in multiple locations gave these 
men a profound and direct knowledge of the situation of the Monarchy, and of the 
peculiar conditions of its distinct regions. The mobile officials knew about the new 
geographies, peoples and their customs, new technologies, trade, routes, war, and, of 
course, the ways to govern and administer the empire.  
Experience was a highly valued trait in the early modern Spanish Empire. It was 
common to praise the experience of the officials, or to criticize their lack of it. This was 
not mere rhetoric or empty words. The king and his councilors took seriously the 
experience of the officials. The monarch was expected to reward experienced officials, 
and the king greatly benefited from their vast knowledge. Officials’ experience had a 
great impact on the way the empire was administered. Not only did their experiences 
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benefit the officials themselves, who knew better how to respond and handle different 
situations, but also the officials’ experience was passed along. Imperial officials 
translated their tangible experiences into written memorials, reports, and books. These 
documents, which circulated profusely across the empire, helped to build a shared 
knowledge of how to effectively govern the many spaces and subjects of the Spanish 
king. 
 
The Ideal of Experience 
Experience was at the center of the political thought in early modern Spain. Diego 
Saavedra Fajardo, the most influential seventeenth-century Spanish political writer, 
devoted a whole chapter—or device—of his Empresas políticas to explain the 
importance of experience to good government, and the ways in which experience could 
be obtained.7 Just as with the other ideas he discusses, Saavedra Fajardo begins by 
displaying and explaining an image that conveys his argument (Fig. 4). The device’s 
motto is Fulcitur experientiis, supported by experience. The figure depicts a Rostral 
column, a Roman victory column erected to celebrate the naval victories. From a plinth, a 
column emerges where the prows of the triumphant ships are mounted. The solid column 
represents wisdom, which is obtained through “speculation and study,” while the prows, 
“that had run through so many perils upon the ocean,” signify the experience.8 According 
to Saavedra Fajardo, these two attributes together made for a perfect governor. Wisdom 
                                                
7 Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Empresas políticas, ed. Sagrario López Poza (Madrid: Cátedra, 1999), chap. 
30. This book, first published in 1640, was soon translated into multiple languages. For a contemporary 
English version, see Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, The Royal Politician Represented in One Hundred 
Emblems Written in Spanish by Don Diego Saavedra Faxardo...with a Large Preface, Containing an 
Account of the Author, His Works, and the Usefulness Thereof; Done into English from the Original, by Sir 
Ja. Astry. (London: Printed for Matt. Gylliflower and Luke Meredith, 1700). 
8 Saavedra Fajardo, The Royal Politician, 214–215. 
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referred to the abstract, universal and constant matters; and experience concerned unique 
events and concrete and particular circumstances. 
 
 
Figure 4. Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Idea de un príncipe cristiano representada en cien empresas 




Saavedra Fajardo posited that there are two types of experience. The first is 
personal and directly acquired experience. The second is indirect experience, cultivated 
either by the study of History, or by communications with those with direct experience.9 
Therefore, wisdom, too, is a form of experience. Nonetheless, he asserts that indirect 
experiences are not as persuasive as one’s own experiences, which “are too deeply 
engraved, as I may say, on our breasts to be soon effaced.”10 For instance, he argues that 
a shipwreck seen from the coast would surely be touching, but nothing compared to 
surviving one, which would be a major life lesson. 
Saavedra Fajardo also maintains that the best teachers for a prince are not those 
“who are most eminent for learning and knowledge,” but those practical men “who are 
learned and experienced politicians.”11 Hence, Saavedra Fajardo urged the monarch to 
rely on officials with actual experience, and cautioned him about leaving the government 
in hands of those who were too thoughtful and committed to a monastic life. In his 
writing he argued that the later kind of advisors lacked any on-the-ground experience and 
knowledge of practical things, for when ruling they would fail either for being too shy, or 
too daring.12 Indeed, for this writer with ample experience as an imperial official 
throughout Europe, making mistakes by stepping into action was much more desirable 
than remaining safe and idle.13 He affirms, “from errors proceeds experience, and from 
thence the best maxims of government.”14 
                                                
9 Ibid., 203–204. 
10 Ibid., 216. 
11 Ibid., 31. 
12 Ibid., 215. 
13 Saavedra Fajardo was Spanish ambassador in Rome, Bavaria, the 1636 Diet of Regensburg, and during 
the signing of the Peace of Westphalia.  
14 Saavedra Fajardo, The Royal Politician, 207. 
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For Saavedra Fajardo, experience was fundamental for officials’ good 
government because it taught them how to behave in different circumstances. Although 
there is one universal reason, he argues, the spirits of men are varied, and therefore there 
are many possible paths. The key for successful ruling is in adapting to the nature of the 
subjects, which should be “suitably to the person’s nature, as they change the bit 
according to the horse’s mouth.”15 Not every official could accommodate to every 
scenario, or to every kind of people. It was up to the king, then, to choose the right person 
for each situation. This was of absolute importance for Saavedra Fajardo. He urged the 
monarch to carefully examine the qualities of the officials before appointing them, as he 
asserted, “more kingdoms having been destroyed by their [the ministers’] ignorance than 
by that of princes”16 
Counterbalancing his arguments, the author closes his chapter noting that too-
experienced officials could also be problematic. If they did not pause to think and 
evaluate every given situation, and, overconfidently, jumped into dangerous situations, 
they would also fail in their government. The king’s council, writes Saavedra Fajardo, 
should be formed by people with great experience as well as by novices, whose fears 
would ensure moderation and caution.17 
Saavedra Fajardo’s insistence on the value of experience was not unique. 
According to Jeremy Robbins, the prizing of experience was part of a broader Spanish 
epistemological trend that emphasized the “arts of perception” as means to truly 
apprehend the world. Robbins argues that seventeenth-century Spanish thought was 
                                                
15 Ibid., 219. 
16 Ibid., 222. Likewise, he suggested to continue with such vigilance, and permanently cast a wary eye on 
officials’ reports, as many tended to write not what they did, but what they should have done. 
17 Ibid., 223–224. 
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defined by two major philosophical currents that were intertwined: Neostoicism and 
Scepticism. For Robbins, the work of Saavedra Fajardo is the best example of this 
conjunction, although he contends that the entanglement of those doctrines became a 
general frame of mind—which permeated all Spanish activities, from literature to 
political theory. In this vein, Robbins critiques studies that focus solely on Northern 
Europe while overlooking seventeenth-century Spanish epistemology, forgetting that 
Spain was the Western most import polity at the time and that it was neither idle nor in 
decline. In fact, contrary to the prevailing opinion, Spanish scientists, philosophers, and 
political thinkers—like Diego Saavedra Fajardo—were widely read and influential on 
European thought. Likewise, Spaniards fully engaged with the new ideas and concepts, 
and actively took part on Humanist ideas and fostered its development. In fact, Robbins 
contends that Spanish empiricism fostered a mindset that was receptive to the new 
science developed by men like Bacon and Locke, and which was built upon 
experimentation.18  
According to Robbins, while scholars have overlooked Scepticism (mainly 
because there are fewer philosophical discussions to trace), it truly had a major impact on 
early modern Spanish thought. Its philosophical “claim that no secure knowledge was 
possible in any area of human activity, from intellectual disciplines down to simple acts 
of perception,” was widely accepted by sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spaniards.19 
Evidently, this was a subversive thought that called into question all possible knowledge. 
                                                
18 Jeremy Robbins, Arts of Perception: The Epistemological Mentality of the Spanish Baroque, 1580-1720 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2007). The work of Saavedra Fajardo is analyzed mainly on Chapters 3 and 4.  
19 Ibid., 36. 
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The only certainty unto which people could hold was Catholic faith. Therefore, knowing 
the truth, and unveiling the treacherous nature of things was mainly a moral activity.20 
Stoic ideas, thanks mainly to the work of Justus Lipsius and other humanists, 
became predominant in seventeenth-century Europe.21 As part of the Renaissance milieu, 
classic ideas and authors, mostly Seneca and Cicero, were assimilated into Christian 
doctrine, and Stoic moral and maxims became widely accepted. Nonetheless, 
Neostoicism was an eclectic movement and fully defining its boundaries is hard.22 In 
Europe, Neostoicism had its greatest impact in Spain.23 Seneca was well known to the 
Spaniards throughout the Middle Ages (perhaps because the philosopher had been born in 
Córdoba), and by the turn of the seventeenth century, Stoic ideas such as “the 
deceptiveness of appearances and of 'common-sense' opinions, the misery and brevity of 
life, the inevitability of death and the need to prepare for it, and the decrying of 'external' 
                                                
20 Ibid., 26–37. 
21 For a good balance of the work of Lipsius see Jacqueline Lagrée, “Justus Lipsius and Neostoicism,” in 
The Routledge Handbook of the Stoic Tradition, ed. John Sellars (New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis 
Group, 2016), 160–173. For a study of the impact of Neostoicism in European early modern politics see the 
classic yet still relevant Gerhard Oestreich, Neostoicism and the Early Modern State (Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1982). Mark Morford studies the impact of Stoic ideas on Lipsius and 
his circle of pupils, specially on Peter Paul Rubens and his paintings: Stoics and Neostoics: Rubens and the 
Circle of Lipsius (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1991).  
22 In fact, the same can be said about Stoicism itself, which lacked a coherent and cohesive program. The 
Stoics originally were defined as those individuals that around the 3rd century BC met at the Painted Stoa, 
in Athens. Thus, although they had many common views, they also had many disagreements. It was 
through the later writings of Cicero and Seneca that a more rounded doctrine emerged. John Sellars 
summarizes in a nutshell the major claims with which Stoicism came to be identified: “that virtue (aretê) is 
the highest good and is sufficient for happiness (eudaimonia), that the soul is undivided and rational, 
meaning that emotions (pathê) are the product of judgments under one's control, and that the cosmos is a 
single living being, identified with God, of which we are all parts.” However, it is also true that the 
meaning and implications of those maxims have also changed through time. John Sellars, “Introduction,” in 
The Routledge Handbook of the Stoic Tradition, 3–4. 
23 The works of Seneca, Lipsius and others circulated profusely in Spain, whether in their original 
languages or translated into Spanish, and men like the Count-duke of Olivares possessed several of these 
books. Moreover, Lipsius himself (a Catholic subject of Phillip II) dedicated some of his works to Spanish 
noblemen such as the Duke of Frías, and the Count of Fuentes. Henry Ettinghausen, Francisco de Quevedo 
and the Neostoic Movement (Oxford: University Press, 1972), 14. For a comprehensive analysis of the 
editions and translations of the work of Seneca, and its reception in Spain see Karl Alfred Blüher, Séneca 
en España: investigaciones sobre la recepción de Séneca en España desde el siglo XIII hasta el siglo XVII 
(Madrid: Gredos, 1983). 
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goods in general” were a commonplace.24 Stoic ideas can be found in the writings of 
almost any Spanish writer or thinker of that period, including Francisco de Quevedo, the 
most prominent exponent of Spanish Neostoicism.25 
Altogether, Neostoicism and Scepticism, argues Robbins, “urged individuals to 
beware of, and to remove, an excess of credulity.”26 These doctrines emphasized the idea 
of human fallibility, the inherent difficulty of discovering the truth and essence of the 
world, and the question of knowledge and perception was posited by means of the terms 
ser/parecer and desengaño/engaño.27 It was necessary to take distance from the object to 
know, and to develop proper techniques of perceptual examination for unveiling the truth. 
In this context of epistemological uncertainty—in which it was acknowledged the 
impossibility of full knowledge, and that the world was extremely diverse, albeit ruled by 
one unique reason—experience acquired a fundamental role.28 Only through the careful 
observation and judgment of many particular events was it possible to know the general 
essence of those events and draw conclusions. Moreover, because of the uncertain and 
deceptive nature of external appearances, the goal of knowledge was to capture the true 
essence of things. Therefore, knowledge became a moral enterprise: only by discerning 
good from bad could the truth emerge. Catholic doctrine, thus, was taken as the 
foundation against which reality was measured and interpreted.29 
Because of these ideas, a form of empiricism emerged that heavily relied on the 
concepts of experience and contingency. Robbins states the three features of this 
                                                
24 Ettinghausen, Francisco de Quevedo and the Neostoic Movement, 11.  
25 Other major figures of this intellectual current are Baltasar Gracián, Pedro de Rivadeneira, Juan de 
Mariana, Francisco Sánchez de las Brozas, and Antonio López de Vega. 
26 Robbins, Arts of Perception, 16. 
27 Ibid., 8. 
28 As it will be seen in Chapter Five, these Neostoic ideas also sustained a cosmopolitan culture that hoped 
to encompass the world’s inherent diversity under one logic and reason. 
29 Robbins, Arts of Perception, 40. 
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empiricism: knowledge arose from sense-experience, it was based on an intense scrutiny 
of the outside world, and the personal direct experience or that of credible witnesses were 
privileged as sources of knowledge and information.30 In this regard, the imperial 
officials were at the forefront of early modern empiricism. Certainly, they had plenty of 
personal and direct engagement with the outside and far-away world. They were 
constantly experiencing it, and adapting to the volatile circumstances; and perhaps more 
importantly, as first-hand observers, they were reporting all of it. 
From the perspective of the history of science, Antonio Barrera-Osorio points in 
the same direction. He has argued that the encounters and personal experiences of 
Spanish officials with the New World led to the emergence of Empiricism in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The recent discoveries of new commodities, but also 
of new technologies and experiences of navigation fostered what he defines as an Early 
Scientific Revolution, in which there was a new emphasis on empirical observation and 
personal experience, and a criticism of the classical texts. Barrera-Osorio shows that 
empirical observation became the common practice of sailors, merchants, explorers, 
naturalists, adventurers, and imperial officials that interacted with the overseas 
possessions, societies, and nature. Progressively, these experiences were later 
institutionalized and incorporated—mainly through the House of Trade in Seville—into 
Spanish practices of imperial government and knowledge production.31 
                                                
30 Ibid., 18.  
31 Barrera-Osorio, Experiencing Nature; “Empire and Knowledge: Reporting from the New World,” 
Colonial Latin American Review 15, no. 1 (June 2006): 39–54; “Empiricism in the Spanish Atlantic 
World,” in Science and Empire in the Atlantic World, ed. James Delbourgo and Nicholas Dew (New York: 
Routledge, 2008), 177–202; “Knowledge and Empiricism in the Sixteenth-Century Spanish Atlantic 
World,” in Science in the Spanish and Portuguese Empires, 1500-1800, ed. Daniela Bleichmar et al. 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 219–232. He also vigorously argues for recovering the 
central place of the Spanish Empire, and of America, in the development of the Scientific Revolution, 
which traditionally has been portrayed as a process exclusive to Europe, and to the Anglo-Saxon world.  
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María Portuondo coincides in the importance of the New World for the 
development of a modern science that moved away from the classic principles in favor of 
new approaches in which sensitive experience was key. The immense flow of new 
knowledge that went from the New World to Europe was integrated in innovative ways. 
One of the major concerns of the Spanish authorities was to know the new world that 
suddenly appeared. This was at the origins of modern cartography—but modern scholars 
have neglected such scientific development, mostly because this knowledge was kept 
secret and the physical evidence destroyed. Portuondo shows that such information was 
gathered through questionnaires filled by officials on the ground, and then those partial 
pieces of intelligence where to be integrated and combined by the imperial 
cosmographers.32   
In this regard, the reports of the imperial officials were of extreme importance for 
the imperial government. They were the king’s eyes and ears outside the royal court. The 
impressive amount of information processed by the imperial councils was based on the 
particular experiences of officials, and served to draw an image of the nature and 
situation of the empire, from the far-away Philippines to a closer place such as Murcia. 
Most commonly, officials framed their experiences in a standard format: the 
Informaciones de méritos y servicios. These documents, which will be studied later in 
this chapter, were presented by the officials as means to obtain royal reward. In them, 
officials summarized their most relevant actions in the various posts in which they served 
around the globe. They assembled those services together to project a coherent narrative 
of themselves as good and ideal officials. The informaciones of officials from all across 
the Monarchy provided much, although scattered, concrete information on local events, 
                                                
32 Portuondo, Secret Science. 
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and altogether, like a patchwork, they sketched a comprehensive vision of the whole 
empire.   
 
Moving and Experiencing the Empire 
A mobile official like Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera knew very well the value of 
experience and basked in his own. In 1656, already in the last years of his life, he rejected 
(for the third time) his second appointment as governor of Panama with a rather peculiar 
argument: that he had too much experience. Following the widely accepted premise that 
“la experiencia es maestra de la ciencia,” he affirmed that having served over 24 years in 
three different parts of the Indies (Peru, Panama, and the Philippines) he had lots of 
knowledge and information about that region and, if he was sent to such a faraway 
region, could not easily share it with the council. Thus, he tried to persuade the count of 
Peñaranda, president of the Council of the Indies, to instead nominate him as a member 
of that Council.33 
Hurtado de Corcuera’s experience did, indeed, help him in the diverse posts he 
held. Because he had been in the army since a teenager, the military was his field of 
major expertise. In 1656, in the midst of the war against England, because of his “mucha 
experiencia y autoridad,” he was commissioned to organize the military defense of the 
                                                
33 BNE, Mss/5757, f. 87v - 89 Hurtado de Corcuera to Count of Peñaranda, “Respuesta sobre la provisión 
del gobierno de Panamá.” The former governor of the Philippines did not only reject the post in Panama, 
but also the government of the island of Santo Domingo. This was a strategic post for the control of the 
Caribbean, where the presence of English and French colonizers was continuously growing and menacing 
Spanish authority. The councilors were well aware of the situation and of the need of a person with the 
“experiencia, valor y prudencia que pedía el estado de las cosas y la defensa de aquella isla.” Thus the post 
was offered to Hurtado de Corcuera, “por el crédito que tenía,” as he conveyed all that qualities. AGI, 
Santo Domingo, 2, N. 70 “Sobre papeles que dan cuenta de los excesos de don Félix de Zúñiga y 
Avellaneda” (Madrid, August 28, 1658), fol. 15v. Hurtado de Corcuera was also appointed corregidor of 
Sanlúcar de Barrameda by the king. He did not hold the post, as he was then governor of the Canaries. 
AHN, Consejos, 13628, 4, N. 22 “Propone personas para el corregimiento de San Lucar de Barrameda” 
(Madrid, May 5, 1659). 
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Principality of Asturias, in northern Spain. The king ordered him to survey the land to set 
its defense, but also to teach basic military notions to the common people, so they could 
be prepared to take arms in case of an English invasion.34 Philip IV gave the old captain 
ample powers, and commanded the Principality’s corregidor to obey and follow Hurtado 
de Corcuera, as he was “persona de las calidades y experiencia militar que sabéis.”35 In 
fact, Hurtado de Corcuera himself declared, “yo he pasado palabra que por haber sido 
capitán de caballos en Flandes, y general de caballería en el Pirú, les asistiré, seré su 
capitán y gobernaré.”36 
The military was, no doubt, an area in which a good imperial official was 
expected to have substantial experience. Military service was a major component of the 
Spanish ideal of nobility. As shown in Chapter One, the Spanish Empire was constantly 
facing war in Europe, America, Asia, and Africa, and there was a huge mobility of 
Spanish soldiers across the globe. Moreover, those war theaters were important schools 
for the imperial officials. When in 1653 the lawyer Juan Francisco de Montemayor was 
temporarily left in charge of the government of the island of Santo Domingo he had to 
arrange a military expedition to the nearby northern island of Tortuga, which had been 
occupied by French pirates. Although his training was academic, he had begun his 
imperial services in the war of Catalonia in the 1640s. This was a life experience that 
greatly influenced him. When some years later Montemayor prepared his información de 
méritos, he greatly emphasized his service in the war. Diverting from the usual concise 
format of the informaciones, he described with great detail all of those activities. As a 
                                                
34 BNE, Mss/5757, f. 6 “Nota,” n.d. 
35 BNE, Mss/5757, f. 8v-9 “Carta de S.M. a el corregidor del Principado” (Madrid, February 18, 1656). 
36 BNE, Mss/5757, f. 52v - 53v “Carta de Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera sobre las dificultades de las 
compañías de Caballos,” 1656. 
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graduate in law, he had judiciary commissions, mainly referred to the judgment of 
fugitive soldiers. At some point, Montemayor was put in charge of securing the 
provisions of the army. He also held positions of political authority and, on some 
occasions, directly took part in military actions.37 Unsurprisingly, then, while governing 
Santo Domingo, he affirmed that because he could not find in the island a trusted soldier 
with enough experience, he himself would direct the actions against the French occupiers 
relying on “algunas noticias que me han quedado del tiempo que en servicio de V.M. 
asistí en el ejército de Cataluña.”38 
The war of Flanders, above all, taught many imperial officials how to fight. The 
captain Manuel Coello, who in 1667 had traveled to Peru as part of the entourage of the 
viceroy count of Lemos, related that on one occasion, during the military activities to 
break up the rebellion in Puno, the countess of Lemos was left in charge of the 
government. He affirmed that she acted outstandingly. Coello praised the lady, and 
claimed that she seemed to have great experience, “como si hubiera muchísimos años 
sido general de Flandes.”39 In many ways, this war became the largest and most 
prestigious school in which Spanish soldiers and officials received their educations. Such 
was the opinion of Jacinto de Aguilar y Prado, a writer, historian and soldier, who, in the 
1610s, voluntarily went to Flanders to fight “porque si un soldado no sirve en aquellos 
                                                
37 AGI, Indiferente, 116, N.3 “Méritos de Juan Francisco Montemayor y Córdoba de Cuenca,” February 7, 
1651. His services would also appear in the cover of his Excubationes semicentum ex decisionibus regiae 
chancellariae S. Dominici insula vulgo dicta Española (Mexico: Franc. Rodriguez Lupercio, 1667).  
38 AGI, Patronato, 273, R. 5, f. 77-78 Juan Francisco Montemayor y Córdoba de Cuenca, “Carta de 
Francisco Montemayor y Cuenca dando cuenta del estado de la isla” (Santo Domingo, September 1, 1653). 
39 BNE, Mss/11017,  f. 193 - 206v. Manuel Coello, “Carta del capitán Manuel Coello, sargento mayor de la 
gente de guerra que llevó el conde de Lemos, virrey de Perú, para la pacificación de Puno, escrita a un 
correspondiente suyo de la ciudad de Cádiz. Con relación del viaje y sucesos” (Lima, January 29, 1669), 
fol. 204v. For a study on the rebellion of Puno, see Antonio Acosta Rodríguez, “Conflictos sociales y 
políticos en el sur peruano (Puno, La Paz, Laicacota. 1660-1668).,” in Primeras jornadas de Andalucía y 
América (La Rábida: Instituto de Estudios Onubenses, 1981), 27–52. 
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países, parece que sus servicios son de menor tonsura, aunque sean dignos de 
estimación.”40 Similarly, when Pedro Esteban Dávila was stationed in the Azores—a 
Portuguese possession with a tradition of rebellion against Spanish authority but at the 
time under the rule of the Spanish monarch—he asked the king to appoint as the island’s 
Sargent Major “un soldado portugués de los de Flandes,” one with the required 
knowledge and merits, but also a Portuguese soldier who had already proven his loyalty 
and who would consider himself more “Spanish” because of his military experience and 
services in such conflict.41 
Moreover, this war was truly a mosaic in which people from all around the empire 
came together and, although serving in companies divided by nations, shared the same 
experiences and saw themselves as Spaniards.42 In his study on the political culture of the 
Spanish soldiers, Raffaele Puddu argues that the service in the army created common 
bonds and a common identity that transcended class boundaries.43 All the soldiers 
fighting the Dutch, despite of their origin, served under the same banner and followed a 
common goal. Furthermore, this war reinforced the Catholic identity of the Spanish 
Monarchy. It was not only a war against political rebels, against people who opposed the 
king’s rule, but more importantly, was a war against heresy.44 Therefore, the Spanish 
soldier was, above all, a Catholic soldier, a theme on which several writers dwelt and that 
will be discussed in depth in the last chapter. 
                                                
40 Jacinto de Aguilar y Prado, Compendio histórico de diversos escritos en diferentes asuntos (Pamplona: 
Carlos de Labàyen, 1629), 27. 
41 BNE, Mss/801, f. 39-42 Esteban Dávila, “Carta al Rey Nuestro Señor por sus consejos de Estado y 
Guerra con el alférez Francisco Cerezo despachado por el marqués de Cropani.” 
42 Ruiz Ibáñez and Vallejo Cervantes, “Vivir sin dexar parte,” 1132–1133. 
43 Puddu, El soldado gentilhombre, 10. 
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Evidently, a good official could not only be a war hawk. He was expected to also 
have other types of experience. Political skills were greatly appreciated. In 1580 the 
outgoing viceroy of New Spain, Martín Enríquez, wrote to his successor reminding him 
that in the Indies everything was so different to Spain and that if “el gobernador nuevo no 
se vale de lo que puede advertirle el que acá ha estado” it would be impossible to do 
things right, at least at the beginning. Indeed, he claimed that because “por haberme 
faltado a mí esta luz cuando aquí vine, fue necesario creer a otros y errar algunas por su 
causa.”45 There were some peculiarities about the American scenario that were only 
grasped once in the region and from people who had direct contact with it. The official 
affirmed that some of the ideals or precepts that could be valid elsewhere did not 
necessarily apply in the New World, for which a particular experience was needed. 
Nevertheless, it is also true that regardless of being in America or in Europe, it 
was never an easy job to engage with the native populations, to negotiate with the local 
elites, to avoid upheavals, and overall, to impose royal authority. In 1647 there was social 
unrest in the city of Salamanca, so the councilors considered that the corregidor should 
be don García de Porres, who was oidor in Valladolid.46 They believed that the qualities 
of a judge, as well as the prestige of his office, would serve better to calm down the mood 
of the population, and to secure the peace. The members of the Audience of Mexico 
followed the same logic in 1660, during the revolt of Oaxaca. At first, the viceroy had 
appointed an alcalde del crimen—a criminal judge—to go to Oaxaca, but the Royal 
Audience argued against it. The oidores considered that it was better to send a ministro 
                                                
45 BNE, MSS/8553, f. 23-35 “Instrucción que por mandado de S.M. hizo el virrey Martín Henríquez para el 
conde de La Coruña, sobre el gobierno de Nueva España,” September 25, 1580, fol. 23. 
46 AHN, Consejos, 13628, 3, “Que a don García de Porres se le haga merced del corregimiento de 
Salamanca” (Madrid, February 17, 1647). 
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togado—a civil judge—because sending an alcalde del crimen would give the impression 
that “solo va al castigo” and the Indians could be intimidated.47 The viceroy agreed and 
chose Juan Francisco Montemayor, the former governor of Santo Domingo and now 
oidor in the Audience of Mexico, to restore order in the region. Likewise, in 1677 the 
Council of Castile argued that it was better to send a judge as corregidor of Córdoba, in 
Andalusia, instead of the customary civil minister (de capa y espada). The councilors 
maintained that at that time the city’s elite was extremely unruly and difficult to control, 
and that the powerful noblemen had taken over all the institutions, threatening the people 
and preventing them from even complaining. Furthermore, they contended that “en todos 
tiempos se haya tenido por remedio conveniente el enviar a Córdoba ministros togados.” 
In light of past experience in similar circumstances, they considered that sending a judge 
was more effective “para reprimir la libertad y licencia de mucha de la gente noble, a 
quien los corregidores de capa y espada no pueden reducir a la quietud, respeto y 
obediencia necesaria.”48 
Hurtado de Corcuera had too been governor of various regions. The nature of that 
post— which required him to oversee basically every activity in the territory under his 
authority—gave him knowledge and experience not only on political matters, but also in 
many other topics such as commerce, fiscal policies, or even judiciary issues.49 While in 
Asturias, he proposed to build a castle in the port of Santoña. The purpose of this building 
was not strictly military, but economic and political, namely, to better control the foreign 
                                                
47 AGI, Patronato, 230A, R.2 “Motines y alborotos de Indios: Tehuantepec, Nexapa e Iztepec,” 1660, fols. 
164–165. For a detailed study of the revolt of Oaxaca, see Chapter Four. 
48AHN, Consejos, 13597, 2, N. 58 “Con otra consulta de este consejo, satisfaciendo a lo por ella mandado” 
(Madrid, May 24, 1677).  
49 His terms as governor of the Philippines and as corregidor of Córdoba where in each place had to 
suppress popular revolts are studied in more detail in Chapter Four. 
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ships that were constantly smuggling goods. He complained that the French, Dutch, and 
Flemish ships that sailed there to buy oranges and lemons carried undeclared 
merchandise, which was exchanged for the fruits without paying the proper taxes. He 
argued that in order to secure the land it was important also to secure its trade. He knew 
this because “el haber servido a V.M. en tantas partes de las Indias, las noticias y 
experiencias que tengo en estas materias me han enseñado a reparar en este punto.”50 His 
experience in major trading hubs such Panama and the Philippines made him aware of the 
perils of the illegal trade, but also of the methods to stop it. His overseas experiences 
gave credence and legitimacy to his decisions in Europe. 
Still, not every experience was positive, or desirable for transplanting. Sometimes, 
officials could also learn and carry vices throughout the empire. In 1623, when Pedro 
Esteban Dávila was governing the Tercera Island, in the Azores, he bitterly complained 
of Guillermo de Rojas, inspector of the island’s castle. The governor affirmed that his 
subordinate was reluctant to obey and to collaborate with him. He accused him of having 
learned too many swindles during his past tenures, “ha intentado conmigo algunas de las 
cosas que con el maestro de campo don Gonzalo Mesía,” his predecessor. Dávila alleged 
that the inspector’s behavior was nothing new, that previous officials had justly punished 
Rojas. Moreover, Esteban Dávila affirmed that even before reaching the island he had 
been warned to be watchful on said official, it was known that “en Perpiñán, Barcelona, 
esta isla y en todas partes donde ha servido ha tenido mil inquietudes y pendencias.”51 
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 163 
In 1643, news from Oran reached the court alerting that the Muslims from Algiers 
were preparing an attack upon the North African fortress. Philip IV response was to 
appoint don Juan de Meneses, a member of the council of War, as corregidor of 
Cartagena in Spain. The idea, suggested by the Council of War, was to have someone of 
experience and authority ready to act and to prevent any military actions from the 
Algerians. However, when the Council of Castile found out about such nomination, it 
caused a great fuss. The councilors complained bitterly about an official they deemed 
utterly incapable. They affirmed that “en todas las partes que ha estado ha dado muestras 
de no ser a propósito para ningún gobierno.” Contrary to what would be expected of a 
veteran official, in the councilors’ eyes, his experiences had not served to form him and 
to improve his abilities. Moreover, based on the evidence of Meneses’ previous positions 
(especially patent on his visita) they sharply concluded that “este sujeto es más a 
propósito para ser mandado que para mandar.” The councilors suggested keeping 
Jerónimo de Medinilla, who at the time was Cartagena’s corregidor, at his post. They 
argued that this official had enough credit and experience to act in case of a military 
attack, as he had served in the fleet, the war in Catalonia, Italy, and at that moment was 
arranging the aid for Oran.52 
It is not clear what the origins were of the evident animosity against don Juan de 
Meneses and Guillermo de Rojas, and whether they were in fact incompetent officials. 
What is clear is that both Pedro Esteban Dávila and the Council of Castile relied on a 
discourse of negative experience in order to justify and convince the king to move aside 
those officials—which, in the case of Meneses, happened immediately. Contrary to the 
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common idea that experience provided knowledge and the basis for good government, for 
Dávila and the councilors, the experience gained by Meneses and Rojas was only 
negative. They asserted that the (bad) officials had only acquired and augmented negative 
methods and habits. These cases reinforced the idea of always being attentive to the 
behavior of the officials. Not in vain Saavedra Fajardo advised on the necessity of always 
casting an eye upon the officials on the ground.53 
Quite unsurprisingly, men with the experience of Hurtado de Corcuera were 
scarce. Most of imperial officials could neither accumulate his level of experience (both 
in terms of the number of posts he occupied, and of the regions in which he moved), nor 
excel in so many different arenas. Authorities across the empire were constantly 
complaining about the difficulties of finding suitable officials, and warned about the 
dangers of appointing people lacking the needed credentials. The count of Castellar, 
viceroy of Peru, informed the king in 1676 how hard was to find a person fit for the 
government of the port of Callao, an office too important to be handled by people without 
enough experience, especially in a moment when authorities feared a pirate attack. The 
Audience of Lima had proposed to appoint don Francisco Meneses, who had been 
governor of Chile. However, Castellar dismissed such proposal because Meneses was too 
old and was retired in Trujillo. The Audience, then, designated instead two persons: don 
Diego de Martos, at the time corregidor of Chucuito, as maestre de campo general, the 
military chief, and don Miguel de Moroña, corregidor of Cuenca, as gobernador general 
de la caballería, the cavalry’s commanding officer. The viceroy did not deem these men 
suitable either. He claimed that although Martos had served in Italy and Portugal, and had 
always been brave and efficient, he had always been in the cavalry, and “carece de las 
                                                
53 Cf. p. 150. 
	
 165 
experiencias [of infantry] que requieren estos empleos.”As for Moroña, Castellar 
contended that his lack of experience made him unfit. Having Moroña been only a 
captain, the viceroy sharply sentenced, “no habiendo mandado nunca difícilmente lo 
sabrá hacer.”54  
 The case of Callao was not exceptional, and it had nothing to do with its location 
or distance from the imperial court. The Council of State struggled on several occasions 
to find seemly officials to be appointed as corregidores of Murcia and Cartagena, in 
Spain. This was a major Mediterranean post very difficult to govern because of external 
and internal constrains. There was the constant threat of a foreign attack (mainly from the 
Turks and North African corsairs), and internal pressure from the local elite—led by the 
powerful marquis of Los Vélez. The councilors could not always pick someone like don 
Gonzalo de Ulloa Carvajal, who had an impressive record of service in Italy, Salamanca, 
Andújar, and Jaén (where he affirmed he had convinced the Prince of Morocco to convert 
to Catholicism).55 In 1646 the king explicitly requested to find someone capable in the 
military and political government, administration of the millones (a tax to support the 
Spanish military endeavors), and who would also look after the building of the fortresses. 
The councilors noted that such a person was almost impossible to find: men skilled on 
military affairs, usually lacked knowledge and abilities on financial matters. Thus they 
proposed to find someone competent in the political and financial administration to 
govern both Murcia and Cartagena, and leave a seasoned military man exclusively in 
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charge of the defense of the Mediterranean port.56 A decade later, the councilors were 
still looking for someone who could be in charge of the administration of justice, the 
political and military government, and the collection of taxes; in short, someone “que 
pueda encargarse de todo y en quien concurran las partes de autoridad, valor, prudencia, 
y experiencia de negocios graves.”57  
Things were not promising in Italy, either. The duke of Segorbe, viceroy of 
Naples, reminded the king, in 1670, of the necessity of having experienced soldiers, 
especially in places like Lucera and Trani, where the menace of a Turkish invasion was 
always present. Segorbe concluded that he could not find many men with enough 
experience and skills in that region.58 Some years later, the king asked his councilors to 
confirm the expertise of don Juan Ortíz Cortés. They had to determine if he was suitable 
to occupy the government of Lecce (a region always harassed by the Turks), or if he 
should be appointed somewhere else, where such experience was not required.59 In 1682, 
the Council of State dismissed the first of the three candidates for the government of 
Calabria Ultra advanced by the viceroy, the marquis of Los Vélez. The councilors argued 
that the marquis of Castelforte was not fit for the post, as he was “mozo sin experiencia.” 
The king agreed with them and with the need to provide the post in a “soldado de muchas 
experiencias.” He then appointed the maestre de campo don Guillermo de Sicilia, who 
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was not in the proposed shortlist, but who had been recently named governor of the 
province of Basilicata.60 
It is important to note, as several of the examples show, that in the early modern 
Spanish Empire there was not a clear and fixed division between the function of the 
officials, and in more than one occasion, the same person could occupy different 
positions. The reason is because, contrary to what some scholars have stated, this political 
and administrative system was far from being a modern bureaucracy with a division of 
labor, well-delimited offices, duties, and rights, and a clear path of professional 
development.61 While in theory there was a distinction between officials with political 
and military attributes (capa y espada) and officials who specialized in matters of justice 
(togados), a person could perfectly have both qualities.62 Offices did not always have the 
same requirements and attributes; they could change depending on the circumstances and 
the nature of the office holder.  
Accordingly, the promotion of an imperial official did not follow an established 
and objective pattern. In the last instance, officials’ appointments did not depend on their 
own merits, and not even on the advice of the councilors, but on the will of the king. The 
offices belonged to the king who as a favor, and as expression of his grace and 
magnificence, provided them freely to his most loyal and obliging subjects. In 
consequence, although the ideal official was expected to have experience, this was not 
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always the case. Just as a token, in 1625 Philip IV ordered the Council of Castile to 
elaborate the shortlist of possible officials for the corregimiento of Córdoba, in Spain, in 
which they had to include don Gaspar Bonifaz, the king’s equerry. The councilors 
obeyed, but noted that Bonifaz had not held any offices and thus was short on experience. 
They considered he was not suited for governing the city. Hoping the king would change 
his mind, they decided not to formally propose any official. The king did not pay 
attention to the opinion of his councilors, and appointed Bonifaz as corregidor. The 
councilors had to obey the king, who was not required to explain his decisions.63 
Although this case could serve as an example of the traditional image of the absolutist 
monarch, one who had unrestricted and unchecked power, this was more an exception 
than the common norm.64 Most of the time, the king would follow the established path 
and follow the advice of his councilors. In fact, some years later, the councilors 
complained about Bonifaz, who they accused of being absent from his post and not 
fulfilling his duties. The councilors claimed that now it was necessary to send Antonio 
Valdés to Córdoba, who was someone of stronger arm than usual “para el castigo de los 
excesos de las personas poderosas, mirando por la administración de ella [the city], 
protección y defensa de los miserables.” The king conceded with a brief “como parece.”65 
Evidently, experience was closely tied up with age. In 1651, the 35-year old 
Francisco de Herrera did not accept the corregimiento of Salamanca— a city in 
permanent turmoil, notorious for “los tumultos que de ordinario hay entre estudiantes y 
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ciudadanos.”66 Herrera justified his rejection by claiming that he was too young and 
inexperienced. He feared that he lacked “canas y experiencia” for holding such a tricky 
office.67 Thus, for an official, being old in the early modern world was not a 
disadvantage, quite the contrary. Melchor de Ávalos de Castillo was proposed for the 
corregimiento of Trujillo in Peru, and was praised for having “canas y autoridad.”68 In a 
text on the government of the Indies, the controversial Pedro Mexía de Ovando 
contended that the imperial officials should always be “con canas y talento.”69 This 
celebration of officials’ age held true even when they were extremely old and closer to 
their final days. Juan de Oñate was appointed inspector of the mines of Spain when he 
was 74 years old. Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera held his last office in the Canaries (after 
having turned down several others) in 1660, at 73 years of age. Their acquired wisdom 
and knowledge was much appreciated and it usually surpassed other issues related to 
their old age—like lack of mobility, illnesses, or hearing impairment. 
This respect for age went hand in hand with the early modern veneration for 
tradition. Political writers openly expressed their disdain for novelty and change. In his 
highly influential Della ragion di stato, Giovanni Botero devoted a whole section (“De 
no hacer novedad”) to this idea.70 He affirmed that there was nothing more loathsome for 
the good government that changing those things to which antiquity had given reputation. 
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For the Italian writer, “la novedad trae consigo odio.” Thus, it was always wise to respect 
and follow ancient knowledge, ideas, and uses. Diego Saavedra Fajardo conveyed a 
similar idea and sentenced: “for there is no new thing under the Sun; the thing that hath 
been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done, is that which shall be done. The 
persons are changed not the scenes, manners and customs are always the same.”71 The 
past served as constant example, and the experience of the officials made possible to 
navigate already known scenarios. 
History was a fundamental source of knowledge, and, in consequence, of indirect 
experience. For the members of the early modern Spanish Empire the past was the 
greatest of teachers, and they eagerly looked back at it seeking examples that could shed 
light on the current issues.72 Above all, the Bible and the life of Jesus provided the best 
historical lessons and sources of inspiration. However, it was the Roman Empire which 
provided the main political framework and language under which the newborn empire 
was understood and explained.73 
Nonetheless, the movement and experience of the officials put such ideals into 
question. They were in constant contact with the contingent world, in which there were 
many unforeseen factors and things did not necessarily go as planned. In fact, Saavedra 
Fajardo himself moderated his assertion, and a few pages later he acknowledged the 
importance of contingency, and the appearance of new unexpected and different 
circumstances. Thus, in a radically modern fashion, he warns against an excessive 
veneration of the past, and opens the door for novelty and change: “innovations are not 
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always dangerous; it is sometimes convenient to introduce them. Were there no 
alterations, the world would never be perfected.”74 Because of the singularity of every 
situation, the past alone could not serve as a guide. It was also imperative to fully know 
the present, and the understanding of contemporary issues was only achieved either by 
direct experience or by the communication with someone possessing such experience.75 
The only way to gain experience was by actually doing: by moving, and having 
direct on-the-ground engagement with the world. Saavedra Fajardo advised against the 
idle and contemplative spirits that remained cloistered away. In this vein, a still young 
and ambitious Pedro Esteban Dávila complained of the few responsibilities and activities 
he had as governor of Tercera. He requested the king to give him another post, no matter 
where and how difficult it could be. Desperate, he claimed, “sáqueme V.M. de este 
rincón, que este puesto es para enviar viejos a descansar.”76 
Unsurprisingly, Spanish imperial officials tried to take advantage of their 
activities on the ground as much as possible. Their multiple services to the king took 
them across the empire and had them facing very diverse situations, people, and 
geographies, giving them great knowledge of things obscure for the rest. Not only 
officials with ample and proven experience like Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera believed 
so, but it was a widely spread idea. The soldier and writer Jacinto de Aguilar y Prado 
stated in 1623 that during his conversations and discussions with other soldiers they 
defended their opinions “no solamente [con] innumerables historias, pero [con] la misma 
                                                
74 Saavedra Fajardo, The Royal Politician, 213. 
75 According to Jeremy Robbins, this shift of interest in contemporary knowledge and experience prepared 
the ground for “breaking the intellectual hold of the authority of antiquity,” and for the emergence of a new 
modern science. Robbins, Arts of Perception, 77. 
76 BNE, Mss/801, f. 11v-13v. Esteban Dávila, “Carta escrita al Rey Nuestro Señor por sus consejos de 
Guerra e Indias con Fernando de Sosa, general de la flota de Nueva España,” fol. 13v. 
	
 172 
experiencia, madre de toda verdad.”77 Forty years later, Juan Francisco de Montemayor 
claimed, “la verdad solo puede juzgar dellas [of his actions and decisions] quien ha visto 
y tocado con las manos lo que hay y ha pasado en estas provincias.”78 He was trying to 
defend himself from the strong accusation against his violent actions during the 1660 
revolt of the Indians of Oaxaca. Juan de Torres Castillo, one of the chroniclers of that 
revolt and a Montemayor’s aide, had a similar opinion. According to his account, when 
he got news of the revolt he conferred with don Antonio de Lara Mogrovejo, alcalde del 
crimen of Mexico, to inform the viceroy of what they deemed was a very dangerous 
situation, “por las muchas experiencias que [Lara Mogrovejo] tiene adquiridas del natural 
de los indios” because he had governed them in Guatemala.79 
Direct experience was highly valued not only by the officials, but by the society 
as a whole. Many other mobile subjects also claimed to hold the truth based on what they 
had seen, listened to, and felt. The missionary priest Domingo Fernández Navarrete 
introduced his description of China by reaffirming that chronicles written by direct 
witness were much more trustworthy. In his view, most of the things written in Europe 
about China and Asia were false. Thus, Fernández Navarrete assured readers that his 
narration, based upon his own “noticias, experiencias, vista de ojos,” as well as on 
conversations with other eyewitnesses, “noticiosos, experimentados, y testigos oculares 
en aquellas regiones,” would divert from and contradict most of published accounts.80 
Imperial officials, and the many other people who were permanently on the move, were 
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highly conscious of their circumstances, and bragged about their own tangible and direct 
experiences. They affirmed that because they had seen, heard, and touched the world, 
they had more credibility than any others to make opinions, judge, govern, and advise. 
They were what Serge Gruzinski rightfully identifies as the “experts” upon whose 
shoulders the global Spanish Empire was built.81 
 
Transplanting Experiences across Imperial Spaces 
The circulation of the officials was intense and worldwide. Historiography has 
usually emphasized the transmission of people, ideas, values, institutions, and even 
diseases from Europe to America, leaving aside the movement in the opposite direction.82 
Nonetheless, there was also a sizable number of officials with experience in America who 
returned to Europe.83 They presented their services in the New World as credit for opting 
for posts in the Iberian Peninsula. In 1616, Don Juan de Toledo Meneses was the first 
candidate on the shortlist of proposed officials for the corregimiento of the city of 
Salamanca elaborated by the Council of Castile. In the brief summary of his merits and 
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experiences the councilors noted that he had started to serve the king 30 years before in 
the Indies, and from there—in an opposite direction to most other officials—he had 
passed to Flanders, where he acted under the patronage of the Archduke Albert. He was 
described as “cuerdo y de buenas partes.” No doubt, he had the favor of the councilors as 
they affirmed that his name had also been suggested for the corregimientos of Palencia, 
Badajoz, Las Cuatro Villas de la Costa de la Mar, Toro, Logroño, and Ronda y Marbella 
in two occasions.84 Even though Toledo de Meneses did not get the appointment on that 
occasion, he continued to be a usual candidate, and five years later the king finally named 
him corregidor of Salamanca.85 However, he did not last for a long time in such office, as 
he soon relinquished his post in order to join the duke of Alcalá in Rome.86 
Toledo Meneses was not the only indiano that served in Salamanca, and he 
definitively was not the only official with American experience acting in Europe. In that 
same 1616 shortlist, the councilors recommended don Francisco de Brizuela.87 He was 
the son of Melchor de Brizuela, who after serving in Peru went to Spain, and fought in 
Portugal. Then, he was part of Queen doña Ana’s entourage in El Escorial, where he also 
oversaw the building of that monastery. Finally, don Melchor was named corregidor of 
Mérida, where he died.88  
                                                
84 Toledo Meneses was suggested for the office in Las Cuatro Villas three years earlier AHN, Consejos, 
13600, N. 7 “Nombramiento para el corregimiento de las Cuatro Villas de la Costa de la Mar,” May 12, 
1613. 
85 In 1616 the King chose instead don Diego Pareja. AHN, Consejos, 13628, 3, N. 9 “Propone personas 
para el corregimiento de la ciudad de Salamanca” (Madrid, February 5, 1616); AHN, Consejos, 13628, 3, 
N. 11 “Propone personas para el corregimiento de la ciudad de Salamanca” (Madrid, October 16, 1621). 
86 AHN, Consejos, 13628, 3, N. 12 
87 Francisco de Brizuela was also proposed for the government of Panama, and three years later, he appears 
serving as corregidor of Madrid. AGI, Panama, 85 “Propone personas para el cargo de gobernador y 
capitán general de la provincia de Tierra Firme y presidente de la Real Audiencia de ella” (Madrid, 
December 23, 1627); AHN, Consejos, 13620, 13, N. 12 “Propone personas para el corregimiento de 
Madrid” (Madrid, February 15, 1630). 
88 Some other cases of successful officials with an American background are Pedro Suárez Lanchero who 
was appointed corregidor of Salamanca. Most of his merits were the services of his father and grandfather 
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For these officials, as well as for the king and his councilors, the previous 
experience of these men across the Atlantic was not only much praiseworthy, but also 
deemed as valid and useful in the Old World. Indeed, for the inhabitants of the Spanish 
Empire, Europe and America, although each had its own intrinsic peculiarities, were 
profoundly intertwined and the experiences in one region could easily be translated into 
the other. 
Perhaps, mining is one of the fields where it becomes clearer the impact of the 
American experience on the development of early modern science and technology, and 
also on the government of the empire. Juan de Oñate was a mining expert indeed. 
Although now he is more associated with the conquest of New Mexico, those activities 
were in fact just a break from his overall dedication to mining. Even his first services to 
the crown were connected to this field. In 1592, Oñate was appointed by the viceroy of 
New Spain, Luis de Velasco, as the alcalde mayor (chief magistrate) of the recently 
created Mining District in Mesquitique Potosí. The Tlaxcalan Indians who lived in the 
area had shown some silver veins to the Spanish authorities, who rushed into their 
exploration and exploitation. Juan de Oñate was in charge of surveying the land and 
issuing the permits to establish residences and refining mills. He actively took part in the 
                                                                                                                                            
in America. AHN, Consejos, 13628, 3, N. 14 “Propone personas para el corregimiento de la ciudad de 
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Sepúlveda. AHN, Consejos, 13606, 1, N. 13 “Propone personas para el corregimiento de Gibraltar” 
(Madrid, June 5, 1621). Diego de Rozas fought in Aragon and in the island of Tercera in Azores. Then he 
crossed the Atlantic. Fought Francis Drake in Cartagena, and stayed for a time in Havana. Later on, Rozas 
returned to Europe, served in La Mamora in North Africa, and held minor offices in the royal court before 
he was appointed corregidor of Betanzos y La Coruña AHN, Consejos, 13597, 1, N.14 “Propone personas 
para el corregimiento de las ciudades de La Coruña y Betanzos” (Madrid, November 8, 1630). Fernando de 
Saavedra, oidor of the Audience of Lima, was named corregidor of Murcia AHN, Consejos, 13619, N. 21 
“Títulos de corregidor de Murcia y Cartagena para el licenciado don Fernando de Saavedra” (Madrid, July 
9, 1648). There are many more examples in Guillermo Lohmann Villena, Los americanos en las órdenes 
nobiliarias, 2a ed. (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1993). 
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founding of what soon would be known as San Luis de Potosí, the major silver mine of 
North America.89 However, not long after, he left his post in San Luis to fully dedicate 
himself to his personal project of settling New Mexico, a region that he governed 
between 1598 until 1608. This enterprise was mostly financed with the profit of his and 
his family’s silver mines in Zacatecas, to where he returned after his adventure as 
conquistador ended badly. For the next decade he was dedicated solely to his mines, 
something in which he exceled.  
Juan de Oñate reflected some of his knowledge in his “Tratado de Re Metálica.”90 
It is a short manual discussing the best available methods of ore beneficiation. In very 
technical language, the author describes the practices of mining: finding the silver veins, 
extracting the metals, and then, refining them. The document mostly focuses on the Patio 
process, which used mercury amalgamation to recover silver from the ore. It was 
invented in 1554 by Bartolomé de Medina in Pachuca, Mexico, and revolutionized the 
mining industry as it was much more efficient than smelting to refine silver. It is very 
likely that Juan de Oñate became a major proponent of this technique in Europe.91 
When in the 1620’s Oñate arrived in the Iberian Peninsula, he was widely known 
and respected. Antonio Rodríguez, a retainer of the duke of Alva, who at the time was 
serving as viceroy of Naples, kept the duke updated on the presence of Oñate in the court. 
The informant did not spare his praises to the Mexican: “le miro con particular respeto y 
                                                
89 Homer E. Milford, “Introduction,” in Nuevas leyes de las minas de España: 1625, ed. Homer E. Milford 
et al. (Santa Fe, N.M: Sunstone Press, 1998), 8–9. 
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Milford et al. (Santa Fe, N.M: Sunstone Press, 1998), 78–96. This treatise first appeared published as part 
of Mariano Cuevas, S. J., ed., La Puebla de los Angeles en el siglo XVII (México: Editorial Patria, 1945), 
229–247. However, there is not an original copy of this treatise. The document published by Milford and 
Cuevas is an anonymous text, apparently written in the second half of the seventeenth century, but based on 
Oñate’s writings on metallurgy. 
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veneración porque hallo en él un sujeto de piedad Christiana y celo glorioso.” 92 Oñate 
was much celebrated for his conquering adventures, as well as for his mining business 
and his richness, on proof of what he had brought precious metal objects as present to the 
king. Rodríguez told his patron that Oñate had generously offered the king his mining 
expertise to “wake up” the mines of Spain, which for so long had remained idle. He 
claimed that in Mexico, Oñate had “resurrected” previously exploited and abandoned 
mines, and that he hoped to do the same with slag heaps left by the Romans. 
Many believed that thanks to the guidance and experience of Oñate it was 
possible to profit from the available mineral resources in Spain. Among these people was 
the king himself, who entrusted this Mexican with the recovery of the Spanish mining 
industry. On January 16, 1624 Philip IV created the Junta de Minas, the first board 
dedicated solely to the government and administration of the Iberian mines. It was given 
ample attributions and exclusive jurisdiction in anything related to the mines. Among its 
members was the powerful and ubiquitous count-duke of Olivares, as well as some other 
major figures of the imperial administration such as the marquis of Alenquer, Diego de 
Silva y Mendoza; the lawyers Baltazar Gilimón de la Mota, and Gregorio López Madera; 
and the Jesuit priest Hernando de Salazar—who later acted as Oñate’s will executor. 
Their first task was to assess the evaluations and suggestions proposed by Oñate, after his 
inspection of the Spanish mines.93 
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 From 1624 to his death in 1626, Juan de Oñate dedicated soul and body to a full 
inspection of the major mines of Spain.94 He was in Burgos, Cartagena, Granada, and 
Guadalcanal.95 At his request, the king ordered the viceroys and corregidores from 
Castile, Portugal, and Aragon to send inventories of the mines in their jurisdiction, as 
well as samples of their minerals. Oñate’s idea was to launch a major mining production, 
beginning with the abandoned mines. He was confident of the viability of his project and 
that the old mines still had minerals because either they had not been fully exploited, or 
the minerals had grown up again.96 
As a part of these inspections and of the activities of the recently established 
board, the 1584 mining code was reprinted in 1625 under the direction of Juan de 
Oñate.97 The 1584 code, issued by Phillip II, was known as the Ordenanzas del Nuevo 
Cuaderno (the New Code Law). It was the first royal attempt to hold control over the 
Spanish mining centers by incorporating them into the property of the crown.98 While in 
the Oñate’s 1625 reprint some updates were made, there were no real major changes to 
the laws. It was mainly published because editions of the first ordinance were scarce, and 
some printing errors had to be fixed.99 
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Andrés de Carrasquilla, secretary of Juan de Oñate, was in charge of reprinting 
the mining statute and wrote its prologue. In it, he expands on his patron’s deeds: how he 
left his fortune and home, and despite his age, crossed the Atlantic to serve the king. 
More interesting are Carrasquilla’s arguments about the mining resources available in 
Spain and how the Spaniards related to them. He maintains that ancient Spaniards had 
rejected the riches at their home, leaving others, like the Romans or the Phoenicians, to 
benefit from them. Oñate’s secretary seems perplexed by the fact that Spaniards had 
traveled long distances looking for treasures that were already at home, although he 
remarks, “nada es tan nuestro como el Nuevo Mundo.” Carrasquilla thinks that Spaniards 
acted the same way as the American Indians, who gave away their gold and silver in 
exchange for meaningless glass beads. If the Indians had been braver, he adds, they might 
have crossed the ocean to find in Europe the wealth they rejected at home, just as the 
Spaniards did. According to the eulogistic writer, it was only thanks to Oñate’s vision and 
wisdom—derived from his great experience—that Spaniards were now realizing the 
enormous wealth laying under their feet, which, properly exploited, would ensure the 
fortune of the Monarchy.100 
Juan de Oñate’s mining experience and expertise was not unique. He was part of a 
long tradition of America-based men dedicated to this activity. They were truly experts 
on the field, and were constantly renewing and improving it. They wrote treatises, did 
research and experiments, and came up with new inventions and methods. Overall, they 
were developing a state-of-the-art technology. For instance, the already-mentioned 
Bartolomé de Medina invented in 1554 the Patio process, which quickly became adopted 
throughout America. Some years later, in 1590, Alonso Barba perfected this method in 
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South America by making a heat amalgamation. This reduced the time of the process to 
only a couple of hours.101 Carmen Salazar-Soler has studied the cases of several of these 
American mining experts who wrote letters and reports in order to guide the mining 
policies. Their expertise relied on their great first-hand experience on these matters. Not 
only that they lived and worked in mines for several years, but also studied them. 
Moreover, they acted as cultural passeurs, transmitting Western ideas to America, but 
also sharing the American (both Spanish and Indigenous) knowledge in Europe.102  
In this regard, it is widely accepted that much of the mining innovations came as a 
consequence of a creative entanglement of Western and American knowledge. However, 
the indigenous voices have been silenced and it remains difficult to clearly identify their 
contribution to the development of early modern science. Recently, Allison Bigelow has 
compared the translations (and misinterpretations) in English and German of Alonso de 
Barba’s Arte de los metales (the most important early modern mining treatise) to unveil 
the concepts that European translators did not fully understand, because they came not 
from Spanish, but because their origin was in Quechua and the Andean thought.103    
Indeed, Juan de Oñate was not the first, nor the only, imperial official who 
proposed to apply and transfer his American mining experience into Spain. In 1649 the 
famous Alonso Barba also traveled to Spain in company of another Potosí miner, Agustín 
Núñez de Zamora, to analyze some recently discovered mines in Niebla, Andalusia.104 In 
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1601, the captain Martín de Ocampo, a former corregidor of Cuenca, Peru, now back in 
Spain, wrote a memorial to the king. He hoped, in a similar vein to Oñate and 
Carrasquilla, to bring to the monarch’s attention the hidden treasures that laid in Castile, 
and from which the Crown was not fully profiting.105 He equally argued that the Spanish 
mines were not nearly exhausted. If they were not being exploited, it was because of 
Spaniards’ lack of proper knowledge and techniques.  
Ocampo’s main focus was on the mercury mine of Almadén. He detailed the 
current process and costs of production of mercury—in which the crown took part by 
providing the mine and 150 workers (100 free moriscos and 50 forced workers)—and of 
its transportation to Seville.106 Ocampo proposed a new method to obtain and refine the 
mercury, which would be less expensive and more productive. He claimed that with this 
technique, which had been tested and proved in front of experts in the royal court, all the 
mercury needs in America would be satisfied. Thus, it would not be necessary to continue 
exploiting the mines of Huancavelica in Peru, and also incurring associated expenses: 
paying the workforce and the officials, buying the mercury for the miners, and financing 
its transportation. More importantly, the plan would help to rein in the abuses of the 
Indigenous people who were forced to work in the Peruvian mines in really poor 
conditions.107 He argued that his exposition was based on the “conocimiento y 
experiencia que ya se tiene de las cosas referidas.”108 He presented his experience as the 
best evidence to support his assertions. 
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 Martin de Ocampo’s proposal was not accepted. The Almadén mines continued 
to be exploited with the same methods by the Fugger, a powerful German family that 
banked several of the Crown’s activities. Nonetheless, Ocampo’s actions eventually 
gained him royal favor. In 1615 the king granted him the right to exploit, for thirty years, 
the mercury mines he had discovered in Canales, León. Moreover, the crown committed 
to buy him all the mercury that he would place in Seville.109 Ocampo had secured a quite 
profitable business. 
Some years later, other indianos got involved in the activities of the mine of 
Almadén. In 1646 Juan Alonso de Bustamante built there the Oven of Aludeles, after he 
returned from Huancavelica, Peru, where ten years earlier the oven had been invented by 
Lope Saavedra Barba.110 In 1652 Diego de Sotomayor, a partner of Bustamante, asked to 
be rewarded for such improvement. The councilors of the Indies affirmed that the new 
technology had significantly improved the production of the mine, and the American 
need for mercury had been satisfied without having to buy it from Germany. They 
conceded, then, that it was appropriate to grant him immediately a corregimiento in Peru, 
as well as an encomienda, similar to how Bustamante had been favored.111 
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Codifying the Experience: The Informaciones de Méritos y Servicios  
Evidently, Martín de Ocampo, Juan de Oñate, Diego de Sotomayor, and many 
others acted with the hope of having access to royal bounty. According to the precepts of 
the culture of patronage, described in the previous chapter, it was expected that the king 
would reward fairly and properly the services of his subjects. Therefore, imperial officials 
rushed to advertise all the services they performed. However, they needed to not only 
make claims about their (and their families’) many services, but also to prove them. The 
most common way in which the officials did this was through the Informaciones de 
méritos y servicios, a service record of the officials. 
These documents, also often referred to as relaciones or probanzas, had been 
popular since the first years of the Spanish presence in America. The first Spanish 
conquistadores and officials in the New World—who were extremely mobile and carried 
out their activities in a variety of locales—used these documents to present their services 
to the far-away king and to request reward.112 The informaciones were also soon adopted 
by local indigenous elites who relied on them to consolidate their power.113 In fact, 
informaciones have proven to be a very rich historical source and scholars are using them 
in very clever ways, for instance, as windows into ideas of gender and identity, or into the 
notions and boundaries of idolatry.114 
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The informaciones tended to be short documents (around four or five folios), and 
were usually handwritten, but there were also many officials who preferred to have their 
informaciones printed. These documents gave detailed information on how, when, and 
where officials had served the crown. Normally, they would state the date in which 
officials began serving, and then list all of the official’s activities. The officials would 
enumerate the posts in which they had served, their obligations, and how successful they 
were in achieving their goals. In these documents the officials outlined what they 
considered were their most important and outstanding achievements. I. A. A. Thompson 
correctly notes that, in concordance with the military ideal of the hidalgo, most of the 
services cast by royal officials were portrayed as of a military nature, and even those that 
were not connected to the military (like being member of the city council), were 
militarized as much as possible.115 The informaciones, he argues, represent an 
“ideological declaration” of the nature of royal service. The activities and behaviors 
exposed in them matched the archetypical image of the Castilian hidalgo.116 Similarly, 
Robert Folger in one of the few monographic studies of the informaciones, contends that 
through the process of writing and production of theses texts the supplicants of royal 
favor assumed the image of an ideal subject of the king. According to Folger, this process 
led to the homogenization of the subjects and their services, thereby challenging the idea 
of a subjective authorship. The individual disappeared, and the documents were in fact 
“generated by a bureaucratic apparatus.”117 
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Although in many regards Folger’s argument is appealing and innovative, it is 
driven by a mistaken conception of the workings of the Spanish Empire’s political 
culture, which leads to a distorted view of the relaciones, the imperial service and 
servants, and of the structures and systems of power. Folger tries to apply to seventeenth-
century Spanish America theories by Certeau, Althusser, and Foucault on the modern 
state, bureaucracy, and power. He finds in the Spanish Empire the perfect and absolute 
modern state, but overlooks the vast historiography that has renewed our understanding 
of the limits of the power and the capacity to control of the Spanish king. He bases his 
arguments on his readings of a few digitized relaciones, and of the laws (the 
Recopilaciones de Indias) that tried to regulate the process of royal reward. He sees those 
laws as rigid and fully coercive. Folger thinks of a Spanish bureaucracy that held tight 
and absolute control upon the subjects, who consequently were homogenized and 
standardized. Therefore, he claims that there was an “eradication of individuality, in our 
modern understanding.”118 However, his analysis fails to understand the nature of the 
much flexible and casuistic early modern Spanish legal and political system, as well as of 
the culture of patronage. For instance, he mistakenly affirms that “the principle that the 
prince awards with mercedes (offices and privileges) those who can prove their merits, or 
those of their ancestors, lost significance after the death of Philip II.”119 Curiously, Folger 
illustrates his arguments with the 1578 relación of Miguel de Cervantes. He defines it as 
“atypical” because, according to him, it was illegal that someone without connections to 
America requested a post there, and notes that “there is no trace of the ‘genius’ of the 
                                                
118 Ibid., 43. 
119 Ibid., 130. See Chapter Two for a study, from an imperial and global perspective, of the practices and 




creator of Don Quijote.”120 However, the first published book of Cervantes appeared in 
1582, and more importantly, there was nothing unusual in the soldier and writer’s 
request. Thousands of men with very similar lives, and without any direct ties to the New 
World hoped to cross the Atlantic and change their fortunes there. 
Officials could also use the informaciones to defend themselves from their 
enemies’ accusations, and to justify their failed services. In what might appear to present-
day readers as a dramatic and grumbling tone, officials related the many sacrifices they 
had to endure to fulfill their duties and, usually, lamented their precarious situation that 
left them at the mercy of the king’s favor.121 Informaciones—like the letters of remission 
studied by Natalie Z. Davis—were, certainly, literary productions.122 They could acquire 
an epic tone, in which the official did lavished compliments on himself, presented 
himself as self-immolating, and basically claimed to be the reason for the survival of the 
Monarchy. As already mentioned, the officials fashioned stories that presented 
themselves as being in harmony with the archetypical image of the Spanish imperial 
official, who sacrificed his life in order to defend the king and Catholicism and always 
behaved honorably. Such letters did not necessarily expose the “truth” of past events, but 
instead revealed how these officials made sense of them, and how they incorporated 
fragments of their personal experiences into a larger discourse of royal service. 
                                                
120 Ibid., 43. 
121 The language of poverty and misery, as a means of requesting royal favor, was well extended and 
engraved in Spanish political culture. Even the wealthiest and most powerful men of Spain expressed in 
those terms. The duke of Medina Sidonia, arguably the richest Spaniard, requested in 1588 two 
encomiendas for his children before accepting to command the Armada Invencible against England, 
because such office would leave his “family deeply in debt.” Quoted in Geoffrey Parker, Imprudent King: 
A New Life of Philip II (Yale University Press, 2014), 289. Thompson, “La economía política del 
‘servicio,’” 287–288. 
122 Natalie Zemon Davis, Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and Their Tellers in Sixteenth-Century 
France (Stanford, Calif: Stanford Univ. Press, 1995). 
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Because in the early modern world there was not a clear separation between the 
public and private spheres, officials could often list as services to the king activities that 
now we would consider to be private, such as commercial enterprises, or writing a 
book.123 Moreover, not all services were provided for the king himself, but often to the 
abstract entity of “the Crown,” or in some cases to “the Republic.”124 Therefore, the king, 
who embodied the polity, had the obligation to reward past services done to his ancestors, 
as well as those activities that did not necessarily benefit him directly, but that were in 
favor of the community. 
Royal service was never thought as an individual achievement. Quite to the 
contrary, it was a familial endeavor. When in 1699 the marquis of Villa Rubia requested 
to be appointed as corregidor of Huaylas in Peru, he claimed that he was “heredero y 
sucesor de los servicios y casa de don Juan de Garay y Otañez,” who had served the king 
in Catalonia several decades before. In fact, the marquis provided evidence not of his 
services, but of Juan de Garay’s. The councilors and the king considered the petition to 
be fair and granted the marquis the corregimiento. However, the sisters of the marquis 
protested the appointment. They argued that, as legitimate daughters of Simón Otañez del 
Campo Garay, they were also heirs of don Juan de Garay’ services, and that because of 
their pitiful current state the king should reward them instead. The councilors ruled, 
without providing any explanation, that the women did not have the right to claim either 
                                                
123 Amongst his services, Juan Márquez Cabrera included the writing of his manual for soldiers (based 
upon his own military experiences in Italy, Catalonia, Portugal, and the Windward Islands) AGI, 
Indiferente, 124, N. 50 “Méritos: Juan Márquez Cabrera,” 1664. His book had been published that same 
year, and it was cleverly dedicated to the Council of the Indies. In the introduction he praised the power of 
the Spanish king as there was no other who “tenga más puestos y conveniencias que dar a sus soldados.” 
Juan Márquez Cabrera, Espejo en que se debe mirar el buen soldado (Madrid: Domingo Garcia Morràs, 
1664), 4. Four years later he was made governor of Honduras, and then of Florida. For a discussion of this 
book and the ideal of the Catholic soldier, see Chapter Five. 
124 Thompson, “La economía política del ‘servicio,’” 286. 
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the inheritance or the services, and therefore should not object to their brother’s 
nomination. However, because of their miserable situation and the fact that they were 
indeed descendants of Juan de Garay, the king could display his natural clemency and 
bountifulness and provide them some kind of support.125 
Because imperial service was deemed as service to the crown, and because the 
king inherited the services done to his ancestors, officials also inherited the credit and the 
possibility of royal favor when such deeds had not been yet rewarded. Officials (and any 
person seeking royal favor) would list not only their services but those of their families 
and even their in-laws. Likewise, the mere fact of belonging to certain families or kin was 
considered a service by itself.126 In 1676, don Antonio Vélez de Medrano presented his 
informaciones to the Council of Castile. After summarizing his current services as 
governor of Newport, in Flanders, and his actions in the military in Flanders, Catalonia, 
Extremadura, and Galicia, he presented the services rendered by his ancestors. He started 
with his father, the general don Pedro Vélez de Medrano; continued with his grandfather, 
don Antonio Vélez de Medrano y Mendoza and his great-grandfather, Rodrigo Vélez de 
Medrano, and finished with the father of this , his great-great grandfather, Hernán Vélez 
de Medrano. All had some experience of service to the king, and had moved across the 
empire, from Sicily to Brazil, and Malaga. Finally, don Antonio mentioned he was 
descendant and heir of Don Andres Vélez de Medrano who would have been favored by 
king don García, in some immemorial time.127 This official deemed the quality and the 
                                                
125 AGI, Lima,14 “Pretensión del marques de Villa Rubia del corregimiento de Huaylas” (Madrid, 
September 21, 1699). 
126 Thompson, “La economía política del ‘servicio,’” 288–289. 
127 AHN, Consejos, 4450, N. 26 “Méritos del sargento general don Antonio Vélez de Medrano,” April 13, 




services of his lineage to be of similar or even greater importance than his own services. 
Moreover, his services could not be evaluated in isolation, but as part of his family 
tradition of service and loyalty to the crown.   
Evidently the word of the officials was not enough to prove their services. They 
accompanied their memorials with letters and certifications from their peers, and 
especially from their superiors and patrons. In order to elaborate on the informaciones, 
witnesses were questioned. They were most commonly brought by the candidate to 
support the officials’ assertions. As the imperial institutions grew and became more 
sophisticated, official’s informaciones were checked against records in the imperial 
archives. The councils would corroborate and certify the information provided by the 
officials, making it official. The informaciones presented by don Sebastián de Seruela y 
Caxa in 1652 were verified by one of the secretaries of the Council of the Indies, who 
confirmed that “consta ser ciertos los servicios que presenta.”128 Likewise, in 1639, Philip 
IV ordered a search of the Secretary of State’s papers to find information on how and in 
what circumstances his predecessors awarded grandees.129 Those archives—as any 
modern historian could testify—contained records of the informaciones and many other 
documents, and served as a source of knowledge and information for the crown. Robert 
Folger also pays special attention to the role played by the imperial archive, which he 
defines as “an imagined totality of information accumulated by state apparatuses.” He 
claims that the archive provided “a master-text that quashes the fictional, 'literary' 
potential of individuals written exchanges with the authorities, including relaciones de 
                                                
128 AGI, Lima, 8 “Consulta de la Cámara” (Madrid, September 4, 1652). 
129 AHN, Estado, 674, 3 “Para que se busquen los ejemplares de la forma en que los señores reyes han 
hecho por lo pasado grandes” (El Retiro, January 24, 1639). 
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méritos y servicios.”130 Evidently, this total archive did not exist. Folger acknowledges 
this, and that such an archive could only be imagined.131 Notwithstanding, he chooses to 
read the informaciones as if ‘the Archive’ existed, obviating scholarly works that show its 
flexible, negotiated, and incomplete nature.132 
The informaciones circulated widely throughout the court. Imperial officials 
presented them to one or several of the king’s Councils. The use of these documents had 
been established and was common for many centuries in Castile.133 However, their use 
and number increased exponentially along with the growth of the monarchy and its 
institutions and the number of people involved in the imperial enterprises. This is why 
examples of informaciones abound in all of the archives, whether in Europe, America, or 
Asia. There are some collections devoted exclusively to holding these documents, and 
they can be found almost anywhere. They are perhaps the most common type of 
document in the early modern Spanish world. This by itself suggests the importance of 
the culture of patronage, royal service, reward, and the overall value of experience. 
Moreover, the informaciones inspired a major form of writing: the autobiography. Robert 
Folger argues that several literary works of the period—like Baltasar Dorantes de 
Carranza’s Sumaria relación, Alonso Borregán’s Crónica de la conquista del Peru, and 
Rodríguez Freyle’s El carnero—usually judged works of minor literary quality, should be 
read as part of this genre.134 
                                                
130 Folger, Writing as Poaching, 10–11. 
131 Ibid., 15. 
132 See, for example, Kathryn Burns, Into the Archive: Writing and Power in Colonial Peru (Durham 
[N.C.]: Duke University Press, 2010). 
133 For a study on the use of these documents, and the dynamics of royal grace in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries, see Dios, Gracia, merced y patronazgo real. 
134 Folger, Writing as Poaching, chap. 3. 
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 As has been shown throughout this chapter, the informaciones were read and 
scrutinized by the councilors, who relied on them to assess the service and experience of 
the officials. In these documents, the mobility and expertise of imperial officials was 
codified. Councilors relied on these documents to choose candidates for different offices 
across the empire, as well as to support officials’ requests for favor and retribution. 
Moreover, the crown itself learned from them. The multiple testimonies of activities 
across the whole world provided the king with valuable on-the-ground information on his 
far-flung empire. When assembled, the scattered pieces and examples provide an 
impressive, comprehensive vision of the workings of the empire.  
The experience of the imperial officials, which developed through their mobility 
and daily direct contact with diverse populations, became vital for ruling of the Spanish 
Empire, not only because experience made them better officials and helped them solve 
everyday problems of imperial rule, but because experience provided a major source of 
information and knowledge that had practical and immediate consequences on the 
imperial policies. Their experience around the world, in the most diverse locations, 
greatly shaped the ways in which the rest of the Spanish society thought and knew the 
world. Moreover, as it will be seen in the following chapter, official’s experiences of 
ruling and government circulated across the empire, and defined the ways in which they 
related with distinct imperial subjects and imposed the king’s authority.
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Chapter Four: Controlling Dissent and Imposing Authority 
 
Cosa conocida es que el Monarca de las 
Españas no solo es dueño del Nuevo Mundo, 
sino también que posee en Europa diferentes 
reinos y estados, provincias y ciudades, y 
que tiene dominio sobre varias naciones 
y  vasallos con poder soberanos, pero es tan 
suave el yugo de su dominación que a cada 
cual de ellos permite gozar de sus fueros y 
gobernarse por sus leyes y estilo sin reducir 
a ninguno de sus estados en forma de 
provincia, aunque con derecho lo pudiera 
hacer con todos.1 
 
Y lo que principalmente se debe procurar es 
su pacificación, reducción y quietud y el 
desagravio de los indios.2 
 
 
In 1610, Phillip III—following the advice of the Jesuit priest Luis de Valdivia and 
the viceroy of Peru, the marquis of Montesclaros—decided to conduct a “defensive war” 
against the Araucanians in South America.3 This was a radically different way to engage 
with the indigenous population who fiercely rejected Spanish dominion. The new official 
policy sought to make peace with the Indians, stop the on-going war and military 
offensives, and rein in Spanish abuses of the natives. However, this strategy had many 
detractors. Four years later, Alonso González de Nájera, while governing the castle of 
Porto Ercole in Tuscany, finished writing his Desengaño y reparo de la guerra del reino 
de Chile.4 In the text, he sought to elucidate why the Spanish were losing the war, and 
                                                
1 AHN, Estado, 671, N. 6 “Impreso anónimo sobre la posesión de América y Europa,” prob 1666, fol. 1. 
2 AGI, Patronato 230A, R.1 “Delitos y castigo de los indios de Tecoquilco e Iztepec,” 1660, fol. 4. 
3 On the Defensive War, its implementation and further discussion in favor of a renewal of an offensive 
approach in 1626 see Díaz Blanco, Razón de estado y buen gobierno. 
4 BNE, Mss/10646 Alonso González de Nájera, “Desengaño y reparo de la guerra del reino de Chile: donde 
se manifiesta las principales ventajas que en ella tienen los indios a nuestros españoles y los engaños que de 
nuestra parte han sido causa de la dilación de su conquista...: dividido en cinco partes” (Puerto Hércules, 
1614). The manuscript remained largely unknown until 1866 when it was published as part of the 
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proposed a path to victory. The author expressed his disdain for the Araucanians, who he 
believed were little more than war-mongering barbarians. The only acceptable outcome, 
he argued, was to launch an offensive campaign against the Araucanians, defeat and 
enslave them, and then disperse them out throughout the viceroyalty. 
The tension and continuous debate about how to impose royal authority reached 
beyond Chile and America and affected the whole empire. Spanish officials in Europe, 
Africa, America, and Asia reacted in very different ways to similar challenges to royal 
power. In the following pages, I will focus on the rebellions of the Araucanians, the 
Sangleys of Manila, the peasants of Córdoba, and on the expulsion of the moriscos. In the 
process, I will unveil the ways in which imperial officials perceived the rebels and dealt 
with the king’s enemies. Those attitudes and actions were informed by the immense 
number of preconceived notions, prejudices, stereotypes, and ideas about rulership and 
governmentality that circulated across the empire. I will also explore how officials 
worked to implement imperial authority across the global empire, and how their own 
personal experiences, as well as those of their colleagues, shaped their behavior.  
There was not a unique way of imposing power; context was key. Imperial power, 
which worked under the pretense of being capable of homogenizing imperial subjects, 
was in fact dependent on local conditions and negotiations between local actors. What is 
                                                                                                                                            
monumental Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España: Alonso González de Nájera, 
Desengaño y reparo de la guerra del reino de Chile (Madrid: Imprenta de la viuda de Calero, 1866). 
Despite the fact of being a theme so specific to the American continent, “que tratan hechos, casos y usanzas 
tan peregrinas,“González de Nájera did not see any problem in dedicating his book to the viceroy of 
Naples, don Pedro Fernández de Castro, count of Lemos. In a clear global consciousness of the Spanish 
Empire, he argued that even though the events narrated were “exquisitas y de provincias apartadas,” the 
viceroy would find them of great interest and value, specially because of the curious spirit of the count who 
always was eager to learn more about “aquellas partes que menos comunican los de las nuestras.” 
(González de Nájera, “Desengaño y reparo,” fol. II.) No doubt that the count of Lemos should have had 
some interest on the Chilean matters, until 1608 he had been the President of the Council of the Indies, and 
they surely met in Madrid when the author was lobbying for his cause. 
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striking about this is that mobile officials, with little experience on the ground, were able 
to swiftly grasp particulars and adapt to new circumstances. These officials were aware of 
the uprising’s singularities, and sometimes understood and even sympathized with the 
rebels’ motives. At the same time, Spanish officials remained conscious of their imperial 
mission: to impose the Spanish king’s authority and spread the Catholic faith. These royal 
servants understood the global nature and impact of their actions. They did not think of 
their activities in service to the king as isolated events, but rather as activities connected 
to global events. They did not forget that their mission was imperial, and thus universal, 
even though it was always enforced in local and specific ways. 
 
The Imperial Mission: Reducir  
The control of dissent and imposition of the monarch’s authority were expressed 
as the desire and need to “reducir” (to reduce) the other. This word is used repeatedly in 
the early modern Spanish documentation, regardless of the geographic location of the 
uprisings or the subjects in rebellion. González de Nájera contended that all of the 
governors of Chile had the authority to reduce the “naturals” (indigenous peoples) by soft 
and benevolent means, or by force.5 In 1660, Mexico’s Audience sought to achieve the 
“pacification, reduction and quietude” of the revolted Indians in Oaxaca.6 The oidor 
(judge) Juan Francisco Montemayor’s first service to the king was in the war that sought 
to “reduce to its obedience the principality of Catalonia.” 7 In 1623, the Council of Castile, 
worried by the excesses of Córdoba’s elite, proposed don Antonio Chumacero de 
                                                
5 González de Nájera, “Desengaño y reparo,” fol. 83. 
6 AGI, Patronato, 230A, R.2 “Motines y alborotos de indios: Tehuantepec, Nexapa e Iztepec,” fols. 164–
165. 
7 AGI, Indiferente, 116, N.3 “Méritos de Juan Francisco Montemayor y Córdoba de Cuenca,” fol. 12. 
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Sotomayor as corregidor (chief magistrate) of the city. Chumacero de Sotomayor had 
previously served the king by imposing his authority over the powerful elite of Asturias, 
and therefore appeared to be a fit candidate to “reduce [the noblemen of Córdoba] to the 
needed tranquility, respect and obedience.”8 Similarly, the Council of Castile praised Juan 
Barrio de Sepúlveda for having led the “reduction and pacification” of the revolted 
runaway slaves in Panama.9 Likewise, the news of the “probable reduction” of the rebels 
that rose up in Messina, Italy was soon widely published and celebrated across the 
Monarchy.10 
Reducir did not only refer to an ideal of dominion, or diminishing the other. 
Sebastián de Covarrubias, in the first comprehensive Spanish dictionary, defined 
“reducir” as “convencerse” (to be convinced), and “reducido” as “convencido y vuelto a 
mejor orden” (convinced and turned to a better order).11 Pedro Esteban Dávila used the 
word in that sense when he was the governor of Tercera in the Azores Islands and 
complained about the Portuguese who lived there. These new subjects of the Spanish 
king, he contended, were untrustworthy and disloyal, but unfortunately he was incapable 
of “persuading and reducing them.” In other words, they refused to collaborate with him 
and only recognized the Portuguese authorities despite his entreaties.12 
 Reducir was an expression that summed up the officials’ wish to control the 
different peoples and societies that composed the Spanish Monarchy, and belied officials’ 
                                                
8 AHN, Consejos, 13597, 2, N. 12 “Propone al licenciado Don Antonio Chumacero de Sotomayor para el 
Corregimiento de Córdoba” (Madrid, March 16, 1623). 
9 AHN, Estado, 6402-1, N. 98 “El doctor Juan del Barrio de Sepúlveda, Oidor de Quito,” April 11, 1600. 
10 Avisos que ha traido un correo extraordinario, despachado de Nápoles a 2 de enero 1675 por el ... señor 
marqués de Astorga, virrey y capitán general de aquel reino, tocante al asedio y a la reducción probable 
de los amotinados de la ciudad de Mecina a la obediencia de S. Magestad (Zaragoza: por los herederos de 
Diego Dormer, 1675). 
11 Sebastián de Covarrubias, Tesoro de la lengua castellana (Madrid: Luis Sánchez, 1611), 5. 
12 BNE, Mss/801, f. 54v-58 Pedro Esteban Dávila, “Carta al Rey Nuestro Señor por sus consejos de estado 
y guerra con Thome Correa de Acosta” (Tercera, September 5, 1623), fol. 55. 
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strongly held conviction of the superior morality of the Spanish imperial enterprise. To 
reducir the Indians, the Sangleys, the moriscos, the Portuguese, the Dutch, the Catalans, 
or the peasants and noblemen of Córdoba meant not only to appease their mood and 
subject them, but more importantly, to convince them of the benefits of subjugation. The 
goal was to incorporate them under the “better order,” which was Spanish and Catholic. 
Officials commonly displayed a tendency to denigrate and diminish those who 
were to be reduced. Officials in the Philippines frequently made derogatory comments 
about the Chinese living in the archipelago, along with depictions of them as weak, 
cunning, and homosexual.13 Montemayor affirmed that the Mexican indigenous people 
were cowards by nature and “children of the lie.”14 Pedro García de Ovalle, a judge in 
Buenos Aires, asserted that the inhabitants of the Calchaquí Valley were “stubbornly 
rebellious,” a notion also conveyed by the governor of Tucumán, Alonso Mercado y 
Villacorta.15 For him, the Calchaquí tribes were sub-human and barbaric.16 All these 
officials held onto well-established stereotypes. In fact, Spanish officials often referred to 
the wretched and barbarian condition of the American Indians. These negative 
descriptions were not exclusive to the Chinese or the Indians, but were used to portray 
almost anyone. The king and the marquis of Castel Rodrigo, viceroy of Sardinia, 
discussed the need to fight against the neighboring Muslims, whom they perceived as 
nothing but barbarians.17 Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera also claimed that the peasants in 
Asturias, Spain were so rude that it was impossible to teach them anything.18 
                                                
13 Cf. p. 210. 
14 AGI, Patronato, 230A, R.4, f. 16-20 “Francisco de Montemayor al virrey” (Nexapa, August 23, 1661). 
15 AGI, Charcas, 26, R. 15, N. 113, b “Pedro García de Ovalle” (Buenos Aires, May 16, 1665). 
16 AGI, Charcas, 26, R. 15, N. 113, a “Carta del gobernador de Tucumán” (Esteco, January 27, 1665). 
17 AHN, Estado, L. 100, f. 156 “Que se armen bajeles contra moros” (San Lázaro, October 24, 1661). 
18 Cynthia E. Milton, The Many Meanings of Poverty: Colonialism, Social Compacts, and Assistance in 
Eighteenth-Century Ecuador (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2007). 
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These negative representations were part and parcel of the rhetoric of a civilizing 
mission. The Spanish presence in America and Asia was justified as long as the Spaniards 
took care of and protected the natives, and raised their allegedly wretched condition. Such 
attitudes were part of the political culture of colonialism, which justified Spanish rule 
over, and the exploitation of, indigenous populations.19 Evidently, the other side of the 
Spanish “better order” was the other’s “worst order.” Such judgments by the royal 
officials served to justify their imperial mission overall. To reduce, then, was seen as the 
natural conclusion derived from both Spanish superiority as well as the perceived 
inferiority of an “other” who could not refuse, in moral or practical terms, the Spanish 
order. 
 
The Araucanians of Chile 
The indigenous population in the Araucania in southern Chile had been 
impossible to reduce to Spanish authority. They lived outside Spanish rule and fiercely 
rejected it, even attacking Spanish towns and garrisons. This ongoing intense war became 
a source of continuous concern for royal officials and chroniclers, as well as for today’s 
historians. Many documented this conflict as it occurred, and scholars have studied it 
from diverse perspectives.20 From at least the seventeenth century, the war was compared 
                                                
19 Cañeque, The King’s Living Image, chaps. 6–7; Owensby, Empire of Law, 55–56; Brian Philip Owensby, 
“Between Justice and Economics: ‘Indians’ and Reformism in Eigteenth-Century Spanish Imperial 
Thought,” in Legal Pluralism and Empires, 1500-1850, ed. Lauren A. Benton and Richard Jeffrey Ross 
(New York: New York University Press, 2013), 147. The rhetoric of wretchedness was also central in the 
discourses and definitions of poverty, see Cynthia E. Milton, The Many Meanings of Poverty: Colonialism, 
Social Compacts, and Assistance in Eighteenth-Century Ecuador (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University 
Press, 2007). 
20 One of the most famous works on this matters is Alonso de Ercilla’s La Araucana, its first part, out of 
three, was first published in 1569, and since then several editions have appeared. For a current English 
version, see Alonso de Ercilla y Zúñiga, The Araucaniad: A Version in English Poetry of Alonso de Ercilla 
y Zúñiga, trans. Charles Maxwell Lancaster and Paul Thomas Manchester (Nashville, TN: The Vanderbilt 
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to the concurrent conflict in Flanders; as a result, Chile was referred to as the “Flandes 
Indiano.”21 Both were endless wars, and in both the stubborn rebels were impossible to 
defeat. In both scenarios, the Spanish military was credited as the most seasoned and 
prestigious in the world. Their experience significantly shaped the war methods of 
Spanish soldiers across the globe. 
Moreover, many soldiers moved from one warfront to another. The 
aforementioned Alonso González de Nájera, a veteran of Flanders, joined a company of 
soldiers in 1600 that sailed to Chile to support the new governor, Alonso de Ribera, as 
part of a new warring against the Araucanians. This offensive was a response to the 
massive Indian rebellion that started in 1598 with the Disaster of Curalaba, in which 
several Spaniards, including the governor, Martín Óñez de Loyola, were killed in an 
ambush. In 1608, González de Nájera was commissioned by the governor don Alonso 
García Ramón to return to Madrid to request more funds to continue the war. However, 
his petitions were unsuccessful.22 Not only was additional funding rejected, but the 
overall strategy changed dramatically. Despite efforts by those who hoped to continue 
aggressively attacking the Araucanians until their final surrender, the crown opted instead 
for a more conservative approach by conducting a primarily defensive war strategy. 
                                                                                                                                            
University Press, 2013). For contemporary studies, see Rolf Foerster G., Jesuitas y Mapuches: 1593-1767 
(Santiago de Chile: Universitaria, 1996); Guillaume Boccara, Los vencedores: Historia del pueblo 
mapuche en la época colonial, 2. ed. (San Pedro de Atacama, Chile: Línea Editorial IIAM, 2009). 
21 The most outstanding example of this expression is the seventeenth-century text of the Spanish priest and 
soldier Diego Rosales, which was first published two centuries later by Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, 
Historia general de el reyno de Chile, Flandes indiano (Valparaiso: Impr. del Mercurio, 1877). For studies 
on the use of this term, see Carlos Lázaro Avila, Las fronteras de América y los “Flandes indianos” 
(Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Centro de Estudios Históricos, Departamento de 
Historia de América, 1997), chap. 5; Baraibar, “Chile como un ‘Flandes indiano’ en las crónicas de los 
siglos XVI y XVII.” 
22 José Toribio Medina, “Introducción Biográfica,” in Desengaño y reparo de la guerra del reino de Chile, 




This new policy was informed by the “reason of state,” which above all sought to 
preserve the polity. Royal authorities, namely the marquis of Montesclaros, viceroy of 
Peru, claimed that the war was too expensive and futile, so they argued for a change of 
approach that will allow them to conserve available resources. Curiously, it was the Jesuit 
priests, led by Luis de Valdivia, who introduced the idea of a defensive war. While in 
other regions of the empire there was a tension between the proposals of the radical 
Catholics (whose priority was to defend religion) and the exponents of the reason of state, 
the radical Catholics in Chile did not object to ceasing the military offensive there. In the 
American case, the mission of spreading and defending the Faith did not conflict with the 
new policy. This contrasts with the European scenario. In 1609, Phillip III also signed a 
treaty with the Dutch Republic, the “Twelve Years’ Truce.” This armistice was highly 
contested by the radical Catholics who urged the crown to continue the war in order to 
fulfill its duty to protect Catholicism and defeat heresy.23 Historian José Manuel Díaz 
Blanco contends that while the Dutch were considered plainly as heretics who 
consciously rejected Catholicism, the special condition of the American Indigenous 
peoples made it feasible for Catholic extremists to agree to stop the war. Conversely, the 
Dutch rebellion lacked any justification, and it had to be suppressed no matter the cost. 
The Jesuits viewed the rebellion of the Araucanians, however, as legitimate. Luis de 
Valdivia argued that the Indians were fighting against Spanish exploitation, and they had 
the right to fight tyranny. The solution, therefore, was to stop Spanish abuses. If the 
                                                
23 José Manuel Díaz Blanco, “La guerra defensiva: confesionalidad y ‘maquiavelismo’ de la política 
española en Chile,” Chronica Nova: Revista de Historia Moderna de la Universidad de Granada no. 35 
(2009): 285.  
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Araucanians were fairly treated, they would have no reason to rebel, and they would 
willingly embrace Catholicism and Spanish rule.24 
However, González de Nájera, who was suddenly without a job in Chile and had 
no reason to return to South America, had a different opinion. After serving as major 
sergeant in Castile, where he was commissioned to enforce the militia’s reforms outlined 
by the king’s favorite, the duke of Lerma, he was named governor of Porto Ercole in 
Tuscany.25 During his time as governor, he finished his manuscript reflecting on the 
Chilean situation. Desengaño y reparo is a heated exposition of González de Nájera’s 
warmongering opinions and his disdain for the indigenous population. For him, the 
Chilean natives possessed almost every possible defect: they were lazy, weak, cruel, 
lascivious, belligerent liars, idolaters, and drunkards.26 He argued against the prevailing 
notion that the Araucanians were mighty fighters and almost impossible to defeat, noting 
that they were no stronger than any other peasants in the world. In fact, he made a 
detailed comparison between the Araucanians and the Castilian peasants to demonstrate 
that the former were by no means braver than the latter. The only reason for the 
Araucanians’ alleged ferocity was their uncouth appearance. If the Spanish peasants 
shaved and wore simpler clothes, González de Nájera argued, they would also look 
fearsome.27 
For González de Nájera, the explanations to why the Spanish could not win the 
war had to be found somewhere other than in the Araucanians. One important reason was 
the geography of the area. The Indians took advantage of the difficult terrain, familiar to 
                                                
24 Ibid., 279–280. 
25 Centenero de Arce, “¿Una monarquía de lazos débiles?,” 148. 
26 González de Nájera, “Desengaño y reparo,” fol. 27 ss. 
27 Ibid., fol. 24–24v. 
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them, similar to the Swiss in the Alps or the moriscos in the Alpujarra mountains in 
Granada.28 The Araucanian cavalry also surpassed that of the Spaniards.29 Most 
importantly, González de Nájera contended that the Araucanian victories were due to the 
more than fifty fugitive Spaniards living among them. Some were mestizos, but the 
majority were “legitimate Spaniards” who changed their names, clothing, and physical 
appearance. He denied Indigenous rationality and agency and argued that those Spaniards 
taught Indians to fight according to Spanish strategies, helping them to surpass their 
natural limitations.30 The writings of González de Nájera present the effects of these 
cases of extreme Spanish mobility and fix the limits of movement as well as the 
boundaries that separated the Spanish from the others.31 
González de Nájera concluded that in order to defeat the Indians it was necessary 
not only to continue the war, but to amplify it. A change in strategy was also needed. To 
defeat the enemy, he advocated creating a permanent and ever-expanding fortified 
frontier from which the Araucanians could be raided and progressively pushed far south 
until their final conquest.32 At this point of the book, the most radical ideas of the author 
emerged. Because of the diabolical nature of the native population, he argued, it was 
impossible to trust them and make peace. He earnestly criticized those (like the Jesuit 
Valdivia) who supported such appeasement policies. He also contended that because of 
Indigenous natural aversion to anything Spanish, they would never truly and completely 
                                                
28 Ibid., fol. 57. 
29 Ibid., fol. 67v.-73v. 
30 Ibid., fol. 74–74v. 
31 Rolena Adorno has studied the case of Gonzalo Guerrero, the alleged first conquistador that went native, 
to show Spanish anxieties on this regard. The Polemics of Possession in Spanish American Narrative (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), chap. 9. Likewise, the work of Inga Clendinnen has shown the 
confussion brought by the initial contact between the Spanish and the Indigenous people in Yucatan, 
Ambivalent Conquests: Maya and Spaniard in Yucatan, 1517-1570, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
32 González de Nájera, “Desengaño y reparo,” bk. 4. 
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assimilate into Spanish society. The soldier and writer believed there was little possibility 
of evangelizing the Araucanians, who would remain tethered to their idolatries. The only 
possible solution González de Nájera could conceive was to denaturalize the Indigenous 
population. This entailed a complete eradication of the natives from their homes and 
enslavement throughout the viceroyalty, in order to send them as far away as possible 
from their homeland and to separate them from each other. For the author, forced 
removal and enslavement of the Araucanians, represented a positive step in the right 
direction, as “it will be worthier that they live in other parts as slaves of Christians, than 
in their land as captives of the devil.”33 
 
The Expulsion of the moriscos 
In order to support his drastic proposals, the governor of Porto Ercole looked to 
the recent process of expulsion of the moriscos, the Muslims that after the Reconquista 
were allowed to remain in the Iberian Peninsula once converted and baptized, from Spain 
as a model.34 This “praiseworthy” action, in his own words, kept the kingdom free of 
such “suspicious and unworthy vassals,” and prevented them from harming the 
Christians.35 For him, his proposal was even more beneficial. While the moriscos had 
been sent back to Africa to continue in their infidelity, he planned to distribute the 
enslaved Araucanians among Christians that ultimately would guide them and teach 
them. Indeed, from 1609 to 1614 the Spanish crown put in action an aggressive policy of 
                                                
33 Ibid., fol. 190v. This brutal policy was put into practice several decades later by Alonso Mercado y 
Villacorta against the Indigenous Calchaquíes, in Tucumán. See Giudicelli, “De la déportation à 
l’invisibilisation.” 
34 The term moriscos is a short form of “nuevos cristianos de moro.” 
35 González de Nájera, “Desengaño y reparo,” fol. 190.. 
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expelling (mostly to North Africa) more than 280,000 moriscos that lived in the Iberian 
Peninsula.36 
That González de Nájera chose the expulsion of the moriscos as the paradigmatic 
case to be imitated in America should not come as a surprise. One of the executors of that 
deportation was captain Alonso de Sotomayor, a well-reputed official who had served in 
the wars in Europe and then in America as governor of Panama and Chile.37 Back in 
Spain, at the end of 1609 he accepted a commission to direct and coordinate the 
expulsion of the moriscos living in Toledo and La Mancha.38 Sotomayor and González de 
Nájera had actually met in Madrid circa 1608. The former was then serving as councilor 
in the Council of War, and sat on the board that discussed González de Nájera’s request 
to support the war in Chile. The erstwhile governor of Chile was also a vocal defender of 
the offensive war against the Araucanians. In Desengaño y reparo, González de Nájera 
openly praised Sotomayor and proudly affirmed that the two of them shared the same 
opinions about Chile.39 It is plausible that in those meetings they also spoke about the 
moriscos and the “solution” that Sotomayor would soon lead in Toledo.  
I am not arguing that González de Nájera and Sotomayor were the masterminds or 
the ideologues behind the deportation of the moriscos or the denaturalization of the 
                                                
36 Scholars are still debating about the consequences and the execution of this policy, see, for example: 
James Casey, “Los moriscos y el despoblamiento de Valencia,” in Poder y sociedad en la España de los 
Austrias, ed. John H. Elliott, trans. Xavier Gil Pujol (Barcelona: Ed. Crítica, 1982), 224–247; Antonio 
Domínguez Ortiz and Bernard Vincent, Historia de los moriscos: vida y tragedia de una minoría, 3. 
reimpr. (Madrid: Alianza Ed, 1997); Ana. Echevarría Arsuaga, Los moriscos (Malaga: Editorial Sarriá, 
2010); James S. Amelang, Historias paralelas: judeoconversos y moriscos en la España moderna, trans. 
Jaime Blasco Castiñeyra (Madrid: Ediciones Akal, 2011); Manuel Lomas Cortés, El proceso de expulsión 
de los moriscos de España (1609-1614) (Valencia: Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2011); 
Mercedes Garcia-Arenal and Gerard Albert Wiegers, eds., The Expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain: A 
Mediterranean Diaspora (Leiden: Brill, 2014). 
37 Francisco Caro de Torres, Relación de los servicios que hizo a Su Magestad del rey don Felipe Segundo 
y Tercero, don Alonso de Sotomayor (Madrid: viuda de Cosme Delgado, 1620). 
38 See, Lomas Cortés, El proceso de expulsión de los moriscos, 301–339. 
39 González de Nájera, “Desengaño y reparo,” fol. 128v. 
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American natives. But for these enforcers of the king’s authority—and, in general, for the 
rest of Spanish society—the struggles against the Araucanians and the moriscos were hot 
topics that could be easily related. Around the same time, the priest Reginaldo de 
Lizárraga saw striking similarities between the Muslims and the Araucanians and 
affirmed that the latter “believe that after death they go beyond the sea, where they have 
many women, and get drunk. It is the paradise of Mohammed.”40 Although moriscos and 
Indians had their own long and specific histories, Lizárraga interpreted those histories 
from the same starting point: the preeminence of the King’s law and of the Catholic 
religion. Imperial officials shared the goal of imposing and defending the empire’s rule 
and religion everywhere on the globe. This mission brought them together and gave them 
a common identity. There was, in fact, a common and imperial understanding of the 
problems that affected imperial hegemony.  
In addition, there were practical similarities between the challenges of dealing 
with the American Indigenous population and the moriscos. After the Catholic Kings 
finished the Reconquista in 1492, they faced the problem of incorporating the majority of 
the population, which was Muslim and Arab-speaking, into their legal and social system. 
At first, Muslims were allowed to practice their religion freely, but soon, less tolerant 
opinions prevailed, and Muslims were forced to be baptized and convert to Catholicism. 
A massive and difficult process of evangelization of non-Spanish speaking populations 
took place in the Iberian Peninsula. The resemblance between this process and the 
evangelization of America did not escape the eye of the Jesuit Cristóforo Rodríguez, who 
in 1556 tried to convince Ignacio de Loyola of the necessity and benefits of taking part in 
                                                
40Reginaldo de Lizárraga, Descripción del Perú, Tucumán, Río de la Plata y Chile, ed. Ignacio Ballesteros 
(Madrid: Dastin, 2002), 465. 
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the evangelization of the moriscos. He argued that if just two priests were ordered to 
participate in such an enterprise, “the Lord would open here other Indies.”41 The 
American case appeared as the archetype of evangelization, and a model for Europe. 
It is worth underscoring the synchrony of the events in America and in Europe. 
Scholars have often assumed that the Spanish Monarchy was a well-defined polity when 
the Spanish arrived in America. However, the Spanish Empire was being built at the 
same time in those two regions, usually by the same people. The conquest and 
incorporation of different peoples, the effort to rule under one religion, and the 
imposition of the institutions of justice, taxation, military, and political government were 
undertaken almost simultaneously in Africa, America, Asia, Europe, and the Atlantic 
islands. Significantly, an exchange of experiences and expert knowledge shaped the 
process not only in America and Asia but also in Europe. The people who undertook the 
evangelization of America learned a great deal from the same processes in Granada (and 
many of them took part in both campaigns), but the conversion of the Amerindians also 
served as example and guide for the Old World.42 Drawing on what he considered the 
positive experience of evangelizing the Amerindians, the Franciscan Diego Valadés 
published a textbook for priests in which he argued for the intense use of images to aid 
the transmission of concepts to the “rude” Italian peasants.43 Likewise, when the 
celebrated bishop of Puebla, Juan de Palafox, returned to Spain, he decided to use the 
                                                
41 Quoted in Adriano Prosperi, “‘Otras Indias’: Missionari della Controriforma tra contadini e selvaggi,” in 
Scienze, credenze occulte, livelli di cultura: Convegno Internazionale di Studi: (Firenze, 26-30 Giugno 
1980), by Istituto Nazionale di Studi sul Rinascimento (Firenze: L.S. Olschki, 1982), 207. 
42 Antonio Garrido Aranda, Moriscos e indios: precedentes hispánicos de la evangelización en México 
(México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1980); Mercedes García-Arenal, “Moriscos e indios. 
Para un estudio comparado de métodos de conquista y evangelización,” Chronica Nova. Revista de 
Historia Moderna de la Universidad de Granada no. 20 (1992): 153–176. 
43 Prosperi, “‘Otras Indias’: Missionari della Controriforma tra contadini e selvaggi,” 224. 
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communicative strategies (mostly visual, but also sermons) that he had learned in the 
New World to convert the “rustic” Castilian farmers.44 
However, not everyone wanted to convert the moriscos. Many believed that such 
an enterprise was doomed to fail, mainly because of morisco reticence to abandon their 
religion and customs and truly assimilate into Spanish society. Moriscos’ loyalty to the 
Spanish crown was called into question. They were portrayed as an internal enemy, much 
like the “fifth column” of the Ottoman Empire.45 It seems that most of the Christian 
population despised the moriscos.46 While priests were generally more condescending 
with the Indigenous people regarding heterodox Catholicism, they were much less 
tolerant with morisco “deviations.”47 The main difference is to be found, once again, in 
the notion of the Amerindians as wretched and undeveloped children. Their failures were 
to be reprimanded, but ultimately forgiven. Moriscos, on the other hand, were considered 
apostates. Their deliberate rejection of Catholicism could neither be tolerated nor 
forgiven. 
                                                
44 Fernando Bouza, “Memoria de memorias. la experiencia imperial y las formas de comunicación,” in 
Europa, América y el mundo: tiempos históricos, ed. Antonio Feros and Roger Chartier (Madrid: Marcial 
Pons, 2006), 124. 
45 Such fears were not fully unfounded. Ottoman Sultans and Muslim African leaders, indeed, reached the 
moriscos expecting that they could destabilize the Peninsula, while they launched attacks on the 
Mediterranean and Easter frontiers. Andrew C. Hess, “The Moriscos: An Ottoman Fifth Column in 
Sixteenth-Century Spain,” The American Historical Review 74, no. 1 (1968): 1–25. 
46 Domínguez Ortiz and Vincent, Historia de los moriscos, 129–155. Nonetheless, there were some 
important exceptions, like Miguel de Cervantes, who portrays a rather sympathetic vision of the moriscos. 
(Don Quixote, second part, chaps. LIV, LXIII. See also Stuart B. Schwartz, All Can Be Saved: Religious 
Tolerance and Salvation in the Iberian Atlantic World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). For an 
analysis of the ideas and representations about the moriscos that were debated in the seventeenth century, 
especially from the time of the Expulsion and onwards, see Antonio Feros, “Rhetorics of the Expulsion,” in 
The Expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain, 60–101. 
47 Bernardo Pérez de Chinchón affirmed that it was easier to convert an Indigenous person than a Muslim. 
Libro llamado antialcorán, que quiere dezir contra El Alcorán de Mahoma: repartido en veynte y seys 
sermones (Salamanca: Juan y Andrés Renaut. A costa de Claudio Curlet, 1595), 322. 
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Hardliners against the moriscos advocated their expulsion, and celebrated when 
Phillip III took this very step in 1609.48 The priest Pedro Aznar Cardona penned a fierce 
diatribe against the moriscos and justified their expulsion based on their “natural 
rejection” of Christianity.49 The repudiation of the moriscos revealed the most intolerant 
aspects of Spanish society. The advocates of the expulsion wished to eradicate all signs 
of difference. The priest Damián Fonseca, in a brutally honest passage, contended that the 
forced deportation was justified because moriscos sought freedom of conscience.50 For 
this author, the mere desire for religious tolerance deserved punishment. Under the 
premises of imperial Catholicism, it was the Monarchy’s duty to fight and exterminate 
heresy and religious deviation. 
 
The Slaughter of the Sangleys 
The expulsion of the moriscos undoubtedly set a precedent for many of those who 
feared and rejected difference, usually expressed in terms of religious difference. 
Religion, however, was not only about faith, but about culture and civilization generally. 
The 1609 forced deportation served as an example—and even as an ideal in other parts of 
the world—of how to impose Spanish civilization, which some imperial officials 
understood, or at least desired, as unique and exclusive. Throughout the seventeenth 
century, the authorities of the Philippines (almost the antipodes of the Peninsula and the 
                                                
48 Antonio Feros points out that the expulsion of the moriscos was carried out in 1609 to divert the criticism 
that the Monarchy was facing because of the truce signed with the Dutch rebels. By expelling the Muslims, 
Phillip III was still able to expose his militant Catholicism and please the most radical defenders of the 
imperial Catholicism. Kingship and Favoritism, 204. 
49 Pedro Aznar Cardona, Expulsion iustificada de los moriscos españoles y suma de las excellencias 
christianas de nuestro rey don Felipe el Catholico Tercero (Huesca: Pedro Cabarte, 1612), pt. 2, 3v.-4. 
50 Damián Fonseca O. P., Iusta expulsion de los moriscos de España: con la instruccion, apostasia, y 
traycion dellos: y respuesta á las dudas que se ofrecieron acerca desta materia (Roma: Giacomo 
Mascardo, 1612), 126–127. 
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moriscos) made several references to the expulsion of the moriscos and proposed this 
method as a solution to their own problems. At the time, Manila was one of the most 
cosmopolitan cities of the world, a major hub in Southeast Asia, and a crossroads and 
melting pot where Philippine natives, Chinese, Japanese, Indians, Armenians, American 
Indians, Spanish Americans, Europeans, and Africans met and lived. Such groups arrived 
with their own languages, dresses, and culture, as well as various religions, from Islam, to 
Confucianism, to native practices.51 
Not surprisingly, coexistence in the islands proved hard. Most of the tensions 
involved the large Chinese population, which Spanish called sangleyes.52 Their situation 
was peculiar as they crisscrossed between two empires, and theoretically, were not 
subjects of the Spanish Monarch. They paid for a license to live in the islands and be 
governed under the Spanish laws, and were placed within a specific quarter called the 
“Parián” that changed location many times over the years, but always remained outside 
the walls of Manila and within a cannonball’s range. They fulfilled all kinds of needs and 
became essential to the Manilan economy. They were the providers of cheap and much 
needed goods and workers.53 Such was their growth that in just a few years they greatly 
                                                
51 Even halfway through the eighteenth century, Manila was still a vibrant and diverse city. The Jesuit 
Pedro Murillo Velarde, in his 1740 account, is very telling on this regard: “Estando una hora en el Tuley o 
Puente de Manila se verán pasar casi todas las naciones de Europa, Asia, América y África; se verán sus 
trajes y se oirán sus lenguas. El prodigio es que todos estos para comunicarse entre sí hablan en español; 
pero cómo. Cada nación ha formado una jerigonza por donde se entienden. Yo oí un día un gran pleito 
entre un sangley, un armenio y creo que un malabar; todos hablaban español y yo no entendía a ninguno, 
por no haber estudiado entonces sus vocabularios.” Quoted in Antonio García-Abásolo, “Los chinos y el 
modelo colonial español en Filipinas,” Cuadernos de Historia Moderna (April 11, 2012): 234. 
52 According to the governor Francisco de Sande, the term sangley meant “people that come and go.”AGI, 
Filipinas, 6, R. 3, N. 25 “Carta de Sande dando cuenta de su llegada y de la situación” (Manila, June 7, 
1576). For a comprehensive study of the Chinese in Manila see Juan Gil, Los chinos en Manila (siglos XVI 
Y XVII) (Lisboa: Centro Científico e Cultural de Macau, 2011). 
53 García-Abásolo, “Los chinos y el modelo colonial,” 231. 
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outnumbered the Spanish population. Throughout the seventeenth century, Sangleys 
numbered around 20,000-30,000, while the Spanish hardly reached 2,000.54 
The relationship between the Spanish and the Sangleys was tense and rife of 
conflict. When analyzing this relationship, there are two opposing perspectives. On the 
one hand, Antonio García-Abásolo affirms that despite of some violent events and the 
deep cultural and religious differences, in the end, a pragmatic approach prevailed and  
“every necessary accommodation was made to create an environment of understanding 
and amicable coexistence.” This was, then, a model of coexistence in the early modern 
globalized world.55 On the other hand, Manel Ollé argues that the extreme violence and 
continuous conflict between these two groups should not be overlooked or 
underestimated. For this historian, violence was at the core of the Chinese-Spanish 
relationship, which was anything but amicable.56 Both scholars concur in pointing out 
that the root of the problems was the cultural differences that seemed insurmountable. 
García-Abásolo highlights Spanish efforts to assimilate Sangleys and baptize them.57 
However, Ollé emphasizes that integration was never possible because of Spanish 
authorities’ intolerance and Chinese unwillingness to integrate.58 
Certainly, the high levels of violence (both physical as well as rhetorical) against 
the Chinese make it difficult to envision a harmonic society. Spaniards distrusted and 
scorned the Sangleys, but they also exploited and, ultimately, depended on them. Some 
                                                
54 Ibid., 236. There is no demographic information for the native population. 
55 Ibid., 223. 
56 Manel Ollé, “Interacción y conflicto en el parián de Manila,” Illes i imperis no. 10/11 (2008): 63. 
57 García-Abásolo, “Los chinos y el modelo colonial,” 268. 
58 According to Ollé, Sangleys lived isolated and continued practicing their rituals and customs, and kept 
strong ties with their homeland, “Interacción y conflicto,” 65, 79. 
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Spaniards denounced the abuses against the Sangleys, but they remained a minority.59 
Overall, a negative vision of the Chinese prevailed. The Spanish constantly insisted upon 
the dishonest character of the Chinese, mostly based on their allegedly sodomitic 
practices.60 The governor Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera claimed that the Sangleys were 
the “most spiritless and fearful” people that he had met.61 Likewise, Manila’s attorney, 
Hernando de los Ríos Coronel, considered the Chinese to be “too seditious, cunning, and 
bribers.”62 As Manel Ollé rightly points out, those depictions contrasted with the 
idealized descriptions of China, usually presented as a highly civilized and ordered 
kingdom, full of richness and knowledge, and lacking only Catholicism.63  
One of the climatic points in this tense and conflictive relationship that highlights 
the extent of Spanish anxiety, violence, and near absence of consideration for Sangley 
lives, can be found in the 1639 Sangley revolt. On November 19th, a group of Sangleys 
assaulted the house of Luis Arias de Mora, governor of the town of Calamba, thirty-four 
miles south of Manila, at the shores of Lake Bay. The rebels burned the house down and 
killed the Spanish official, as well as a priest who was with him. This triggered a full-
scale revolt across the island that lasted more than four months.64 The causes of the 
uprising are still not clear. Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, the governor of the 
                                                
59 That was, for instance, the position of Domingo de Salazar, bishop of the Philippines. AGI, Filipinas 6, 
R. 10, N. 180 Domingo de Salazar, “Memorial sobre el estado de las islas” (Manila, June 12, 1582). 
60 Ollé, “Interacción y conflicto,” 68. Depictions of sodomy have been used as a common denigratory trope, 
see, for example, Peter Herman Sigal, ed., Infamous Desire: Male Homosexuality in Colonial Latin 
America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003); Zeb Tortorici, “‘Heran todos putos’: Sodomitical 
Subcultures and Disordered Desire in Early Colonial Mexico,” Ethnohistory 54, no. 1 (December 21, 
2007): 35–67. 
61 Letter of Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera to the king, June 30, 1636 in Francisco Navas del Valle and 
Pablo Pastells S.J., Colección general de documentos relativos a las islas Filipinas existentes en el Archivo 
de Indias de Sevilla (CGIF), vol. 8 (Barcelona: Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas, 1933), 
CCXLVI. 
62 AGI, Filipinas, 27, N. 51, “Petición del procurador Ríos Coronel sobre varios asuntos.” 
63 Ollé, “Interacción y conflicto,” 68. 
64 Gil has a detailed comparison of all the revolt’s available narrations. Los chinos en Manila, 491–513. 
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archipelago at the time, and his supporters argued that this was part of a major anti-
Spanish conspiracy with ties across the entire region that included Dutch and Chinese 
enemies, most remarkably the Chinese pirate Zheng Zhilong, who was supposed to give 
naval support to the rebels. However, they claimed, the Sangleys of Calamba rushed and 
did not wait long enough for the others, who were not fully prepared to step into the 
action.65 Conversely, scholars have claimed that this was a largely local uprising against 
exploitation and abuses.66 Charles J. McCarthy even argues that the conspiracy never 
existed, and that Hurtado de Corcuera invented it to diminish his own culpability and to 
increase the prestige of his victories.67 
Whether or not there was a major conspiracy, these events shattered the fragile 
foundations of Spanish hegemony in the archipelago. The pronounced demographic 
imbalance, the constant rejection of the Sangleys, and the poor conditions in which the 
Sangleys lived, bred rebellion, which terrified the Spanish.68 The idea of a Sangley 
mutiny was a permanent source of anxiety and concern for the Spaniards; the possibility 
of an international offensive against the rather weak Spanish presence in Asia always 
loomed. Hurtado de Corcuera’s conspiracy speaks to an image of the Sangleys as the fifth 
column of the Chinese empire, similar to how the moriscos and the Ottomans were seen. 
The news of the killing of Arias de Mora spread like wildfire, and Sangleys from 
various towns joined the rebellion. Although the insurgents were mostly unarmed, it 
                                                
65 Hurtado de Corcuera, Memorial de D. Sevastián Hurtado de Corcuera, fol. 2–2v; BNE, Mss/2371, f. 
602-603v. Anonymous, “Relación verdadera del levantamiento de los sangleyes, en las Filipinas, y de las 
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presented a truly dangerous situation for the authorities. Thousands of Sangleys 
converged, attacking Spanish churches and buildings and killing anyone they could: 
Spanish fears had become a reality. Hurtado de Corcuera’s response was nothing less 
than ruthless. He recruited every available man, including the Spanish, “as well as 
Indians, mestizos, Japanese, and free blacks,” and conducted a merciless attack.69 He 
ordered that all the Spanish in Manila “should kill the Sangleys whom they kept.” The 
command was carried out immediately and on December 2nd “they slaughtered all the 
Sangleys that were in Manila.”70 Later on, Hurtado de Corcuera ordered the Parián, the 
Chinese borough, to be burned down. 
After several weeks of intense fighting across the island, the few still living 
Sangleys surrendered unconditionally, and by March of 1640, the revolt had been 
completely quashed. The toll of this repression is shocking: while only fifty Spanish and 
300 Indians perished, around 20,000 Sangleys were slain, almost the entire Chinese 
population in the island was annihilated.71 Some of the imprisoned Sangleys were sent to 
the galleys, while others were distributed as slaves.72 Despite the brutality and cruelty 
displayed against the Chinese, the Crown did not find necessary to reprehend Hurtado de 
Corcuera.73 As seen in Chapter Two, the governor after his term was subjected to an 
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603.  
70 Anonymous, “Relation of the Insurrection of the Chinese,” in The Philippine Islands, 1493-1803, ed. 
Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson, vol. 29 (1638-1640) (Cleveland, Ohio: A.H. Clark Co, 
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72 Gil, Los chinos en Manila, 509. For the enslavement of Asians in Manila, and their further export to 
Mexico, see Tatiana Seijas, Asian Slaves in Colonial Mexico: From Chinos to Indians (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
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unusually harsh inspection, and spent more than five years in prison. Yet in the more than 
fifty charges against him, there is none condemning his actions against the Chinese.74 
Once Hurtado de Corcuera defeated the revolt, he sent news of his victory to 
China and invited Chinese merchants to return to the island.75 Although one might think 
that after such a dramatic episode the Chinese would have been more wary about going to 
the Philippines, it seems they did not condemn the massacre nor make any sort of 
reprisal. Indeed, despite Spanish fears and the harsh treatment Chinese had to bear, the 
two parties were mutually dependent on each other. The viceroy of Mexico, the duke of 
Escalona, bluntly expressed this radical pragmatic view. At the same time he rejoiced at 
Spanish victory, he acknowledged that the killing of almost all the Sangleys had been 
extremely costly and prejudicial for Spanish interests because the Chinese “although they 
are bad blood, they still feed.”76 It did not take long before a return to normalcy, and soon 
thousands of Chinese resettled under the same, or even worse, conditions.77 As shocking 
and sad as it might be, the bloodbath of the Sangleys did not have any major effect or 
consequences.78  
The large, undesired, but desperately-needed Chinese population in the 
Philippines raised several issues that were hard for the Spanish authorities and society to 
solve. In an anonymous fictional dialogue written at the end of the seventeenth century, a 
                                                                                                                                            
de su rebelión, con otros sucessos de aquellas islas (Sevilla: Imprenta de Clemente Hidalgo, 1606); AGI, 
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74 AGI, Filipinas, 2, N. 172 “Consulta sobre residencia de Hurtado de Corcuera.” 
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76 “Letter of the viceroy of Mexico, duke of Escalona. January, 1 1641,” in CGIF, 8:CCXLVII. 
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Spaniard and an Armenian debated the two groups’ complex and difficult coexistence.79 
The Armenian appears perplexed in the face of the enormous number of Chinese who 
lived in the Asian archipelago with absolute freedom, while acting against Spanish goals 
and values. He even argues that Sangleys were the true lords of the Philippines and that 
the Spanish did not hold real dominion. After all, the Spanish were dependent on the 
Sangleys for almost every aspect of their lives, especially in the area of trade and 
commerce.80 The Armenian then asserts that the only thing of real value the Spanish 
possessed was their silver, which did not give them any more authority in the Philippines 
than in any other kingdom where they could trade.81 The Armenian continued by 
highlighting the counter-productive effects of Sangley behavior on the religious 
indoctrination of the natives of the island, which was, ultimately, the justification for 
Spanish rule. For him, the Spanish were betraying God and the king: Instead of teaching 
the “poor naturals” properly, they were left to be contaminated by the Sangleys.82 The 
Armenian concluded his diatribe by comparing the Sangleys with the moriscos, who, 
according to this character, also poisoned Spanish society. Claiming that similar 
problems required similar solutions, he saw no other answer but to expel the Sangleys 
from the Philippines once and for all.83 Thus, almost a century after the fact, the 
expulsion of the moriscos remained a powerful image and a compelling precedent. 
Similarly, the Dominican Jacinto Samper wrote in 1682 an enraged report 
suggesting that no Sangley should be allowed in the islands. He claimed that because of 
                                                
79 BNE, Mss/11014, fol. 1-25v. “Diálogo y conversación entre un español y un armenio contra los Chinos 
sangleis que vienen a Manila.” The text is not dated, but it mentions the 1686 Royal Decree expelling the 
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order was pressing for the expulsion of the Sangleys.  
80 Ibid., fol. 2–2v. 
81 Ibid., fol. 9. 
82 Ibid., fol. 11. 
83 Ibid., fol. 20. 
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their atheism they were even more despicable than the moriscos, who at least “confessed 
one god.”84 In 1677, another Dominican, the Florentine Victorio Riccio, who had lived 
several years in the Philippines and in China, argued, just like the fictitious Armenian, that 
the Sangleys were infidels and sodomites. In his view, they were damaging the political 
body and were a bad influence to the Indians. Their trade also conflicted with Spanish 
interests, as only they profited from it.85 These and many other brash testimonies pushed 
the Crown to approve the expulsion of all the Sangleys who were not baptized on 
November 14th, 1686.86  
Nonetheless, as had also been the case with the moriscos, many Spaniards 
opposed the expulsion. Although the city council of Manila agreed on the pernicious 
character of the Sangleys, it advocated not expelling them, but rather “reducing” them 
and keeping them tightly controlled in the Parián.87 In 1667, the Jesuit Francisco Combes 
offered reasons for why the Sangleys should remain in the Philippines. While he 
acknowledged that on several occasions they had revolted against Spanish rule, he 
thought they could still be controlled. In a rather pragmatic argument, he described the 
Sangleys’ importance, and the many professions and services they fulfilled that the 
indigenous population could not replace.88 In another essay, an anonymous writer argued, 
point by point, against Riccio’s proposals. The author claimed that the Sangleys, while 
sinners, could easily live among the Christians (just like the Jews and Heretics did in 
                                                
84 AGI, Filipinas, 28, N. 131, 962 - 968v. fr. Jacinto Samper, “Informe a favor de la expulsión de los 
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Europe) and that Riccio’s diatribes were lies that overlooked the many Sangleys who 
were good Christians.89 Similarly, the Jesuit Luis de Morales contended that the 
expulsion was contrary to the priests’ obligation to spread Catholicism, especially among 
the Chinese.90 
Even more remarkable, the Sangleys themselves protested the order. In a very 
confident (almost arrogant) tone, the “infidel Sangleys” reminded Spanish authorities of 
the disadvantages and problems that their expulsion would carry. The Sangleys claimed 
that the Spaniards had first asked the Chinese to come to the islands, and had then invited 
them to stay. The Sangleys also argued that the Philippines depended on Chinese trade, 
which they handled. In a not-so-veiled threat, they contended that without the Sangleys, 
no Chinese merchant would want to go to the islands. Spaniards would have to go 
themselves to China to get their goods, just like the English and the Dutch, and face the 
dangers of sailing and pirates.91 
This opposition made the 1686 order of expulsion impossible to enforce. There 
were other practical matters as well, namely the Chinese population could not be fully 
policed. Spanish authorities did not really know who should be reduced, who had truly 
converted, and who was merely paying lip service. Moreover, because of the Spaniards’ 
total dependency on the Sangleys for their survival—despite advocates of the expulsion 
claiming to the contrary—getting rid of them was unrealistic. Because of this, in 1695, the 
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Audience of Manila openly recognized that it had completely failed to carry out the royal 
order, and suggested its revocation.92  
 
The Defense of the Miserable 
The expulsion of the moriscos, the resistance of the Araucanians, and the 
slaughtering of the Sangleys were powerful images of the struggle against populations 
different from the Spanish and those who opposed Spanish rule. Nonetheless, despite the 
aggressiveness of Spanish rhetoric and actions, killing, expulsion, deportation, and 
denaturalization were not the only methods for dealing with those resisting imperial 
power. Several officials argued for more moderate policies and strategies to deal with the 
Monarchy’s perceived enemies. Although it might seem paradoxical, royal officials, even 
someone seemingly as brutal and bloodthirsty as Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, could 
grasp the motivations of the dissenting peoples they were crushing. 
In 1652, some years after serving in the Philippines, Hurtado Corcuera, the man 
who slaughtered thousands of Sangleys, was commissioned by the Crown to put an end 
to the political and social turmoil afflicting the city of Córdoba in Spain. On that 
occasion, despite the populace’s open affronts to royal authority, he acted in a much more 
conciliatory manner and avoided the use of violence. That year, the city’s lower classes 
revolted in what has been called the “Bread Riot.” This was a food riot in which the 
urban dwellers protested against the scarcity of food, the elevated prices of bread and 
grains, and the social conditions that favored the rich oligarchy. This was not an isolated 
event, but was part of a larger wave of popular protests and altercations that shook 
Andalusia between 1647 and 1652. These movements were fostered by extreme 
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inequality, permanent war, economic crisis, and the plague that ravaged the region.93 The 
case of Córdoba was one of the most notorious because of the strength of the movement, 
as well as the importance of the city and the noble families that lived in the region.94 The 
riot resonated throughout the region and metastasized to nearby towns.95 
On May 6th, a furious crowd took control of Córdoba. The events in the city had 
started almost by accident. Apparently, the crying of a devastated mother who had just 
lost her son due to starvation outraged the people. Rumors spread quickly, and in a few 
hours an angry mob overtook the city. Evidently, the first target of the crowd was the 
city’s elite, represented politically by the cabildo. Córdoba was at the time one of the 
cities in Spain with the greatest social differentiation and segregation of classes.96 The 
noble and rich men who ruled the city, owned the fields, and controlled the market were 
accused of being greedy and of doing nothing to prevent or mitigate the scarcity that 
afflicted most of the citizens. 
Most of the violence and accusations were directed against the city’s corregidor, 
the Peruvian don Pedro Alfonso Flores y Montenegro, viscount of Peñaparda, who had 
no option but to flee the city in order to save his life.97 The popular claim was that he had 
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done nothing to stop the abuses of the cabildo and, to the contrary, had colluded with the 
oligarchy. It seems that such accusations were not far from the truth. A couple of months 
prior to the revolt, the Council of Castile, worried by the news that Peñaparda’s 
“procedures were not in compliance with the duties of a minister,” decided to remove 
him from his post in order to prevent social and political disturbances.98 However, social 
distress moved faster than official paperwork, and when the riots started Peñaparda was 
still corregidor. 
Once the uprisings broke, the rioters demanded a change of authorities. Don 
Diego Fernández de Córdoba, a charismatic patrician with broad support among the 
revolting populace, was given control of the government of the city. This move, which 
adhered to the early-modern formula of “long live the king, death to bad government,” 
succeeded in temporarily calming the mood. However, tensions remained. The new 
corregidor tried to reassert the elites’ authority over the city. First, he organized an armed 
militia to suppress the plebeians who, although mostly armed with rocks, sticks, and 
knives, greatly outnumbered the city’s forces. Then, he identified and punished the 
revolt’s leaders, sentencing four of them to death.99 
 The crown was well aware that much more serious action was needed to restore 
authority and secure the peace. Skipping the traditional process of consultation with the 
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Council of Castile, the king directly appointed someone with the credentials and 
confidence required to accomplish the objectives: the captain don Sebastián Hurtado de 
Corcuera.100 The experienced official was appointed with the explicit mission of restoring 
peace. First, in order to reinstate the king’s authority, he offered a royal pardon that he 
brought with him from Madrid.101 This was typical behavior for any imperial official 
dealing with a popular unrest: commit acts of violence to raise fear among the people, 
and then show mercy and love from a forgiving (though not forgetful) king. 
Hurtado de Corcuera also needed to assure the provision of bread in the city at 
just prices. Thus, don Sebastián turned his attention from the commoners to Córdoba’s 
elite in order to break their control and monopoly over the much-needed and scarce 
grains. Seasoned in dealing with the powerful oligarchies who controlled the Asian trade, 
he had no problems in compelling the patricians, by reason or force, to sell their grains, 
and he forbade them to stock products or speculate with the price. Additionally, he 
bought grains from other regions, lowering the price of grain in Córdoba.102 The king 
must have been very pleased with the way Hurtado de Corcuera dealt with the powerful 
oligarchy, imposing his authority and defending the Monarchy’s interests. In 1658 the 
monarch dismissed the three people suggested by the Council and motu proprio, at his 
own initiative, appointed the captain as corregidor of Sanlúcar de Barrameda.103 The king 
needed someone trustworthy to impose his authority over this recently acquired strategic 
port where powerful Spanish and foreign merchants benefited from the transatlantic trade 
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and which until recently had been possessed by the duke of Medina Sidonia.104 However, 
Hurtado de Corcuera did not hold the post, because by then he was already on his way to 
the Canaries to serve as their governor.105 
As representative of the Crown in Córdoba, Hurtado de Corcuera mediated 
between the elite and the populace and sought to protect the latter. For that, he relied both 
on force and the imposition of justice, two major features of royal power. Hurtado de 
Corcuera, as well as the king and his councilors in Madrid, understood the motivations 
behind the riots and the violent actions that altered the social order. In fact, the Council 
ordered Hurtado de Corcuera to disarm the militia organized by Fernández de Córdoba. 
The councilors considered that such armed body was an extraordinary measure that 
should not become permanent because it would only strengthen the elite’s power and 
work against the lower classes.106 Already in 1622, the Council of Castile had argued that 
the government of Córdoba needed someone “of stronger arm.” They wanted a person 
who could serve as a firewall against the city’s elite “to avoid and punish the crimes and 
excesses of the powerful, looking for the good administration of justice, protection, and 
defense of the wretched.”107 
The king, the councilors, and Hurtado de Corcuera followed a familiar pattern of 
rulership. They used a language and reasoning almost identical to that deployed by the 
Council of the Indies and other imperial officials when dealing with Indigenous revolts in 
America. For example, during the 1660 outbreak of Oaxaca, the Council of the Indies 
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gave the order to pacify the Indians “with much gentleness, without afflicting them with 
harsh punishments.”108 Similarly, the Royal Audience of Mexico sought the 
“pacification, reduction, and peacefulness, and the reparation of the said Indians.”109 It 
was essential, then, to identify the reasons for the indigenous uprising and to satisfy their 
demands. Juan Francisco de Montemayor—the oidor commissioned to suppress the 
revolt, who used extremely violent methods, condemned even by the Crown (Fig. 5)—
also argued that the root cause of the upheaval was the exploitation and violence suffered 
by the Indians.110  
 
Figure 5. Portrait of Juan Francisco de Montemayor (Alfocea, Spain). Photo by María Gálvez. He is 
holding a letter in his right hand, while his left one is laying on a book, and next to it there is a helmet. The 
letter and the book depict him as a man of letters, essential attributes of a good judge. These qualities, 
however, do not appear at odds with the helm, which reminds us of Montemayor’s military activities and 
how he combined the quill with the sword.  
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Consequently, Montemayor finished his mission in Oaxaca—after severely 
punishing the culprits of the rebellion, and issuing a general pardon for the rest of the 
population—by promulgating his Ordenanzas, a set of laws to restructure the 
government. The laws covered almost every aspect of Indigenous life and interactions 
with the Spaniards, from civil to religious authorities to merchants. The idea repeatedly 
expressed was that Indigenous people had been exploited and abused almost by everyone, 
and that it was necessary to find a remedy for the situation. Montemayor concluded that it 
was imperative to undertake radical reforms in order to secure the protection and good 
treatment of the native population and prevent future upheavals. However, this set of 
laws did not really reform anything; it merely brought attention to pre-existing laws that 
supposedly protected the native population. Montemayor reminded corregidores and 
other Spanish officials that it was their obligation “that the Indians be treated with love 
and care.” Hence, the oidor urged these officers to look for the “shelter, conservation and 
good treatment of said Indians.”111  
Juan Francisco de Montemayor has usually been portrayed as a hotheaded 
official, prone to violence and drastic punishments. Héctor Díaz Polanco and Consuelo 
Sánchez call him “la espada restauradora” (the restoring sword), a man who relied only 
on violence to reinstate social order.112 Judith Zeitlin affirms that “the recently arrived 
Montemayor had little understanding of the nuances of Indian-Spanish interaction, nor 
did he encourage or support anything which broached the separation between colonist 
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and colonized.”113Although it is true that Montemayor was new to New Spain and its 
complex society, and that he enforced unusually severe punishments, it is questionable to 
assert that he failed to grasp the society. In fact (and as perplexing as it might seem), 
despite his recent arrival to Mexico, the official quickly adapted to the local political 
culture and acted accordingly, as demonstrated by his response to the rebellion. 
Montemayor’s Ordenanzas and his overall behavior during the rebellion are 
indications of his deep understanding of Mexican political culture. On the one hand, he 
acted as any other imperial official would, whose obligation was to impose and restore 
the king’s authority.114 Moreover, he relied on the standard tools officials had at their 
disposal—especially dispensations of the king’s justice—and which were performed in 
particular ways. As Alejandro Cañeque has argued, love, fear, and anger were the pillars 
upon which political legitimacy and control were built. They were not private emotions, 
but social and political ones. The Spanish Monarchy, overall, was calibrated for a mix of 
love and fear; thus mercy was very important.115 Montemayor followed these political 
ideals almost perfectly. The harsh punishments were administered in order to scare the 
Indigenous people, a reminder of the dangerous consequences of subverting the royal 
order. Once completed, he showed clemency by issuing a general pardon to the 
remainder of the native population.  
On the other hand, the oidor clearly understood the special role played by the 
indigenous population. With his Ordenanzas, he reminded everyone of the king’s love to 
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de Zaragoza, 2001). 
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the “wretched Indians,” and of his obligation to protect them and take care of them. He 
was quick to rely on the tropes that other officials and authorities used to portray the 
natives, and strictures about the way the Spanish should interact with them. In fact, 
Alejandro Cañeque has analyzed in depth Montemayor’s depiction of the natives as 
wretched, and argues that such characterizations were part of the political culture of 
colonialism and justified Spanish rule and exploitation over the Indians.116 In accordance 
with the early modern Spanish political culture, American Indigenous peoples, like the 
Castilian plebeians, were the weakest members of the political body, and therefore 
needed to be both firmly ruled and protected by the king and his ministers.  
 
Global Imposition of Authority 
The cases of Córdoba and Oaxaca urge us to think about the linkages and 
engagement of America’s political culture with the Spanish Empire overall, and to 
question the limits and extent of its specificity. Moreover, the events help us to see the 
breadth of the circulation of some political notions—like the defense of the miserable or 
the ideal of reducir—among imperial officials who were moving from one region to 
another. The way in which Montemayor dealt with the rebels of Oaxaca was not that 
different from the ways in which other officials dealt with rioters in Castile, Messina, or 
Granada.117 There, too, the Crown constantly argued that it was its duty to protect the poor 
                                                
116 Cañeque, The King’s Living Image, chaps. 6–7. 
117 For an study on the revolt of Mesina, see Luis Antonio Ribot García, La revuelta antiespañola en 
Mesina: causas y antecedentes (1591-1674) (Valladolid: Universidad, 1982). For the revolt of Naples, see 
Rosario Villari, The Revolt of Naples (Cambridge, UK; Cambridge, MA, USA: Polity Press, 1993). 
Uprisings in Granada are studied in Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones andaluzas. For a general overview of 
the historiography and the recent interpretations on European social uprisings see Samuel K. Cohn, Jr., 
“Authority and Popular Resistance,” in The Oxford Handbook of Early Modern European History, 1350-




and the vulnerable, especially against the abuses of the powerful. Spanish imperial 
officials did not act in similar ways merely because they were following orders. They 
shared a common behavior that was the expression of Spanish imperial cosmopolitanism, 
which I will discuss in Chapter Five. They took similar courses of action because they 
perceived the differing situations according to a unitary perspective and ideal of how an 
empire should behave, govern, and suppress dissent. 
While there are many similarities in the way royal officials in Córdoba and Oaxaca 
acted, there are also some shocking differences between their actions in Chile and the 
Philippines. There is no doubt that circumstances in Castile were distinct from those in the 
Asian archipelago. Hurtado de Corcuera acted according to the particular parameters set 
by the distinct scenarios, actors involved, and overall social and political conceptions. It 
was, indeed, very different dealing with rebellious Chinese than with Castilian peasants. It 
is worthwhile to underscore that the early modern world was not by any means 
egalitarian, but rather was built on the premise of hierarchical differentiation. Moreover, 
such distinctions were conceived as communal rather than individual. Identity related to 
the community to which one belonged.118 Thus, the way rebellions or any other dissenting 
movement were understood, and how authorities reacted to them, depended to a great 
extent on the place the rebels occupied within the political body. 
Although in both cases (Manila and Córdoba) the rioters reacted against abuses, 
in the Philippine islands, the Sangleys lacked major advocates. Spanish authorities did 
not grant any legitimacy to their revolt. Furthermore, although officials always feared 
popular uprisings in Castile, they also enjoyed a greater margin there to move and act. In 
Asia, the Spanish presence and power were far more precarious. Thus, in Hurtado de 
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Corcuera’s view, the only way to preserve social order in the islands was by means of 
violence and terror, and by physically eliminating any possible menace. Nonetheless, fear 
of rebellion and demographic imbalance alone cannot explain such brutality. In fact, in 
America, Spaniards were always a minority and authorities were constantly putting out 
fires and dealing with native rebellions and resistance to Spanish hegemony, typically 
without resorting to such harsh tactics of repression.  
It seems that the most brutal policies were applied against those seen as a 
potential threat to the society. The moriscos and the Sangleys were thought of as a 
disease on the political body, and as a consequence, they had to be removed.119 
Moreover, these populations might ally with Spain’s enemies, making them even more 
dangerous. They were portrayed as alien to the Spanish Monarchy, as people unable to 
integrate into the polity. Most Native Americans, in contrast, were perceived (and very 
often perceived themselves) as full members of the Spanish Empire and although they (as 
well as Castilian peasants) occupied the lowest positions and were thought as 
“miserables,” they were integral and essential to the political body. They could be 
reprehended and punished, but their right to exist was not called into question. The case 
of the Araucanians serves as an interesting counterpointing case in which Spanish 
authorities debated whether such population could or not be incorporated into the 
Monarchy.  
The Sangleys, the populace of Córdoba, and the American Indigenous peoples felt 
poverty, hunger, and exploitation in similar ways. However, the vision and conceptions 
of them were very different, and accordingly, so was the way in which the Crown and its 
                                                
119 AGI, Filipinas, 28, N. 131, 1114 - 1121 “Informe sobre que no se permita vivir en Filipinas a los chinos 
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representatives treated them. The political, social, and religious circumstances of the 
rebels made a great difference. Imperial officials chose different strategies and tactics of 
accommodation and repression in order to assure their never-changing quest: the 
imposition and preservation of the Spanish king’s authority wherever they were. In this 
respect, religious identity played a crucial role. As will be explored in the following 
chapter, the Spanish Monarchy portrayed itself as the Catholic Monarchy, and thus its 
ultimate mission was the promotion and defense of Catholicism throughout the globe. 
Imperial officials thought of themselves as servants of the crown and as soldiers of God. 
This Catholic identity profoundly shaped Spanish society at all levels. It was what 
differentiated the polity from other nations, and what invigorated the empire’s sense of 
moral superiority. Moreover, the ways in which the Crown’s “enemies” were deemed 
also depended on their beliefs. It made a great difference to deal with newly converted 
Amerindians than with moriscos who stubbornly rejected Catholic doctrine. Nonetheless, 
as we have seen, how this Catholic identity and mission was understood also varied a 
great deal. While all imperial officials agreed on Catholicism’s preeminence and that it 
should be the world’s only faith, the means of achieving this goal were not universally 
agreed upon. Some promoted evangelization and conversion of the idolaters, pagans, and 
heretics, while others lobbied for their physical removal and extermination.  
Spanish officials understood and framed their local fights in global and imperial 
terms. They were all part of one universal struggle of imposing Spanish hegemony. We 
have already seen the case of Alonso González de Nájera, who presented the war in Chile 
to an Italian and European Audience. Hurtado de Corcuera and his followers clearly 
linked the Sangley rebellion to the many others that in 1640 (a truly annus horribilis for 
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the Spanish Monarchy) afflicted the polity.120 One of the governor’s assistants celebrated 
the end of “such bloody uprising that it was so close to extinguish in such remote climate 
the Catholic religion,” and he wished that “the remaining rebels of this Monarchy, that set 
against her at the same time […] in so many parts of the world” would have the same 
end.121 For this author it was evident that the triumph in one region signaled the path in 
the other parts of the empire. The Spanish Monarchy shared the same fate, despite its 
global dispersion. Likewise, for the chronicler of the rebellion of Oaxaca, Juan de Torres 
Castillo, “it is of no less glory to secure the Indians, than to defeat in the Italian 
campaigns,” and the pacification of the Indians was of great importance “not only in the 
government of this New World, but in all the Monarchy.” Consequently, he contended 
that it was rightfully due that such victory “was said in Naples, published in all of 
America and Europe.”122 In fact, imperial power took different shapes in every specific 
context, but it aimed to be unique across the whole world.  
Moreover, the Monarchy clearly and deliberately decided to create a shared 
consciousness of the global struggles against imperial power among all the regions and 
imperial subjects. Throughout the seventeenth century, imperial officials knew that they 
had to face rebellion everywhere, and they celebrated the victories of others across the 
globe as their own. In 1653, while the Aragonese Juan Francisco Montemayor was the 
acting governor of Santo Domingo (prior to his activities in Mexico) he received orders 
to celebrate the recovery of Catalonia.123 He eagerly organized the celebrations, and we 
                                                
120 That same year, major rebellions broke up in Portugal, Catalonia, Naples, and Sicily. There is an 
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121 Anonymous, “Relación verdadera del levantamiento de los sangleyes,” fol. 603v. 
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123 AGI, Patronato, 273, R.5, f. 97-98, “Celebraciones por el triunfo en Cataluña” (Santo Domingo, 1653).  
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can presume that he was especially pleased with such triumph, as he begun serving the 
king in 1642 in the midst of that war.124 
News about the activities of the officials, and of the Monarchy overall, circulated 
rapidly across the globe. Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera’s distinguished actions in the 
1623 siege of Breda earned him prestige throughout the whole of the Spanish Empire.125 
When in 1630 he was commissioned to train the soldiers and to organize the defense of 
the port of Callao, the Peruvian poet and soldier Bernardino de Montoya composed the 
poem “Al río Lima” to laud the arrived captain. Montoya claimed that with the presence 
of such a famous, experienced, and brave soldier, the city was much more secure from its 
enemies.126  
Also, it should come as no surprise that Hurtado de Corcuera described some of 
his military campaigns in the Philippines (against the Muslim kings from nearby islands) 
by resorting to his previous European experiences. He affirmed that he had never 
confronted such difficult scenario, not fighting the Arabs, not in the Pyrenees, nor 
anywhere else where he served the king.127 He confidently claimed that if those actions 
had been “in Flanders or in other part of Europe, they would have been taken of good 
mark” and he would have been rewarded immediately.128 He compared his 
accomplishments with those of his European peers, and not with his predecessors in ruling 
the archipelago, or even with other officials in America; this stands in contrast to most 
                                                
124 “Méritos de Juan Francisco Montemayor y Córdoba de Cuenca,” fol. 12. 
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modern scholars, who isolate and break apart these spaces from the rest of the Monarchy. 
Instead, Hurtado de Corcuera placed himself (as well as the Philippines) alongside those 
officials serving in Flanders and in Europe. He conceived the empire as one connected 
and united entity.129 
There was a global and unified perception of the Spanish Monarchy and, therefore, 
a global understanding of the rebellions that undermined Spanish power. Nonetheless, the 
ways in which the imperial Spanish officials achieved (or tried to achieve) their universal 
imperative of reducir changed according to the circumstances—but each of them 
combined, in different degrees, two of the main attributes of the king: military force and 
clemency. Imperial officials acted according to specific political traditions, as well as to 
well-established notions and prejudices. In other words, not all rebellions were considered 
equal and, more importantly, not all rebels were treated the same way. Córdoba’s food 
riot, the Sangleys’ uprising, and even the Indians’ revolt are events that do not usually 
make it into the history books on the Spanish Monarchy. They were, indeed, minor in 
comparison with other historical events. Nevertheless, they were of extreme importance. 
They were the almost quotidian expressions of the king’s imposition of authority over 
many dissimilar people and landscapes. They represent the permanent struggle for the 
maintenance of the imperial order in a highly heterogeneous and diverse world.
                                                
129 This is why he had no problem in asking the king to send there “some Italians, Wallons, Burgundians, or 
Irish”. Letter of Corcuera to the king, July 25th, 1638 in CGIF., 8:CLXI. 
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Chapter Five: Imperial Cosmopolitanism 
 
Que en todas partes el mundo es uno.1 
 
Son los ánimos de los hombres tan varios 
como sus rostros, y aunque la razón es en sí 
misma una, son diferentes los caminos que 
cada uno de los discursos sigue para 
alcanzarla.2 
 
Porque para nada de lo que tiene entre 
manos puede ser bueno un hombre que no 
ha cabido en el mundo.3 
 
 
In 1614, Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos, the Spanish official-turned priest whose 
travels we followed in the first chapter, published his Quarenta triunfos de la santísima 
Cruz. In the book, the author presented various stories of Christian crosses that appeared 
in different forms, “entre tantos enemigos de nuestra santa fe católica, moros, gentiles, 
idólatras y judíos,” and which would have helped the Catholic armies to defeat their 
enemies across the globe at various times.4 He originally conceived this book as the 
fourth part of his Viage del mundo, also published in 1614, in which Ordóñez de Cevallos 
penned his travels and experiences in Europe, Africa, America, and Asia, but because the 
topic was different, he decided to publish it separately. In many ways, Quarenta triunfos 
serves as a companion to his other book; together they present a worldly vision of the 
Catholic Church and the prevalence of faith in different times and regions. These crosses, 
claimed Ordóñez de Cevallos, helped the emperor Charlemagne beat back Muslim forces, 
and appeared in places such as Jersusalem, Genoa, Zaragoza, China, India, and even—
                                                
1 BNE, Mss/6227 Domingo Toral y Valdés, “Relación de Toral y Valdés,” fol. 217v. 
2 Saavedra Fajardo, Empresas políticas, 429. 
3 AGI, Charcas, 58, 1er. cuad, f. 61v.-62v. Conde de Alba de Liste to Mercado y Villacorta, December 1, 
1657. 
4 Ordóñez de Cevallos, Quarenta triunfos, prologue. 
	
 233 
because the earth did not seem big enough—“en medio de la luna,” a cross so bright it 
was seen by everyone in the world.5 
Quarenta triunfos exemplifies the culture of Spanish imperial cosmopolitanism. 
The author sought to incorporate into a single narrative the different regions, societies, 
and nations of the world. But this was not a neutral exercise by Ordóñez de Cevallos. He 
presented the “Other”—whether Muslim, Jew, American native, or European heretic—as 
an enemy to be defeated and turned into a subject of the Spanish crown, and brought to 
heel under the civilizing order of Catholicism.  
However, Ordóñez de Cevallos’s worldview was not the only possible way to 
look at the world and understand difference. Captain Domingo Toral y Valdés, forced by 
his humble origins, soon entered into the royal service as a means to survive. First, he 
went to Lisbon where he joined a company of soldiers that was dispatched to the war in 
Flanders. After a couple of years in Flanders, fighting in the most precarious conditions, 
he returned to Spain, traversing France by foot. Once there, he had hoped to follow the 
path of thousands of other men like him and embark to America but did not receive royal 
authorization. Nonetheless, his luck seemed to turn for the better when in 1629 he was 
admitted into the retinue of Miguel de Noronha, the count of Linares and recently 
appointed viceroy of India. After an arduous journey—it took over five months to reach 
Mozambique and one of the ships was lost around the Cape of Good Hope—Toral y 
Valdés served in various posts in the Asian viceroyalty. For unclear reasons, however, his 
relationship with the viceroy and other officials soon frayed (he was even incarcerated for 
a while), forcing him to abandon his post and return to Spain on his own. The journey 
home was Odyssean; he traversed the Persian desert, passed through Baghdad and 
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Aleppo, crossed the Mediterranean by hopping from island to island, and finally reached 
Barcelona in 1635. Back in Madrid, the soldier penned his memories and adventures 
under the title Relación de la vida del capitán Domingo de Toral y Valdés.6 
In his extraordinary autobiography, the errant soldier and writer narrates his 
experiences in strange lands and tells of how he communicated and engaged with the 
people he encountered, and how ultimately, despite being alone and lacking resources, he 
managed to survive and get back to his home. Interactions like these made this native of 
Asturias appreciate human virtues and kindness, despite the many differences he noted 
and recorded, from language, customs, dress, and of course religion. While in Aleppo he 
talked with a Jewish man who had lived in Madrid and owned a large collection of 
Spanish books, mostly by Lope de Vega. Toral y Valdés defined this man as someone 
“muy dado a toda humanidad.”7 Later on, moved by the good treatment he received from 
a Muslim, he affirmed, “sea Dios alabado que todas las naciones hizo capaces de razón, 
que más podía hacer un buen cristiano con las obligaciones de hombre noble que hizo 
este moro.”8 Contradicting the widespread view that Muslims and Jews were by 
definition enemies to the Spanish, and vice versa, his own experience taught him that all 
                                                
6 Toral y Valdés, “Relación de Toral y Valdés,” fols. 186–223. The manuscript, which is hold by Spain’s 
National Library remained largely unknown until the nineteenth century when it was published in Marqués 
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7 Toral y Valdés, “Relación de Toral y Valdés,” fol. 220. 
8 Ibid., fol. 218. 
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groups also shared a common humanity. He came to realize “que en todas partes el 
mundo es uno.”9 
The different global visions of Ordóñez de Cevallos and Toral y Valdés show the 
tensions and contradictions within Spanish imperialism. They are also examples of 
different perspectives on how to deal with global difference. Furthermore, both 
conceptions express the extent to which the imperial ideal elicited a sense of 
cosmopolitanism. In this chapter I will analyze the political, cultural and ideological 
milieu that made possible visions and texts of people such as Toral y Valdés and Ordóñez 
de Cevallos. First, I will define the characteristics and limits of an early modern Spanish 
cosmopolitanism, which was marked by its imperial enterprise and by its Catholicism, 
and which allowed for bridging cultural differences from a tolerant standing point, as 
well as, from an imposing one. Accordingly, I will study the ideal of the Catholic soldier, 
and how it impacted the perceptions of the officials themselves, and their interactions 
with other societies. Moreover, the idea that the Monarchy had been chosen by God to 
carry out his divine plan and was in a constant state of siege by enemies across the world 
fostered a sense of Spanish exceptionalism. Spanish officials had, certainly, a great 
interest in knowing the world and in presenting and describing it. Thus, the chapter 
examines some of these global representations and how they were deployed in 
developing a comprehensive vision of the far-flung empire. Finally, a global perspective 
was shared by many different subjects across the empire. Many of these representations, 
as well as the global encounters, were not produced necessarily in the imperial court or 
even in Europe, but in the “margins” of the empire. 
                                                
9 Ibid., fol. 217v. 
	
 236 
Quarenta triunfos and Relación del capitán Toral y Valdés are two exceptional 
examples of early modern Spanish cosmopolitanism. These books were written not by 
erudite scholars, but by mobile lower-echelon officials, based on their own first-hand 
experiences. Yet these texts are not mere descriptions. Ordóñez de Cevallos and Toral y 
Valdés were able to elaborate a more reflective discourse about their experiences, and 
they are explicit in their comparisons and assessments. Moreover, these two texts were 
written within an already large and well-established literary and scientific tradition of 
attempting to explain foreign cultures and peoples. These documents took many forms, 
ranging from ethnographic descriptions of the many societies, governments, polities, and 
their customs; to geographical accounts in which maps and early modern cosmography 
played a major role; as well as literary narratives; navigational maps; voyage accounts; 
and of course royal officials’ chronicles, reports, letters as well as their informaciones; 
and even judiciary records. All these different types of texts and documents brought into 
the European imagination foreign and unknown regions, and made possible to think of 
the whole world as one coherent entity.10 Moreover, these documents and their 
cosmopolitanism were fostered by the non-stop mobility of the Spanish imperial officials, 
who since the sixteenth century had tirelessly traversed and connected the vast and 
separated regions of a far-flung empire. These physical and mental movements enabled a 
unified vision of the globe. Therefore, this chapter is an attempt to answer how the world 
was seen and understood from the perspective of an itinerant Spanish imperial official.  
                                                
10 Recently, Ayesha Ramachandran has published a thorough study of how the world became to be 
envisioned as one in the early modern period, and the different understandings that writers, philosophers 
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sought to imagine and represent the world, and the role of humankind in it, in new terms; departing from 
previous divine conceptions (while never fully abandoning them). Ayesha Ramachandran, The 





One World, Many Cosmopolitanisms 
Cosmopolitanism is a concept in vogue. In recent years, scholars from multiple 
disciplines have been concerned with ideas of cosmopolitanism to grapple with the 
challenges of otherness and difference that arise in our contemporary and globalized 
world. They have followed Immanuel Kant’s path to look back and reinterpret the classic 
Greek notion of cosmopolitanism. These scholars think of cosmopolitanism as a project 
of a common and universal citizenship that recognizes difference and the possibility of a 
multicultural society, transcending nationalisms and cultural differences in a 
contemporary and globalized world, which is politically organized around nation-states.11 
Cosmopolitanism, then, seems to be an easy and straightforward concept: to be a 
cosmopolitan is to be a citizen of the world. However, it is important to note that 
cosmopolitanism is not an unequivocal term. While cosmopolitanism rests on the 
awareness and recognition of human diversity, it leaves open the question of what kind of 
world is imagined.12 
In a recent study on the practice of cosmopolitanism in Antiquity, Myles Lavan, 
Richard E. Paye, and John Weisweiler have noted that cosmopolitanism has usually been 
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understood as a virtue, as an ethical commitment to tolerance, leaving aside its close 
relationship to imperialism. In fact, they assert that “if cosmopolitanism could develop 
without empire, the reverse cannot be said.”13 Thus, they argue for the utility of 
employing cosmopolitanism as a tool of historical analysis to understand the formation 
and workings of empires. They define cosmopolitanism as “a complex of practices and 
ideals that enabled certain individuals not only to cross cultural boundiaries, but to 
establish an enduring normative framework across them.”14 These scholars contend that 
historians must study the ways in which imperial elites dealt with difference. 
The practice of cosmopolitanism offers two possible ways to deal with difference: 
to embrace it, thinking that different perspectives have the same validity, like Toral y 
Valdés did; or to master it so that it fits under “universal values,” which was the position 
of Ordóñez de Cevallos. Derek Heater thinks of cosmopolitanism as a dichotomy in 
which the term sometimes has referred to ideas of world citizenship, and other times to 
ideals of world government, two related but different notions. They speak to the sense of 
belonging to “a community of the whole mankind” and to the need of a “global political 
structure.”  However, the emphasis of one idea over the other, and the actual meaning of 
them have changed over time.15 These two opposite notions respond to the challenges of 
the cosmopolis, which “meant viewing the whole of the universe and all its inhabitants as 
if they were a social entity.”16 While in Ancient Greece and during the Enlightenment, 
argues Heater, cosmopolitan thought stressed ideas of world citizenship, it was in 
medieval and early modern Europe when the idea of a world state, in the form of a 
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16 Ibid., 181. 
	
 239 
universal Christian ruler, took precedence.17 Accordingly, Walter Mignolo differentiates 
two narratives of cosmopolitanism: one managerial, which he defines as “global 
designs,” and related to Christianity, nineteenth-century imperialism and contemporary 
neoliberal globalization; and the other emancipatory, and referring to the ideals of people 
such as Francisco de Vitoria, Immanuel Kant, or Karl Marx, who challenged and 
dissented those “global designs.”18 
In other words, cosmopolitanism can either be read as the ideal to adjust the 
individual to the world so he or she can fit in everywhere, regardless of their differences; 
or as the attempt to adjust the world to fit one’s desires, expectations, values, and goals. 
Thus, imperialism, multiple loyalties, tolerance, recognition of difference, world unity, 
world dominion, have been some of the competing and contrasting ideas present within 
cosmopolitanism.  
Consequently, cosmopolitan viewpoints may provide justification for imposition 
of what certain elites consider to be universal truths, and for the exclusion (or forced 
inclusion) of those who do not conform to their vision of the world.19 Mignolo explains 
that cosmopolitan projects, which sought “planetary conviviality,” appeared both during 
the European Renaissance and Enlightenment, two defining periods for the modern 
world—a world that is, let us not forget, constituted by colonialism, despite being its 
                                                
17 Ibid., 26. 
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hidden face. Thus, the very forces and project of modernity “link cosmopolitanism 
intrinsically to coloniality.”20 In fact, even Kant’s appeal to inclusion and tolerance has 
been challenged and confronted against his own paradigms, which included a hierarchical 
view of mankind, and racism and Eurocentrism, and which impregnated his cosmopolitan 
ideals with an unequivocal imperialism.21  
Cosmopolitanism has, indeed, been articulated by European political thinkers 
throughout the centuries. In the early modern period, it appeared as an attempt to embrace 
the world’s difference at the same time that Europeans were conquering the world. In a 
powerful and suggestive article, Arif Dirlik contends that the power of Eurocentrism, and 
its distinctiveness from other ethnocentrisms, rests not in having created a universal 
narrative that excludes other voices; to the contrary, the Eurocentric discourse has 
succeeded by incorporating other nations’ histories into its master narrative. Different 
voices and perspectives have been assimilated within one (European) order and system. 
Central to Eurocentrism, Dirlik contends, is the accumulation of knowledge, the urge to 
inventory the world’s difference and to include it into new accounts of the past.22 During 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Europeans set to discover, know, measure, 
historicize and incorporate the New Worlds they had encountered. It was during this age 
of discovery that European thought leaders crafted the Eurocentric narrative. They 
established a set of “universal” parameters against which to compare Europe to the rest of 
the world. 
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As is clear by now, contrary to common assumptions cosmopolitanism is not a 
phenomenon exclusive to the modern or contemporary world, nor one directly connected 
to the nation-state and its critique. Cosmopolitan ideas and attitudes, and the attendant 
tension between tolerance and imposition, have been realities since Antiquity and in the 
Middle Ages.23 Margaret Jacob has written one of the first studies on early modern 
cosmopolitanism. Focusing on northern Europe (mainly the Dutch Republic), she finds 
that many people embraced cosmopolitan ideals, mainly in reaction against the Spanish 
Empire, which they perceived as backward and oppressive. Jacob understands 
cosmopolitanism as existing in opposition to nationalism and imperialism, and as a sort 
of claim for a common universal citizenship.24 For Allison Games, early modern 
cosmopolitans (such as tourists, merchants, and ministers) who moved across the globe, 
connecting and transplanting their experiences, built the English Empire, which evolved 
from a weak state into a global power. She thinks of cosmopolitanism as an intrinsic 
characteristic of people who traveled constantly and were forced to adapt to foreign 
settings. For her, basically anyone who moved and had contact with different geographies 
and societies is considered a cosmopolitan, without regards to their understanding of 
cultural differences in relation to the Empire.25 For Brian C. Lockey, early modern 
English identity was forged in conversation with two cosmopolitan perspectives. One was 
nationalist and imperialist. The other one challenged such nationalism and saw England 
as part of a universal Christian commonwealth.26 In her recent book on the development 
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of an early modern worldly vision, Ayesha Ramachandran argues that the cosmographic 
impulse of knowing the whole world and of encompassing it under one description and 
perspective engendered cosmopolitanism. While this process could be part of an imperial 
project, it also fostered a critique of imperialism. Early modern cosmographers 
acknowledged the challenges and tensions of global desires and the particularities of 
individuals living around the world. This cosmopolitanism, claims Ramachandran, 
manifested as an awareness of the vastness of human diversity and the impossibility of 
knowing and embracing it all.27 
Certainly, cosmopolitanism has provided justification for a number of major 
imperial projects, beginning with the Roman Empire, whose military expansions were 
defended by such public intellectuals as Cicero and Seneca.28 Philosopher Peter 
Sloterdjik has noted that the Stoics articulated their cosmopolitanism by equating, “with 
refreshing candor,” their city with the world and, therefore, “they made citizenship in this 
residence an inexhaustible ethical ideal.”29 For the Roman Stoics, to be a citizen of the 
world was to be a citizen of Rome, and this had very precise moral connotations. Stoic 
cosmopolitans understood the expansion of the empire to be a civilizing mission: the 
incorporation of all known societies under Roman law, which they argued accrued to the 
greatest benefit for all. 
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Later on, in medieval and early modern times, there appeared a Christian strain of 
imperial cosmopolitanism. For instance, Dante Alighieri argued for a Christian universal 
empire and the sixteenth-century Spanish bishop Antonio de Guevara, one of the most 
influential Renaissance intellectuals and an advisor to emperor Charles V, contended that 
“[God] willeth that there should be but one Monarchical king and Lord of the World.”30 
Some years later, Richard Hakluyt, one of the major promoters of English colonialism in 
America, came “to finde himselfe [a] Cosmopolite, a citizen... of... one citie universall, 
and so consequently to meditate on the Cosmopolitall government thereof.”31 Similarly, 
Phillip IV’s famous favorite, the count-duke of Olivares, ardently defended the 
universality of the Spanish Monarchy. He despised those who had strong nationalistic 
feelings and did not integrate and subsume into the broader Spanish Empire, lessening the 
king’s universal goals. He claimed, “cursed be the nations, and cursed the men who are 
nacionales! ... I love all the vassals of the king… because they seem to be such a pillar of 
the Monarchy. I am no nacional—that is for children.”32 Guevara, Hakluyt, and Olivares 
were aware of the differences within their polities and tried to bridge these differences by 
creating universal projects that simultaneously appealed to a sense of national pride and 
the Christian cosmopolitan spirit. 
Indeed, early modern imperial ideologues, excited by the discoveries of the New 
World, found in Stoic scholarship and its cosmopolitanism inspiration and an intellectual 
roadmap for building the new empires.33 Although these men were not necessarily strict 
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adherents to Neostoic doctrine, they were impacted by it. As we have seen in Chapter 
Three, Neostoicism circulated widely and significantly shaped the seventeenth-century 
intellectual environment and the activities of the imperial officials. Not only did 
Neostoicism revive the ideas of Roman imperial ideologues such as Cicero and Seneca, 
but it also emphasized the existence of a universal reason governing every human being, 
despite the intrinsic diversity of the world. Stoics proposed that Roman law was a natural 
law that it affected all humans despite their origin or conditions.34 The Spanish political 
writer Diego Saavedra Fajardo, whom we saw in a previous chapter, argued for the 
importance of individual experience and adapting to each unique circumstance and noted 
that “aunque la razón es en sí misma una, son diferentes los caminos que cada uno de los 
discursos sigue para alcanzarla.”35 Therefore, he contended that rulers had to adapt to 
each distinct locale in order to impose Spanish authority, which had one unique essence. 
As Dennis Cosgrove has observed, early modern Neostoic thinkers (mainly 
cartographers) saw the world as being composed of different parts, but at the same time 
maintained a comprehensive vision in which orbe and empire encompassed or subsumed 
these differences.36 
The Spanish theologian Francisco de Vitoria has been portrayed as the most 
important exponent of early modern Spanish cosmopolitanism.37 Heavily influenced by 
Neostoicism, he proposed the existence of universal laws arising from natural law that 
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ruled every human being and society, including, of course, Spaniards and Indians.38 
These were not divine laws, but rather laws deducted from human nature, which Vitoria 
considered to be universal across origin and culture. According to Anthony Pagden, 
Vitoria’s thinking followed Stoic ideas of what was natural to men. One of the main 
natural conditions was the ideal of communication and sociability. This led Vitoria to 
conclude that humans and nations had the need and the right to move, to engage with 
others in trade, and to be hospitable.39 Vitoria’s declarations are considered the origins of 
International Law in that they sought to regulate how nations should engage, and 
prescribed when it was legitimate to do so and under what conditions. In the last instance, 
Vitoria was proposing a justification for Spanish conquest of America on the grounds that 
the Indians rejected European offers to trade with them. 
Walter Mignolo notes the contradictions and shortfalls of Vitoria’s project. On the 
one hand, Vitoria was proposing the configuration of a legal, political, and moral system 
of universal scope, in which all men were deemed equal. This was, certainly, a true 
cosmopolitan desire: to embrace all societies, despite their diversity, within one and only 
system, so that everyone could be a citizen of the same regulated world. On the other 
hand, Mignolo claims that Vitoria based his argumentation on the distinction between 
“principes Christianos” and “los bárbaros.”40 The Spanish thinker unilaterally presented 
an insuperable cultural distinction between these two groups and, therefore, his project 
was not about regulating two sovereign and equal nations, but about two distinct cultural 
systems interacting. These differences were of profound importance. While Indians and 
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Spaniards as humans were ontologically equal, the Indigenous’ barbarian condition made 
them incapable of ruling according to human laws. This was the colonial difference. 
Furthermore, Mignolo contends, the communications and interactions between the two 
groups were one-sided, as Indians never had a say on Vitoria’s project and were 
“included within a system only to be disciplined.”41 Indians were not ready yet to rule 
themselves according to Vitoria’s European standards. As Anthony Pagden contends, it is 
difficult to separate cosmopolitanism from its Europeanism, and from the civilizing 
mission and imperialism that accompanied these ideas.42  
Early modern Spanish imperial cosmopolitanism was informed by the permanent 
and almost insurmountable tension between universal ideals and desires, and its local and 
diverse realities. As discussed in previous chapters, Spanish officials experienced such 
tensions directly. The Monarchy, through its officials, while recognizing the differences 
of the empire’s multiple realms, tried constantly to reinterpret the principles that justified 
its imperial project—the defense and expansion of Catholicism and the king’s 
authority—in each and every case.43 
The discourse and world vision of Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos fit within this 
cosmopolitanism. This imperial official was well aware of human diversity since he had 
experienced it first-hand. Throughout his life, he had crossed several cultural boundaries, 
interacting with other Europeans, American natives, black African slaves and freedmen, 
and Asians. In all of these encounters, Ordóñez de Cevallos attempted to impose his 
values, either fighting the others and hoping to eliminate them, or preaching to them and 
attempting to coopt them into his worldview. 
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Nonetheless, alongside this imperial project there was room for individuals who, 
usually on the basis of their own personal experiences, proposed, desired, or saw a more 
tolerant world. The captain Domingo Toral y Valdés visited many of the same regions 
than Ordóñez de Cevallos did. While he certainly was an imperial official who worked 
for the preservation and expansion of the Spanish Empire, and for the defeat of its 
enemies, he was also capable of embracing human difference. By asserting the humanity 
of Muslims and Jews, he was accepting that there were many different ways of enforcing 
human laws. 
Toral y Valdés’s respect for and appreciation of difference resembles those cases 
of tolerance studied by Stuart Schwartz, in which humble and common people did not 
necessarily see religious difference as a threat or as something perilous. In fact, for these 
men and women everyone could be saved on its own law; living a good life in accordance 
to moral precepts would assure salvation, despite individual beliefs. Furthermore, 
Schwartz has suggested that the cosmopolitanism of the common people, understood “in 
the sense that they were mobile and had seen other lands and other ways,” might have 
contributed, in some cases, to the development of more open and tolerant ideas in the 
Iberian world.44 Although Schwartz does not go in depth on the concept of 
cosmopolitanism, he points to the importance of world mobility for the emergence of 
such ideas. Indeed, cosmopolitanism was not exclusive to imperial elites and ideologues. 
There was surely a kind of popular cosmopolitanism as well. The ability to transcend 
cultural borders was shared by common people, who moved by the thousands to harvest 
crops, migrated to the Indies, and fought wars. In doing so, they experienced diversity 
directly. Many of these men became also imperial officials and, as we have seen in the 
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previous chapters, they—the lower echelon of the Spanish political administration—
engaged with the imperial project, dealing in their own ways with the different societies 
to which they were exposed. 
 
The Catholic Soldier 
Religious thinking and ideas were no doubt at the core of how early modern 
people understood their world. Unsurprisingly, a fundamental characteristic of Spanish 
cosmopolitanism was its religiosity. Brian C. Lockey has argued for taking seriously the 
religious nature of early modern identity and cosmopolitanism. He rightfully argues 
against the opinion of Walter Mignolo, who considers religion to be an irrelevant 
characteristic. For Mignolo, there is no major difference between the religious 
cosmopolitanism that emerged in the sixteenth century and the more secular 
cosmopolitanism characteristic of the eighteenth century.45 Lockey notes that such is a 
misleading reading as it forgets that Vitoria’s global order was dependent on the 
supremacy of papal power, while Kant’s world was organized around secular and 
republican ideals and values.46 This was not a minor difference. The notion of an 
overarching spiritual authority was decisive to how early modern people understood and 
organized their societies. We will go back later in this chapter to the implications of such 
political and religious imaginings. 
Catholicism shaped the goals and methods of the Spanish cosmopolitan project, 
and also provided its justification. Spanish ideologues pushed for a Spanish Monarchy 
that carried out the mission of spreading Catholicism in order to become truly the one and 
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universal religion. Thus, Spanish cosmopolitanism resonated with the ideal of a universal 
church, of being a Catholic anywhere in the world. Moreover, Catholicism informed the 
mission of civilizing the empire’s subjects. Religion served as the watershed that 
differentiated Europeans from the “barbarians.” Last, but not least, Catholic morality 
resided at the core of the Spanish project, which was supposed to be ruled and defined by 
Catholic ideals of good government and coexistence. In this regard, Spanish officials 
were permanently confronted with the ideals of a good Catholic official, and especially, 
of the Catholic Soldier. 
Raffaele Puddu, in his remarkable study of the characteristics and cultural milieu 
of the Spanish soldiers, affirms that Catholic morality defined the way in which military 
service was understood and carried out. The profound interweaving between the service 
to the king and the service to God provided the ethos that supported all of a soldier’s 
activities.47 In a later book, Puddu argues that since the sixteenth century it was 
developed a military identity that was common to the Spanish soldiers throughout the 
globe. This identity was built around the ideals of a global defense of the king’s authority 
and the Catholic religion. Furthermore, such Spanish identity was constructed in 
opposition to three major wars against the enemies of the monarch and the faith: the fight 
against the Muslim ‘infidels,’ especially in Africa, southern Europe, and the Mediterrean; 
the conflict with the European ‘heretics,’ mainly the Dutch; and the struggles in the New 
World against the ‘pagan and barbarian’ Indians.48 Throughout the seventeenth century, 
those struggles overlapped, and in the context of the early modern globalization, became 
global in range. Spanish officials could find heretics as far as America or even Southeast 
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Asia; there were Muslims in the Philippine islands, and the Iberian Peninsula itself; an 
the image of the barbarian and uncivilized came to define many other societies, even in 
Europe. 
Spanish officials were conscious of their duties as Catholic officials. There are 
abundant examples of these men’s concerns regarding their religious struggles and the 
evangelization of the new peoples they were finding and conquering. Santiago de Vera, 
who served as governor of the Philippines at the end of the sixteenth century, affirmed 
that the king was not trying to conquer China or any other kingdom, but that the soldiers 
and ammunition had to be send there for defending and protecting the true mission: “la 
conversión de los naturales y predicación del santo evangelio.” This was done despite the 
great amount of money, men, and resources spent on that mission, because it was worthy 
that “todos se salven.”49 Such evangelization was part of the civilizing process. To 
convert people to Catholicism meant not only to baptize them, but also to inculcate in 
them a set of Spanish values and a vision of the world, and ultimately, to reduce them.50 
Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos, worried by the rising number of European enemies in the 
Caribbean, suggested the Spanish king should either order to populate all of the islands, 
“o mandar los matasen todos, porque no acuda allí el enemigo hereje, como fue en la 
Florida.”51 Likewise, the Monarch, worried by the presence of Muslim infidels in the 
Philippines, ordered governor Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera to organize a military 
campaign against the Muslim kingdom of Mindanao, nearby the Spanish-controlled 
island of Luzon. After a difficult victory, Spanish soldiers’ first action was to go 
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immediately to the Mosque and get hold of the “cátedra grande de Mahoma con sus 
libros y otros aderezos y quemarlos.”52 
Catholic mission and identity went well beyond the limits of religion. It 
permeated all layers of Spanish society and defined its government and political culture, 
differentiating it from other polities in Europe and in other parts of the world.53 Hurtado 
de Corcuera was worried by the lack of religiosity that some of his soldiers displayed. He 
complained that there was not a chapel in the Philippines where the soldiers could attend 
mass—as it was ordered in Flanders—and be properly buried, as befitting “cristianos 
españoles y vasallos de Vuestra Majestad.”54 
Unsurprisingly, Spanish officials—whose political service was impregnated by 
military ideals and attitudes (many had previously been soldiers)—came to view 
themselves as ‘Catholic Soldiers.’ The Jesuit priest Alonso de Andrade in his El buen 
soldado católico y sus obligaciones defined these soldiers as those who not only were 
baptized, but who defended their faith (and every statement of the Church) with their 
lives and arms.55 This book was a manual instructing the virtues that a good Catholic 
soldier was supposed to have. Above all, claimed Andrade, a Catholic soldier had to 
show and defend his faith with words and with actions, differentiating himself from the 
Turks, Muslims, and other heretics.56 This defense and exposition of Spanish Catholicism 
was understood as a global struggle, and Andrade did not hold back in expressing his 
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universal aspirations. The word ‘Catholic,’ he reminded readers, originally meant 
universal, “el que lo abraza todo, sin excluir cosa alguna.”57 
Andrade’s book is a treatise on morality, and specifically, on how a Catholic 
soldier should behave. The priest contends that alongside the military training, soldiers 
require lessons of Christianity, morality, and good customs, so ultimately they can link 
together “la virtud con las armas, y la vida soldadesca con la vida virtuosa, guardando las 
leyes de Dios, y las de la milicia, persuadiéndose que pueden muy bien servir a su Dios y 
a su rey juntamente.”58 For Andrade, who spent time in the North African presidios, 
service to God and king were inseparable. 
El buen soldado is a celebration of the military. Military activities were the major 
source of honor, claims Andrade, and they were also a cornerstone of the defense of 
Catholicism, and in fact, Christ and the Virgin Mary “han tomado la espada, no una, sino 
muchas veces para defender la Iglesia de sus enemigos.”59 Therefore, while the 
theologians defended the faith with the quill, the soldiers used their swords.60 However, 
Andrade warns that wars can only be started for the right reasons, otherwise they would 
be unjust wars, an abominable sin. For a war to be just, its goals must be 
el servicio y gloria de Dios, la administración de la justicia, 
sacar de la opresión a los buenos, castigar a los rebeldes, 
establecer el culto divino, defender la Fe católica, propagar la 
Iglesia, amplificar el evangelio, desterrar la idolatría, destruir 
las herejías, dar a cada uno lo que fuere suyo.61 
 
Andrade criticizes the use of force to achieve political or economic gains, or to increase 
honor. For this Jesuit, war should only be started once all other possibilities have been 
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tried and failed, and when it was absolutely necessary. If a war was just, Catholic armies 
would unquestionably prevail with God on their side. 
Andrade praises the many sacrifices that soldiers make when fulfilling their 
mission of spreading Catholicism across the world. He acknowledges that not even the 
most radical hermits live in such harsh conditions. Soldiers truly know hunger and 
discomfort, claims Andrade; they can spend several days without rest, and a penitent’s 
sackcloth seemed nothing compared to the soldier’s doublet. Moreover, soldiers are 
constantly exposing their bodies and lives to harm. On top of all this, they are forced to 
move and leave their families and homes, “conversando con gentes de diferentes lenguas 
y que siempre los aborrecen y procuran hacer mal.”62 Spanish soldiers were 
cosmopolitans, whose mobility forced them to engage with different populations, who 
were seen, under the imperial perspective, as enemies to be reduced and distrusted. 
Nonetheless, Andrade argues that soldiers of other armies and religions 
experienced the same sacrifices and penuries. Therefore, going through such harsh 
experiences does not guarantee salvation. According to the imperial cosmopolitanism of 
Andrade, it was Catholicism what made the difference in an otherwise universally human 
experience. While everyone would fight and suffer equally, the fact that Spanish soldiers 
did it in order to defend Catholic faith, separated them from the rest, gave them 
preeminence, and ultimately, validated their actions. Soldiers, then, needed to comply 
with Catholic precepts and morality, and El buen soldado explains how to do it. A good 
soldier, that is, a Catholic soldier, must fully and openly practice the doctrine. He should 
often attend mass, confess, and receive communion. Furthermore, soldiers should keep 
away from all kind of vices, mainly gambling and profane swearing. They should instead 
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keep themselves busy with religious and military exercises and readings. Moreover, a 
good soldier should be generous, honest, and specially, docile and obedient. 
These kinds of lessons resonated with the activities of the imperial officials. Juan 
Márquez Cabrera served as governor of Honduras and of Florida during the second half 
of the seventeenth century. Even before those appointments he was already a seasoned 
military man, and, based on his own personal experiences, published his Espejo en que se 
debe mirar el buen soldado.63 This was mainly a technical manual of how a good Spanish 
soldier should behave, and a guide to specific duties according to the various ranks. The 
author explains, for instance, how soldiers should carry their pikes, the needed 
precautions to keep the powder dry, how a sergeant should command, and how a general 
should distribute tasks among his subordinates. Furthermore, Márquez Cabrera ends his 
book explaining, with words and diagrams, a complex mathematical formula that would 
serve to properly and efficiently arrange and move soldiers in different formations.64 
 Nonetheless, Márquez Cabrera also emphasizes that soldiers need to go to mass 
and confess as much as possible, and that their military activities and behavior should be 
based upon the virtue.65 Furthermore, this experienced royal official argues that the larger 
purpose of the military presence and activities of the Spanish soldiers throughout the 
globe was to help the “milicia espiritual,” the priests and missionaries, and to open doors 
for incorporating into Catholicism such a large number of pagans and infidels.66 Indeed, 
he affirmed that while all soldiers, regardless their nation of origin, had the obligation to 
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serve and obey their kings. Spaniards had even more reasons to do so, as their king was 
“columna de la Fe y amparo de la Iglesia.”67 
This manual was thought to be useful in any war theater, whether in Europe or in 
America. Obviously, for someone like Márquez Cabrera, who moved across the world 
serving the king, the global nature of the imperial mission was self-evident. He 
highlighted the importance of always having in the army people expert in the local 
languages, and to be as cautious and friendly as possible when going through a foreign 
country.68 Moreover, he praised the Spanish king’s power to bring under his banners 
soldiers from many different nations, who would happily join the Spanish army to defeat 
those enemies who attempted “derribar la iglesia y su corona.”69 
This official was not alone in linking the Spanish military activities with the 
religious mission. In 1656, the Spanish Admiralty received a proposal for the creation of 
a new brotherhood: “Los Católicos Militares de la Fe.” This was to be a military order, 
dependent on the Inquisition, which had to protect the ports of Cadiz and other ports in 
the Mediterranean from the attacks of heretics and infidels. The brotherhood would be 
funded with alms given by every person anytime they registered a notarial protocol, and 
also with the king’s donation of a fifth of all the ships that were to be captured.70 It is not 
clear whether this project ever proceeded, but its design clearly speaks to the 
interweaving of religious and the imperial aims. No one felt the need to explain why 
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69 Ibid., 3. 
70 BNE, Mss/18719/21 Francisco Vázquez de Párraga, “Representación que hizo al Almirantazgo Francisco 
Vázquez de Párraga en 22 de octubre de 1656, sobre la defensa de los reinos y señaladamente de las costas 
de Andalucía y navegación de la carrera de las Indias” (Madrid, October 22, 1656). 
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defending the Cadiz port and its Atlantic trade served to extend Catholicism. It was 
assumed that the Spanish Empire’s activities were inescapably Catholic.  
As Alejandro Cañeque has noted, the Spanish crown propagandists made 
significant and successful efforts to represent the Spanish ruler as the earthly image of 
God. Through the use of sophisticated images, rituals, and language, human power 
became identified with the divine. There was a close association between the images of 
the Monarch and God. At moments, the two icons were blurred and difficult to 
differentiate.71 Spanish officials understood they were serving simultaneously two 
majesties: heavenly and temporal. 
This association, however, was far from being absolute or lacking in tension. In 
fact, Cañeque argues against the reduction of the Church to an instrument of the State. He 
shows the many conflicts that arose between the ecclesiastic and the civil authorities. 
Theses frictions came as a consequence of the early modern conception of dual powers, 
spiritual and temporal, with each embedded in the pontifical and royal authorities, 
respectively. This paradigm, notes Cañeque, had nothing to do with the separation of 
Church and state, but related to two distinct jurisdictions. This scheme led to multiple 
debates about the primacy of those powers, which in the American case translated into a 
constant rift between the viceroys and the bishops.72 That is why Pedro Ordóñez de 
Cevallos claimed that the lunar cross, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, 
appeared to signal the power of the Church over a very particular enemy: not a Muslim, 
or a heretic, but the Holy Roman emperor, Frederick Barbarossa, who had fought popes 
Adrian IV and Alexander III. Ordóñez de Cevallos, resorting to an extended rhetoric, 
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argued that the moon—whose light was borrowed from the sun, which symbolized 
God—represented the emperor, who received his power from the pope. The cross, then, 
epitomized the preeminence of the Roman church over this emperor and augured his 
submission and punishment.73 
 
Spanish Exceptionalism. One Empire, Many Enemies 
The struggles to defend the Church’s and the Spanish monarch’s authority 
profoundly shaped the identity of imperial subjects. The idea of being in a permanent 
state of siege, surrounded by enemies who hated the Spanish and their empire, played a 
vital role in how Spanish imperial officials interacted with different people throughout 
the empire, whether subjects or foreigners. The persistent threat created a sense of 
exceptionalism, of being different from other nations; but also of internal unity. 
Several scholars have already examined the exceptional nature of Spanish history. 
Tamar Herzog ended her study on the practices and discourses of Spanish nationhood by 
reflecting whether Spaniards, and particularly Castilians, thought of themselves as 
radically different from their European peers, and if their practices were indeed atypical. 
She concluded that against the tropes of a Spanish exceptionalism, Spain was certainly 
embedded in the European political culture.74 Herzog was discussing with a 
historiography that has claimed, for better or worse, the existance of a unique and 
exceptional Spanish character, mostly due to the longlasting presence of Muslim and 
Jewish communities, and their eventual expulsion. Scholars ranging from Claudio 
Sánchez Albornoz to José Ortega y Gasset have attempted to explain Spanish history, and 
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especially its “failures,” by looking to this exceptionalism.75 There has been a tendency, 
thus, to depict Spain (and its empire) as not fully European or modern, a vision that 
contemporary historians have begun to debunk.76 In many regards, this image of Spain 
was crafted in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when Spanish opponents, mainly 
the English and the Dutch, spread the “Black Legend.” Under this perspective, the 
Spanish Empire appeared radicallized and blinded by its stubborn Catholicism, which, as 
a polity, made it intrinsically and particularly oppressive, violent, intolerant, and overall 
backwards. 
While most early modern Spaniards did not share such a negative self-image, they 
did view themselves as exceptional. Spanish exceptionalism was closely linked to the 
empire’s preeminent position on the global stage—as it was the greatest political, 
military, and economic Europear power of its time—and to its mission. This kind of 
exceptionalism has been shared by many imperial powers throughout history, from 
Ancient Rome to contemporary America, who have perceived themselves as chosen by 
God, as the carriers of the ultimate responsability of world order and progress, and as 
lone wolves who, anxiously and tiressly, struggle against a global opposition. 
To Spanish officials, God’s manifest destiny was self-evident: it was part of a 
divine plan that they had defeated and expelled the Muslims from the Iberian Peninsula, 
and then extended their reach to the whole world. Márquez Cabrera started his Espejo del 
buen soldado noting that it was “providencia divina” that Columbus sailed to the New 
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World under the Castillian banner, and that Cortés and Pizarro conquered America. The 
alleged fact that these impressive actions were undertaken by just a few men and not in 
the most favorable conditions reinforced the idea that they succeeded because they were 
always protected by God.77 Moreover, the claim of the constant appareances of Christ, 
the Virgin Mary, the Cross, and saints, such as the ubiquitous Santiago, assured 
Spaniards that their actions were being sanctioned by God, and that they had to continue 
with their mission of spreading and defending Catholicism. 
Furthermore, Spaniards proudly perceived themselves as the only polity that was 
fully Catholic, where all of its members professed the same religion. This was truly ‘the’ 
Catholic monarchy. For instance, the priest Jacinto Samper affirmed, “la monarquía de 
España es la únicamente católica en todo el mundo en que no solo es católica la cabeza, 
sino todos los vasallos que son los miembros de ella.”78 While others could see this 
religious intolerance as a vice and a problem, for many Spaniards this was actually a 
virtue. They had the strong conviction that their law and civilization, with Catholicism at 
its core, was superior to all others, and therefore it was their obligation to protect and 
expand it. 
Consequently, Spanish subjects sensed that they were alone in their struggles. 
Because God chose them, they had to endure, by themselves, all sorts of enemies who 
continuously threatened Spanish authority. This was a heavy burden that, although 
carried out as stoically as possible, fostered a state of anxiety for Spaniards around the 
world, and which in turn informed the ways in which cosmopolitanism was practiced. In 
the National Library of Spain there is a bound collection of assorted documents under the 
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title of Descripción de la India Oriental that illustrates this agitation.79 These papers, a 
miscellanea of letters, descriptions, reports, consultations, and other documents, ranging 
from 1599 to 1654, when the crowns of Portugal and Castile were united (at least until 
1640), that deal with the possessions of the Portuguese crown in East Asia, Africa, the 
Indian Ocean, and America, contain constant references to the enemies that Catholic 
subjects faced and who threatened the authority of the Spanish king in such places as 
Brazil, India, Madagascar, or the Moluccas. An annonymous writer affirmed in 1605 that 
in Goa it was coming “gente da Europa, inimigos do Christo e alevantado do suave jugo 
de Vossa Majestade.”80 The enemies could, in fact, appear in the form of English, Dutch, 
indigenous people from Africa or the Asian islands, or the Persians.81 While there were 
many authors behind those documents, and they were written in different times, they 
share the idea of an empire under attack and that had to be permanently defended. In the 
end, this was the imperial mission of these officials, whether they were Castilians, or, in 
this case, Portuguese: to preserve the global hegemony of the Spanish king. 
Surely the most pervasive of the Spanish enemies in this period were the Dutch. 
In the Descripción de la India Oriental it is constantly mentioned the pressence of Dutch 
ships across the world who effectively threatened the Iberians. The anonymous author of 
a description of various islands in current-day Indonesia claimed that the Dutch were a 
frequent and very real menace, and that “os natural dele vivem a sombra do inimigo, esta 
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em sua masia fortificada e fortalecida que mete para espanto.”82 Also, in what appears to 
be a consulta an imperial official discussed the problems and disadvantages of the 
Twelve Years’ Truce, the 1609 cease of hostilities between the Spanish Monarchy and 
the Dutch Provinces. The anonymous author affirmed that the Dutch would navigate and 
trade without any problems in territories that until then were exclusive to the Portuguese. 
The author warned that the Dutch would get richer, lessening Spanish interests in the 
region. Not only would there be fewer opportunities to do business, but the Dutch would 
sell weapons to the natives. In fact, for this official it was clear that the Dutch would 
attempt to ally with local authorities for overturning Iberian power.83 These fears of 
Dutch attacks and conspiracies were not unfounded. Among this collection of documents 
there is a translation of a Dutch printed document in which Juan Andrea Moerbeceq 
argued for the reasons that made it both feasible and desirable to the Dutch Western India 
Company to launch a military campaign to occupy Brazil, something they eventually 
did.84 
Spanish officials felt threatened and anxious not only in regards to the Dutch. In 
the early modern Spanish documentation, beyond the Descripción de la India Oriental, 
there is a persistent idea of a global and shared hostility towards the Spaniards. Pedro 
Esteban Dávila explained the difficulties of his government and interactions with the 
local Portuguese population in the Azores islands as a consequence of the “odio que 
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tienen a los castellanos.”85 He specifically accused captain Manuel Docanto and other 
municipal councilors who “han tomado por asunto hacer odioso el nombre castellano a 
los portugueses, y de hermanos que estaban se conviertan en mortal odio y 
aborrecimiento.”86 Certainly, these tensions were part of the difficult process of 
integration triggered by the Union of the Crowns, as Jean-Frederic Schaub has argued.87 
Nonetheless, Esteban Dávila’s assertions resonate with many others expressed by other 
imperial officials. In 1662, the chronicler of the indigenous revolt of Oaxaca affirmed 
that the natives had revolted moved by the “natural aversión y odio que tienen por lo 
común a los españoles.”88 In the Philippines, the defenders of the expulsion of the 
Sangleys asserted that a new rebellion was always to be expected because of how much 
the Chinese loathed the Spanish.89 In the “Sumario de todo lo sucedido en Europa el año 
de 1640 hasta el de 1641” (a document part of the Sucesos del año 1640), the anonymous 
author intended to explain the ill-fated year—in which multiple conflicts and rebellions 
arose throughout the empire—as a natural consequence of the large extension of the 
monarchy, and of the envy generated by its successes: 
Como nuestra monarquía es tan dilatada y topa en su extensión 
con tantos príncipes y amenazaban los émulos su felicidad y su 
quietud, convocando y llamando al Turco [...] Los franceses, 
nuestros contrarios finítimos, inquietan el Orbe para que unido 
y coligado se oponga a nuestra grandeza, sin dispensar en 
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hereje o Mahometano que no convoque haciendo Cabos de sus 
armadas a gente diferente en el culto de su religión.90 
 
There was a sense of being hated by everyone and being engaged in a global struggle, 
and as it has been shown in the previous chapter, imperial officials quickly framed their 
local conflicts within this imperial context.  
Throughout these conflicts, wins and losses, the imperial Spanish officials 
incorporated into one narrative the multiple people, geographies, societies, and religions 
in which they dealt. Their own imperial experiences moved them to integrate such a 
disparate world. The plotline they used to give unity to such diversity was an imperial 
narrative, fostered by their Catholic mission and sense of national exceptionalism. 
Nonetheless, the fact that this imperial project attempted to impose one law and authority 
over diverse regions and people did not prevent officials from acknowledging the 
differences among those subjects. To the contrary, there was an active interest in getting 
to know as much as possible of the foreign world, to know the peculiarities of every 
corner of the planet, and to make them accessible. 
 
Knowing and Comparing the World 
In the poem, Descripción de las provincias del reino de Chile, usually known as 
Las Guerras de Chile, the author described the Chilean natives in the following terms: 
tienen cuerpo membrudo de germanos 
el ánimo español y la altiveza 
astucias como griegos y africanos 
la crueldad de los escitas y fiereza [line scratched out] 
el ímpetu francés y ligereza [on the margin] 
constancia y sufrimientos de romanos, 
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y cual infidos partos la firmeza.91 
 
This description relies on what the author believed were known and obvious attributes of 
different people across the world and time. These identity traits were combined to explain 
the true nature of the Araucanians, who in this way became incorporated into the 
European history of the world. Moreover, this is also an effort to clearly define and 
demarcate the Chilean indigenous, signaling both their similarities to others and what 
made them different and peculiar. Through this exercise, the Spanish author not only was 
describing different societies; he was placing them alongside each other, and 
incorporating them into his own vision.  
Imperial officials were ever describing, for European audiences, the foreign 
peoples with whom they dealt on a daily basis. They relied on recognizable images to 
expose the distinct places and societies they saw and in which they served. Thus, they 
constantly drew comparisons. The way to know a different region was by placing it 
alongside another, to try to perceive its peculiarities and commonalities. An easy way to 
explain something unknown was by referring to things familiar to the reader. In 1615, a 
letter arrived to the Philippines from India, briefing on that region and summarizing 
information from other letters and documents. The anonymous compiler described the 
most important recent events and the shifting regional politics across the Indian Ocean. In 
order to express what was at stake in the recent conflicts, he wrote that the Sultan was 
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afraid of losing his control over the city of Sumatra, the most important port, “por donde 
le entra todo en su reino, como Sevilla en Castilla, o Lisboa en Portugal.”92 
One of the most evident differences that imperial officials encountered in their journeys, 
and which had a profound impact on their interactions and how they learned about the 
world, was language. The Spanish Empire was, indeed, marked by an enormous linguistic 
diversity. Its inhabitants spoke not only Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, or Catalan, but also 
Nahuatl, Quechua, Chinese, and even Arabic. The count of Gondomar, a major Spanish 
official who became ambassador in London in the 1610s, received a letter written in his 
native Galician congratulating him for speaking in Portuguese when dealing with the 
Portuguese people, something they appreciated.93 Because of the composite nature of the 
Spanish Empire, the Spanish king was thought as an independent ruler in each of his 
possessions, and had to behave according to every area’s particular laws and customs. He 
had to speak the language of his subjects and sent letters written in Portuguese to his 
officials in Portugal, Brazil, and India.94 Likewise, he received documents in other 
languages. In 1582, Cachil Guapebaguna, the king of the Moluccas islands, nearby the 
Philippines, wrote to Philip II. He had just learned about the Union of the Portuguese and 
Castilian crowns and offered his vassalage. The letter was written in Portuguese and 
signed in Arabic (Fig. 6). The first was, until then, the official language used by this 
native leader—who portrayed himself as vassal of the Portuguese crown—to 
communicate with the European authorities, and the second was his native tongue. The 
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Figure 6. Detail of letter sent by Cachil Guapebaguna to Philip II. It is written in Portuguese and signed in 
Arabic. AGI, Filipinas, 34, N. 43. 
 
letter reached the imperial court, where it was translated and read to the king.95 There 
were a great number of papers circulating within the empire written in different 
languages. Pedro García de los Ríos was the secretary in the imperial archive of 
Simancas who was in charge of organizing, preserving, and translating the many papers 
written in Latin, French and Italian.96  
Henceforth, in order to rule and administer the empire, the crown and its officials 
had to rely on people fluent in the native languages. They were natives but also Spaniards 
(mainly priests), and they were experts in a great number of languages, from Nahuatl in 
Mexico, to Kaka, the native language of the Calchaquís (in current Northwestern 
Argentina), as well as Arabic in the Mediterranean.97 These in-between people were 
absolutely necessary for the functioning of the empire.98 There was a clear consciousness 
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of the need to communicate with people in their own languages. The Peruvian writer 
Pedro Mexía de Ovando affirmed that  
cuando se pretende que un hombre bárbaro, o una nación de 
lengua diferente, sean políticos, las personas que han de ayudar 
a desnudarles de aquella corteza, han de saber su lengua y con 
ella misma, y no con otra diferente, se les ha de dar a entender 
aquello que se pretende, porque de otra manera fuera imposible 
poderlo hacer. Parece más justo y de menos inconveniente que 
el cura aprenda la lengua de los feligreses, que no ellos la del 
cura.99 
 
Nonetheless, it is also true that Spanish became the imperial language, spoken by many 
subjects, and the language by which the empire was ruled.100 Moreover, Spanish was 
used as the early modern lingua franca. Thus, León Pinelo asserted, 
que aunque [Valencia, Vizcaya, and Aragon] tienen lenguas 
propias, usan de la castellana por su elegancia y facilidad, y por 
ello está admitida en toda España, en Italia, y Flandes. Por arte 
y curiosidad la saben y entienden alemanes, franceses y moro. 
En las Indias, desde el estrecho de Magallanes, hasta lo más 
Occidental de Nueva España y en todas las islas adyacentes en 
las mares del Norte y del Sur.101 
 
Once again, this speaks to the permanent imperial tension between the universal 
and the particular; between homogenizing desires and disparate realities; and of the force 
of cosmopolitanism in general. Native populations engaged with imperial power while 
maintaining their own culture and language; but simultaneously, they were pushed to 
embrace Spanish. On the one hand it was accepted and expected that the many diverse 
imperial subjects would speak their own language and preserve their customs, but on the 
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other hand, there was continuous pressure to override such distinctions, and to unify all 
under one universal culture, which happened to be Castilian and Catholic. 
As seen in Chapter One, maps and cosmographies played a major role in 
recording and exposing of the world. They allowed for a unified representation of the 
world, which could fit in just one book. All the different geographies, polities, races, 
religions, animals, plants, were contained under one single narration. It is worthwhile to 
note, once again, that this inclusion of the different world was enunciated from a 
European point of view. The vision of the cosmographers was imperialist.102 
Unsurprisingly, these cosmographies start most of the time with an ample description of 
Europe and of its various kingdoms, which could take most of the book, to then talk of 
the lesser-known regions of Asia, America, and Africa. The information provided for the 
latter regions was mostly sketchy and not fully accurate. While early modern 
cosmographers included in their works different societies, and often contrasted them with 
their own, at the end of the story, it was their society which prevailed and appeared as the 
first and most civilized one, and which should lead the way for the others. The words of 
Giovanni Botero—one of the most celebrated and influential early modern political 
thinkers—on this regard are exemplary. In his Relaciones Universales he asserted that 
Europe  
parece la hizo naturaleza sólo para que fuese capaz de 
comunicarla y de recibir en sí todas las riquezas de las demás 
provincias y ciudades del mundo, para universal señora del 
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espacioso mar por do se extiende, y para que tuviese debajo de 
su imperio a la África, a la Asia, y a la nueva América, hacia la 
cual derrama y mira con muestra y puesto tal que parece la está 
dando la mano.103 
 
In his celebrated Peso político de todo el mundo, the English native, turned into a 
Spanish subject, Anthony Sherley set out to describe to the Spanish king the whole world 
and its many regions.104 Sherley, born in 1565, was a fascinating character. A Catholic 
English nobleman who moved broadly across the world engaging in particular business, 
he was also an official of the English crown. He traversed much of Europe and visited 
Africa and Central America. He also traveled East and spent time in cities such as 
Constantinople and Aleppo, becoming acquainted enough with the Persian Shah to return 
to Europe as his representative. He wrote a famous account of his voyage to Persia.105 
Afterwards, he went to Morocco and then to Spain, where he settled. He became a subject 
of the Spanish monarch and was commissioned to attack enemies’ ships in the 
Mediterranean, and was even admitted in the Order of Santiago. Finally, he retired in 
Granada where he wrote a manuscript dedicated to the count-duke of Olivares. Sherley, 
who had moved throughout the world, hoped to show the king’s favorite “tan inmensa 
universalidad y atreverme a presentar a Vuestra Excelencia los aspectos, objetos y 
discursos de todas las naciones y la sustancia de ellas.”106  
In Peso político the foreign Spanish official hoped to sketch the current state of 
the world, pointing out to the strengths and weaknesses of every monarchy, revealing its 
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secrets to Olivares, so the favorite could develop the policies that would ensure Spanish 
global hegemony. He started by describing Spain, and curiously (to say the least) he 
defined it by comparing it to the New World. Sherley was complaining that, just like the 
Spaniards were migrating to America to capitalize on its natural resources, other nations 
were going to Spain, “la India de los modernos,” to butcher its riches.107 Then, he 
described all the major polities of the world, presenting them all as enemies of the 
Monarchy, from the Portuguese, to the French, the Persians, the Dutch, the English, the 
Chinese, and of course, the Turks, who Sherley depicted as the major menace to Spanish 
power. While he acknowledged the power and richness of England, he claimed that that 
country did not have any richness by nature, that their riches were all acquired, and thus, 
knowing England’s secrets it could be stopped. However, the Turks had much power “en 
sustancia”, and Shirley affirmed: 
Me parece que no hay más efectivamente que dos grandes 
planetas en materia de dominio, de los cuales esta monarquía 
como mayor es el sol y el imperio del turco la luna, y por ser 
forzoso que el sol, que es monarquía en razón de las causas que 
el tiempo que corre mueve, haga su curso por muchos signos, 
algunos de los cuales calentarán más, y otros menos, es 
acertado discurso de disponer el todo de manera que no tenga 
oposición de la luna, de lo cual siempre siguen muchos y malos 
y peligrosos y perniciosos ejemplos (digo) efectos.108 
 
Sherley’s document was a “cosmografía y delineamiento” in which the world was 
depicted in its diversity, but at the same time, the author was able to draw parallels and 
comparisons, and to abstract and encompass it. Indeed, he stated that “aunque el mundo 
es representado entre tantos estados y provincias y viven en ellas tanta diversidad de 
gentes, las constituciones de estos tantos estados y de estas tantas naciones son tres y no 
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más la constitución de las unas.”109 He categorized all the world’s states into three types: 
first the necessitous like the English, Venice, or the Dutch, that had nothing on their own 
and had to acquire almost everything from the outside. Second, more powerful nations, 
with major resources, like France, Russia, or China. And finally, the Spanish Monarchy, 
which had the greatest resources and a presence over the entire world. In this way, 
Sherley blurred the differences between the other nations and presented to the most 
powerful Spanish minister a unified and comprehensive vision of the world through the 
lens of Spanish imperialism. 
 
Global Interactions on the Edges 
The global vision outlined by Sherley was not exclusive to the imperial leaders 
and ideologues in Madrid, but was shared and built by many other subjects across the 
polity, despite (and even perhaps, due to) distance and geographic separation. One 
interesting feature of Spanish imperialism is that it was enunciated and developed not 
necessarily from the center of the empire, but from its “peripheries.” Imperial subjects on 
the “margins” of the empire had, indeed, multiple material and physical contacts and 
interactions with many other different peoples that forced them to rethink the world and 
their and others’ place in it. Moreover, there was also a circulation of ideas and 
information that spawned very powerful mental and intellectual connections, in which 
people outside Europe could relate to others’ experiences, and imagine a united and 
coherent global empire.  
For instance, early modern cosmopolitanism took place in Mexico City. The four 
parts of the world converged on that American center. There were large native and 
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Spanish populations, and also African slaves and freed men and women lived in the city. 
Despite the official desire to keep these populations separated, there was constant contact 
among these people, which created a hybrid and mixed society.110 Moreover, Mexico 
served as a door into the Asian world. Because the galleon that connected the Philippines 
with the rest of the Spanish Empire sailed from the port of Acapulco (on Mexico’s west 
coast), merchants, clerics, and officials passed through the city of Mexico in their way to 
or from Asia.111 Furthermore, there was also a major presence of Asian slaves in this city, 
as Tatiana Seijas has recently shown.112 Likewise, these material encounters engendered 
mental connections and Mexicans developed a comprehensive image of the Spanish 
Monarchy and the world.113 Bernardo Balbuena, a Spanish poet and priest, who as a 
youngster moved to New Spain, clearly expressed this view in 1604 when he wrote: 
In you [Mexico City], Spain unites with China 
Italy with Japan, and finally, 
A whole world in trade and order.114 
 
Not only could Mexicans feel and perceive the whole globe, but Mexico impacted 
other people and places. After having served in America for over twenty years, Juan 
Francisco de Montemayor returned to his native Zaragoza to retire and die there. He 
came back from Mexico, where he had an impressive career (particularly, he had a major 
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role crashing an Indigenous revolt in Oaxaca, as it was seen Chapter Four) and had been 
able to accumulate considerable wealth. The old oidor spent his American fortune in 
buying a manor for himself in the nearby small village of Alfocea, which he hoped to 
create splendor by building there a proper church. The church is a beautiful example of 
how Montemayor became a citizen of the world (Fig. 7). In his will, he stated his desire 
to place in the church’s high altar, after properly ornamenting it, “la Ymagen de la 
Concepcion que traxe de Mexico.”115 This royal official brought with him a piece of 
Mexico to this remote land, in the deep provinces of Aragon, which now stands next to 
the many other Mudejar, Romanesque, or Gothic churches of the region.116 
Around 1621, an anonymous Paraguayan Franciscan, who at the time was in 
Madrid, wrote to his Provincial in Paraguay, a region in which missionaries and priests 
were carrying evangelizing activities. While the Jesuits missions are the most famous 
today, there were many religious orders acting in that region, and there had been 
Franciscan reducciones since at least 1580.117 Paraguay, characterized by its lowlands, 
difficult terrain, and inaccessibility, was perceived as a frontier zone, not only in 
geographic and political terms, as it was in the outskirts of the Spanish Empire in  
America, but also as a frontline of civilization. It was seen as a region inhabited by 
savages, by Indigenous peoples who needed to be preached to and converted. Although  
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Figure 7. Image of the Immaculate Lady, Alfocea. Photo by María Gálvez. 
this Franciscan was not a royal official, his letter constitutes a good example of the 
possibilities of mental integration of the far-flung empire. Indeed, even though 
throughout this dissertation I have tried to uncover the Spanish imperial officials’ vision 
of the world, such images were not exclusive to Spanish officials or even Spaniards, but 
were shared by a great number of other people—foreigners, American and Asian natives, 
among many others—who also came to see themselves as global subjects of the Spanish 
Monarch. 
The object of the short missive to the friars in South America was to narrate the 
celebrations and festivities organized in Madrid celebrating the proclamation of Philip 
	
 275 
IV. The Franciscan described the many foreign ambassadors and their retinues that 
arrived in the court for the occasion. Madrid, the imperial capital, was a cosmopolitan 
city in which people from all over the world converged. The priest was mostly impressed 
by the Turkish cortege, led by a pasha from Cairo, who “entró por la puerta segoviana en 
una carroza sin cielo, toda forrada de pelusa encarnada y él con una manta encabellada y 
un turbante de más de cien varas de toca que más parecía carro triunfal que carroza.” It 
seems that he was not the only one mesmerized by these unusual foreigners. He claims 
that “se despobló Madrid cuando entró [the Turk ambassador],” everyone went to the city 
doors to see the newcomers, and the king, in a major and infrequent honor, ordered all his 
grandees to go out and receive the pasha.118 
The Turkish embassy was truly exceptional. As Sherley noted, the Turkish and 
Spanish empires were in a continuous and open confrontation. Their dispute was not only 
geopolitical, but also ideological and even ontological: it was about the triumph of one 
religion over the other, of one civilization, and one understanding of the world. They 
mainly clashed around the Mediterranean, where Christians and Muslims were constantly 
being taken captive. Although by the end of the sixteenth century, and after the famous 
Spanish victory in the battle of Lepanto, Philip II had signed an armistice with the 
Ottoman Sultan in which temporary peace was achieved and thousands of captives were 
exchanged, the tense relationship and conflict with the Turks continued to be a pressing 
issue for the Spanish crown during the seventeenth century.119 The Paraguayan friar 
seemed to be well acquainted of all this. In his missive, he attached a copy of a letter sent 
by Philip II to the Great Turk discussing the terms of the rescue of captives.  
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Through communications like this, people living in Paraguay, a region usually 
perceived as an imperial frontier, could engage with the global empire. The mobility of 
people across the world contributed to the circulation of images. Not only that the letter 
from Madrid was a way to renew the ties with the king and the royal court, but also, the 
stories told in it made possible for the Franciscans in Paraguay to relate their own 
experiences of evangelization in the South American jungles to those of the 
Mediterranean captives. Suddenly, things that could take place in a place like Malta could 
appear close for someone who could have never stepped out from Paraguay. 
The interactions in the Philippines provide another good example of global 
encounters on the periphery of the empire. The Philippines was one of the farthest 
possessions of the Monarchy, and one of the most difficult to reach. Nonetheless, this 
situation did not mean isolation from the rest of the world. Quite the contrary, the Asian 
archipelago became a geographic node in which people from all over the globe came 
together and interacted with each other. In 1616, the Spanish officials in Manila received 
notice of the presence of Dutch corsairs south of the major island of Luzon, nearby the 
island of Capul, which, although tiny, played a strategic role in guiding the ships that 
came from Acapulco. The Audience of Manila, which was ruling the islands in the 
absence of a governor, worried about the news of the threatening newcomers, rushed to 
interrogate witnesses and to gather information.120 While there were some Spanish 
officials, like the sentry Jerónimo Pacheco, who provided some details about the visitors, 
most reports were given by outsiders such as Chinese and Japanese men, as well as 
indigenous people of the islands, referred by the Spaniards as ‘Indians,’ a term that 
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homogenized and blurred the differences of indigenous societies in Mesoamerica, the 
Andes, and Asia. 
The first witness was Felipe Antic, a native from Catanduanes, one of the many 
islands in the archipelago, who gave his testimony with the help of interpreters. He was 
piloting a small frigate in the company of seventeen more Indigenous men when he ran 
into another native rowing towards him, who warned him of the Dutch presence. Antic 
anchored his boat and, from a hidden position, spotted the corsairs, who he described as 
white, blond, and long-haired men carrying harquebuses. The Spanish judges also 
interrogated Francisco Quitian (and other five Christian Sangleys), who in his limited 
Spanish gave the few details he could remember from his encounter with the corsairs, 
which had left him perturbed. He could only assert that the captain was “muy blanco y 
tiene los ojos como de gato y las barbas bermejas.” Another witness was Juan de León, a 
Japanese Christian settled in the Philippines, who was proficient in Spanish and did not 
require an interpreter. When he and three other Japanese were in his sampan, he sighted 
three big ships. Suspicious of them, he tried to get away, but they caught him. Various 
men, then, approached León’s precarious embarkation and after asking him in Spanish 
why they were running away, they took him and his companions by force into the 
captain’s ship. Once the Dutch examined these Japanese, they imprisoned them in a small 
ship. Three days later, León was taken in presence of the Dutch captain, who in “lengua 
castellana que la hablaba mal” interrogated him about Manila and its defenses, the 
commerce with China and Japan, the number of ships that had arrived to the Spanish port 
and the goods they brought, and especially about the forces of the naval squadron that the 
Spanish governor had sent to fight the Dutch in the Moluccas.  
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During the five days this Japanese man remained captive he got to see and interact 
with other prisoners, like the Spanish Martín de Aguirre who had gone to Spain to trade, 
but was captured along with nine other Spaniards and two Franciscans. Juan de León was 
also able to meet and get to know the corsairs. He distinguished the differences of 
clothing and behavior among them, noting that the corsairs “divergían unos de otros y 
parecen ser de diferentes naciones.” However, León added, 
como no sabía los nombres de los dichos soldados les decía 
señor holandés y ellos se enojaban mucho diciendo en 
castellano: nosotros no somos holandeses, sino caballeros 
flamencos, gente honrada, que los holandeses es gente ruin y 
bellaca. Y este testigo, como nunca había visto flamencos, le 
pareció que todos eran holandeses, y así los nombraba por este 
nombre.121 
 
This entertaining passage of León’s testimony speaks to his process of learning and 
assimilation of the foreign world. While sailing in his skiff in a remote Asian island, Juan 
de León encountered many people from across the world. He was told about the (slight) 
differences between two European nations, and he could, to some extent, appreciate 
them. However, in the end, and in an inversion of the colonial experience, he flattens 
those Europeans out, and merges them according to his knowledge of the world. It is also 
interesting to note that the communication between these men occurred in Spanish. A 
Dutch and a Japanese communicated in Spanish, as did the Chinese Quitian. Today, such 
exchanges would probably be in English. The language of the most extended and 
powerful political power served as the global lingua franca, and was used even by those 
who appeared as enemies. 
Martín Castaño, the general procurator of the Philippines in Madrid, had a clear 
vision of the role and centrality of the archipelago. In 1624 he wrote to the king’s 




favorite, the Count-Duke of Olivares, affirming that it was necessary to stop the growing 
number of Dutch in that region, “esta, señor, es la cosa de mayor importancia al servicio 
de Su Majestad que hay en el mundo.”122 Castaño argued that the Dutch outnumbered 
and outmatched the Spanish and warned they could easily take over the islands. This 
would be extremely detrimental, giving them access to large riches and power. Thus, he 
asked to send to the Philippines the navy that was being prepared to rescue Brazil. He 
suggested not telling the sailors and soldiers about this until they were into the open sea, 
because people would not willingly enroll to go to the Asian islands. Castaño hoped to 
persuade Olivares claiming that such action would have a dramatic effect on the global 
struggles for power, “se hará una cosa tan conveniente como recobrar la opinión entre 
todos aquellos reinos y naciones que tan perdida está, con que también se volverán los 
naturales de nuestra parte.”123 Moreover, as a good Catholic official, he assured that such 
enterprise would be “de tanta consideración e importancia al servicio de ambas 
majestades,” because it would secure the establishment and growth of Catholicism.124 
The Count-Duke seemed to share his perspective. In his short reply he affirmed that this 
was of extreme importance and had to be taken care as soon as possible. 
It is worth noting the intense dispute that existed between the Spanish and the 
Dutch. The latter built their empire in a clear opposition to the former, and the two 
powers clashed in basically every region of the world, from Europe itself, to America, 
Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Indian Ocean. Both empires thought of the struggle in 
global terms. Benjamin Schmidt shows that the ideologues and leaders of the Republic’s 
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revolt against Spanish rule drew constant parallels between the “Spanish Tyranny” 
against the American “Indians” and the Dutch, and constructed a shared experience of 
oppression and abuses. Therefore, the Dutch Atlantic emerged as clearly anti-Hispanic. 
Dutch imperialists, who thought of themselves “not as colonizers in the Atlantic but as 
the colonized, victims of imperial hostility,” saw in the Indians natural allies, and hoped 
they would fight together against the Spanish yoke.125 This context of global conflict 
complicates the usual understanding of early modern Dutch (as well as English) 
cosmopolitanism. For Margaret Jacob, the Dutch developed a sense of tolerance and 
inclusion in opposition to the oppressive (and almost backward) nature of the Spanish 
Monarchy.126 However, the negative image of the Spanish Empire was heavily promoted 
by the Dutch, for whom everyone but the Spaniards had a place in their cosmopolitan 
world.127 
In one of the documents of the aforementioned Descripción de la India Oriental, 
one Spanish official described Dutch religious tolerance as one political strategy for 
gaining allies among the local leaders and opposing Spanish hegemony. The Dutch, 
claimed the official, treate the Indigenous people “como compañeros, sin hacerles 
instancia para que dejen la ley en que viven, sus ritos y ceremonias.” According to the 
official, this practice proved to be successful as the Dutch, and their merchant ships, were 
warmly welcomed.128 Likewise, Anthony Sherley narrated the never-fulfilled project of 
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the English captain John Norris to conquer Mexico in 1596, who hoped to achieve this 
with promises of “libertad a los esclavos negros e indios, y de igualdad a los mestizos con 
los conquistadores”129 Sherley argued that Spanish enemies would try to exploit Spain’s 
inherent diversity by trying to turn its subjects into enemies. As we can see, some 
cosmopolitan visions were articulated in response to Spanish imperial projects, but also 
as part of other imperial projects. 
The case of the Dutch corsairs in the Philippines also signals the ways in which 
the native population became involved with Spain’s global projects and visions. 
Similarly, Juan Antonio was a Japanese man who in 1623, after having lived for two 
years in Mexico City—that American global hub—traveled to Spain. The oidor of 
Mexico don Pedro de Vergara y Gaviria found out about Juan Antonio’s journey and 
hired him to take with him a Japanese camp bed as a present for the king. Juan Antonio 
was received in Seville by Vergara’s brother, don Diego, and then in Madrid by the king 
himself, in front of whom he assembled the bed.130 Shortly after, Juan Antonio decided to 
return home. Just like any other Spaniard would have done, he asked the king for help 
and protection. He claimed to be in despair and left alone since his parents and two 
brothers died defending the Catholic faith. Because of his expertise in various languages 
he petitioned to be appointed as translator and consul in the Philippines. The king did not 
find this petition outrageous or unusual, but instead gave him permission to return to the 
Indies (even paying for his journey), and urged the governor of the Philippines to bestow 
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him with an appropriate office.131 I have not been able to trace the final fate of Juan 
Antonio, but it is possible that he made it back to Asia, where he became one more of the 
thousands of mobile imperial officials who on a daily basis kept the global empire 
together. 
The Spanish Empire and its imperial project were, indeed, embraced by many 
non-Spaniards throughout the globe. The remarkable case of the Peruvian native Felipe 
Guaman Poma de Ayala clearly illustrates this. While he has been portrayed as a 
prominent case of indigenous resistance and criticism to Spanish colonialism, it can also 
be argued that he thought of himself as a faithful subject of the Spanish king and as a 
member of the global Catholic monarchy.132 
Guaman Poma was an Indigenous nobleman from the region of Huamanga, in the 
Peruvian central Andes.133 He was born shortly after Francisco Pizarro and his army took 
over the Inca Empire, and he lived fully immersed and integrated within the colonial 
society and culture. He was an Indian ‘ladino,’ as he had adopted several defining 
Spanish traits, most importantly that he spoke Spanish and, as we will see, was a fervent 
Catholic. Moreover, he also served the king, and helped with the implementation of 
viceroy Toledo’s reforms. He was an aid and a translator, and assisted the priest Cristóbal 
de Albornoz when he quashed the indigenous religious movement known as Taki Onqoy, 
as part of his extirpation of idolatries campaign. At the end of his life Guaman Poma 
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decided to write a letter to the Spanish king, Philip III, presenting his vision of the Andes, 
its history, major problems, and possible solutions. 
The letter, entitled El primer nueva corónica y buen gobierno, which appears to 
have been written between 1610 and 1615, is a rich and exceptional document.134 The 
author’s hybridity is ever-present in his work. It was written mostly in Spanish; however, 
because Guaman Poma’s native tongue was Quechua, there are also several passages in 
this Andean language. This mixture of linguistic structures and grammar, but also of 
cosmologies, and ideas, make the document fascinating. It is a unique window into an 
otherwise mostly inaccessible world, that of the indigenous Andean society after the 
conquest. However, this hybridity also obscures the message and sometimes makes it 
difficult to grasp the author’s ideas, leaving open the door to many different 
interpretations. 
The document has over 1000 pages and 398 drawings that serve to illustrate the 
main arguments of the author, and it is paginated in a modern fashion. It is divided into 
two parts: the first is a chronicle in which Guaman Poma presents a history of the Andes, 
and an ethnographic description of the region’s culture, society, religion, and customs. 
This section, which has been very useful to scholars of the pre-Hispanic world, can be 
also read in light of the many cosmographies written around that time that tried to present 
the foreign world to a European audience. 
In the same vein in which Botero or Sherley presented distant regions to the 
Spanish king, the Peruvian writer sought to explain and present his own world. The 
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purpose, once again, was to make that world accessible and to incorporate it into 
European history and general knowledge. In fact, Guaman Poma begins his story by 
describing the “ages of the world,” which begins with Adam and Eve; and continues with 
Noah and the Flood; King David; and finally the coming of Jesus, when it also starts the 
history of the Indies with the ruling of the first Inca, Manco Capac.135 Following the idea 
proposed by Dirlik, here we can see Eurocentrism working at its best. The Indigenous 
chronicler relied on the periodization proposed by the Sevillian scholar Jerónimo de 
Chaves in the sixteenth century.136 Guaman Poma sets to make a comprehensive history 
of the world and to incorporate in it his own region, to give voice to his native 
experiences, but this is done from the standpoint of Europe. In the end, it is European 
values and history that set the framework of the Nueva corónica. 
In the second part of the missive, the Andean writer describes the colonial 
government and society, drawing a powerful critique of the abuses and exploitation 
suffered by the native population, and of what the author perceives as a chaotic situation. 
He was mostly worried by the degeneration of Andean society and by the shortfalls of the 
evangelization. In fact, an explicit objective of the book was to serve as a tool to facilitate 
the conversion of the Indians. Thereafter, in a section written in the form of a dialogue 
between the Spanish king and the author, Guaman Poma provides suggestions for how to 
solve all the problems, and how to enhance Catholicism. The author does not reject 
Spanish dominion; quite to the contrary, his proposals aim to improve it. His criticism is 
not against the king, who he sees (as any loyal and faithful Spanish subject) as inherently 
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good and just, but against the local officials who are misbehaving and who do not 
properly fulfill their imperial mission. 
For Guaman Poma, the better imposition of the king’s authority in the Andes is 
clearly linked to an ideal of global Catholicism. Not only does he frame the history and 
situation of Peru within a project of universal evangelization, but he presents his own 
work as part of such an endeavor. The title page of the book shows it clearly (Fig. 8). The 
author appears on the bottom right corner. He is bareheaded and kneeling down, with an 
expression of devotion and obedience. Above him, and in a similar posture, appears the 
Spanish king. The two of them are venerating the major figure of the page, the Pope, on 
the upper left side. The pontiff appears seated on his throne, and is wearing his miter. On 
his right hand he is holding the papal ferula, and St. Peter’s keys on his left one. In the 
center of the page there are three coats of arms, those of the Pope, the Spanish king, and a 
third one depicting a puma and a falcon, which we can presume the author presented as 
his own. They are lined one above the other, and alongside each of the human figures.137  
Rolena Adorno has proposed a reading of this figure by placing it against what she thinks 
was the Andean spatial grid. She argues that the vertical line had no major importance. 
The key, rather, was the diagonal line that directly links the Pope and the author; 
according to that reading, the Spanish coat of arms would indicate a symbolic mediation 
between these two characters. Concurrently, claims Adorno, the king is not only left in an 
unimportant position, but he is positioned to the right of the center, occupying the same 
place that Guaman Poma in his mapamundi has given to the Collas, one of the four pre-
Hispanic communities that formed the Inca empire, and which the author disliked and 
                                                
137 For a detailed description of this and all the book’s images see: Carlos A. González Vargas, Hugo 
Rosati, and Francisco Sánchez, Guaman Poma: Testigo del mundo andino (Santiago, Chile: LOM 




Figure 8. The Royal Library, Copenhagen, GKS 2232 4º: Guaman Poma, Nueva corónica y buen gobierno 




defined as greedy. Another disruption of this image would be the absence of a central 
figure (which used to be occupied by Cuzco and the Incas). Adorno finds here another 
form of critique to the colonized society, and a subtle reminder of the chronicler’s 
perception of the world being upside down and lacking a proper center. All of this would 
indicate the author’s ideal of “an autonomously ruled Christian Andean state.”138  
However, based on the previously mentioned early modern Spanish understanding 
of the dual nature of power, another reading of this figure is possible. As it has been 
noted, in the Spanish world a permanent tension existed between the spiritual and 
temporal powers. Several authors openly defended the primacy of the spiritual power  
over the Spanish king himself.139 Accordingly, for Guaman Poma, the supremacy of the 
Catholic pope is undisputed. The pontiff appears in the most prominent position, fully 
displaying all the symbols of his power. Guaman Poma, clearly sees himself, as well as 
the Spanish king, as servants of the Roman bishop. Just like Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos 
had no qualms in claiming the secondary position of the Christian emperor, the Andean 
writer—who had a close relationship with the Peruvian clergy, and from whom he 
learned Spanish and received access to historical, theological, and philosophical works—
did not hesitate in declaring the superiority of the spiritual power. This idea did not imply 
breaking away from the Spanish king, or even going against his authority. This was a 
discourse with ample legitimacy in the Spanish world and which was defended by people 
as influential as Castillo de Bobadilla, whose loyalty to the Monarchy was not in doubt. 
For Guaman Poma, as well as many others, to be a good vassal was to be a good Catholic 
first. 
                                                
138 Adorno, Guaman Poma, 95–99. 
139 For a discussion of some of these authors, see Cañeque, The King’s Living Image, 80–93. 
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Ultimately, Guaman Poma’s letter appears not necessarily as a project of an 
independent Andean rule, but as a program to fully encompass the Indies within the 
Catholic world. In fact, he narrates the discovery of America in the chapter in which he 
tells the history of the popes.140 At first this might seem unexpected, but for Guaman 
Poma, this encounter in which the New World was first exposed to Catholicism, and the 
subsequent conjuction of America and Europe, engendered what he defines as “Pontifical 
Mundo.” According to him, the world was the result of the union of Castile and the 
Indies, but always under the authority of the Pope. For this Indigenous writer, to be a 
citizen of the world meant to be a faithful Catholic. 
In his graphic depiction of this Pontifical World, the author divided the image into 
two sections (Fig. 9). In the upper one, Guaman Poma placed the Indies, represented by 
five cities, with Cuzco at the center (the other four cities remained unnamed). In the 
lower section, he represented Castile in a similar fashion: Castile at the center, 
surrounded by other four cities. This image remains obscure and difficult to understand. 
The difference in the size of the cities between the two regions is obvious. The Castilian 
cities appear larger and more imposing than the Peruvian ones. However, they are located 
at the bottom, as if secondary. The legends of the image ratify this ordering: “las Yndias 
del Pirú en lo alto de España” and “Castilla en lo auajo de las Yndias.” The meaning of 
this organization is open to debate. When Guaman Poma affirmed that the Indies were on 
top of Spain, was he talking about a physical and geographicl reality? The drawing of the 
mountains and the closeness to the sun might suggest such a reading. Was he implying 
that the Indies stood atop the Spanish polity, that is, were its most important component?  
  
                                                





Figure 9. The Royal Library, Copenhagen, GKS 2232 4º: Guaman Poma, Nueva corónica y buen gobierno 




Or was he referring to his recurring idea of the world being upside-down? Or was he 
indeed subverting the colonial order? 
Whatever answer we choose, it is clear that Guaman Poma saw the world as a 
comprehensive unit, comprised of diverse societies and regions. Walter Mignolo has 
argued that this representation of the world was a ‘de-colonial’ statement. In the 
Andean’s mind—argues Mignolo—there was not the idea of ‘friends and enemies,’ but a 
common world.141 The logic of antagonism was supplanted by an early modern  
cosmopolitanism which included all of the known world. Surely, this Humanga native 
was aware of the world that lay beyond Peru and America. He affirmed that God “hizo el 
mundo y la tierra y plantó en ellas cada cimiente, el español en Castilla, el yndio en las 
Yndias, el negro en Guinea.”142 Nonetheless, this diversity was to be subsumed under 
Spanish authority. He proposed that the Spanish king should have in his court four royal 
representatives: the first, an American prince, who should be Guaman Poma’s son; the 
second, a prince from Guinea; the third, a prince from the Christians of Rome or from 
another king of the world; and the fourth, a prince of the Moors and the Great Turk. This 
four princes would be crowned and hold scepters. At the center of them, however, would 
appear “la magestad y monarca del mundo, rey don Phelipe.” Guaman Poma defined the 
Spanish monarch as the high crown, with the others as lower crowns. For this author it 
was unquestionable that the Spanish king was “monarca del mundo, que ningún rrey ni 
enperador no se puede engualar [sic],” and that he had “debajo de su mano mundo estos 
rreys coronados.” This was a clear manifestation of the power of the monarch, who ruled 
                                                
141 Mignolo, “Cosmopolitanism and the De-Colonial Option,” 118. 
142 Guaman Poma de Ayala, “El primer nueva corónica y buen gobierno,” 929. Rolena Adorno argues that 
in this section Guaman Poma followed closely Bartolomé de las Casas’s El tratado de las doce dudas. 




over “todas las naciones y géneros de personas; yndios, negros y españoles cristianos, 
turcos, judíos, moros del mundo.”143 
Guaman Poma’s work is one expression of popular Spanish cosmopolitanism. He 
was able to bridge cultural boundaries and, in doing so, cemented the Spanish Empire. 
His work belonged to the same cultural and intelectual world in which men such as Pedro 
Ordóñez de Cevallos, Domingo Toral y Valdés, and Anthony Sherley lived and wrote. 
Their works arose from a conception that the world was, indeed, one. Although they all 
saw themselves as subjects of the Spanish king and worked for the universal 
consolidation of his authority, their understadings of that world and its diversity were 
distinct from each other. They depended on their own personal experience, sensibilities, 
and culture, and sometimes, they could express more tolerant, although exceptional, ideas 
or even question colonial rule. 
It was the cosmopolitan worldview and wide-ranging personal mobility of this 
period, both materially and intellectually, that made possible the connection of different 
and far-away regions. These encounters, which were always asymmetrical, forced people 
across the world to rethink the new world order taking shape. Imperial subjects and 
officials attempted to make sense of the diversity of customs, languages, religions, 
geographies, and political organizations, which suddenly appeared in front of them. In an 
effort to construct a more familiar world, they hoped to encompass this heterogeneity 
under a single cosmopolitan ideal—a single political, cultural, religious entity known as 
the Spanish Empire.
                                                





In 1646, Luis Fernández de Córdoba y Arce summarized his more than twenty 
years as an imperial official in a very graphic way: “he peregrinado todo el mundo, 
sirviendo a Vuestra Majestad en las partes más remotas de él, así en Asia como en la 
América y Europa.”1 In just a few words, this official delineated the global dimension of 
the Spanish Monarchy and the importance of officials’ mobility. According to Fernández 
de Córdoba, imperial officials arduously moved from one place to another, working to 
enhance the Crown’s power— reaching even the most remote destinations—and, in this 
way, made evident their loyalty to the monarch and condition as good vassals. 
Through the course of this study we have seen that imperial officials were very 
aware of their key function in the making and working of the Spanish Empire. They 
embraced the imperial goal of protecting and spreading the Faith and the King’s rule 
across the world, and in doing so articulated their own identities to the development of 
such a far-flung Catholic empire. Although not all imperial officials had the same degree 
of mobility, and not every one was permanently on the move, they all shared the ethos 
and understanding of the political culture that I have outlined in this dissertation. More 
importantly, they were never static. The crown itself prevented this. I have not yet found 
an official who stagnated, who began and finished his services in the same post.2 The 
                                                
1 AGS, EST, LEG 3636, 61 “Memorial de Luis Fernández de Córdoba y Arce solicitando el puesto de 
embajador de España en Génova,” 1646, fol. 1v. A similar idea was conveyed in 1649 by don Miguel de 
Salamanca when we has proposed for the corregimiento of Madrid, “Con obediencia ciega he obedecido 
siempre lo que el Rey Nuestro Señor se ha servido de mandarme, sin reparar en riesgos, ni incomodidades. 
Testimonios bastantes son tan largas jornadas en continuada peregrinación de tantos años.” AHN, 
Consejos, 13620, 13, N. 21 “Carta de don Miguel de Salamanca,” April 16, 1649. 
2 The regidores, the local members of the municipal government, could hold their posts for life and live 
always in the same city. However, although their appointment was confirmed by the king, they were not 
imperial officials. They were the representatives of local power, many times counterbalancing and 
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mobility of these early modern officials, and of the society in general, was truly 
impressive, and its effects powerful. 
The culture of mobility was part and parcel of the Spanish Monarchy, as it 
facilitated the overcoming of the (physical and mental) distances and discontinuous 
geography characteristic of the empire and it made the king an ever-present image. 
Mobility was possible thanks to the impressive technological advancements of the time, 
many of which were sponsored by the Monarchy. The crown also sought to regulate the 
travel routes, cycles, and methods, and the people who traveled. In fact, the king 
developed a complex and extensive network of patronage within which its officials and 
their families moved, tying their destinies to that of service to the crown.  
Indeed, officials’ mobility, and their subsequent activities, was conditioned by 
their networks of patronage. The cases of the Villagarcía’s and the Hurtado de Corcuera’s 
show that officials’ success depended on their ability to connect with local 
intermediaries, but also on how they utilized their patrons, clients, and brokers in order to 
gather information and even make allies, or enemies, before reaching their posts. 
Patronage bonds, based on personal and direct connections and an expression of a 
patriarchal society, acquired a new dimension by becoming global and intertwining with 
the imperial networks.  
One important, although self-evident, consequence of officials’ mobility is that it 
gave them experience, making of them privileged actors within the monarchy’s political 
system, especially in a time in which direct experience was favored. Juan de Oñate’s 
American mining expertise was highly valued and put into practice in Spain, also 
                                                                                                                                            
opposing the king’s authority. See, for instance, Polo y La Borda Ramos, “Identidad y poder en los 
conflictos por las preeminencias en el siglo XVII.” 
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showing the integration of these two regions. Officials’ experiences were summarized 
and codified in their Informaciones de méritos. These documents serve as windows into 
the officialdom’s values and ideals of service, and altogether they represent an enormous 
corpus of officials’ experience. This accumulated knowledge circulated across the 
empire, informing the crown and other officials’ policies. 
Past events and performances guided officials in one of their most important and 
constant duties, regardless of their location: controlling dissent to royal authority. Thus, 
officials, encouraged by the example of the expulsion of the moriscos from the Iberian 
Peninsula, could voice and enforce aggressive programs, such as the expulsion and 
enslavement of the Araucanians in Chile. Officials’ violent imposition of authority came 
along with the imperial mandate of protecting the Monarchy’s weakest subjects (the 
American Indians, but also the Castilian commoners) from the abuses of the more 
powerful, as the king had the obligation to take care of those deemed as wretched. 
However, officials did all of this in many different ways, adapting to the particulars of 
every region and to how the rebellious people were judged in terms of the whole political 
body. 
Officials’ mobility and daily undertakings reveal how the global empire was 
articulated in each local scenario, and expose fault lines in how they conceived of the 
imperial project. Officials’ continuous dealings with the myriad geographies, cultures, 
and societies that composed the empire spawned an imperial cosmopolitan culture. Some 
men could be more open and tolerant, like Domingo Toral y Valdés, while others aimed 
to fully subsume difference under the principles of the Catholic Monarchy. There was, 
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indeed, a profound linkage between cosmopolitanism and imperialism, the former being 
indispensable for the latter, as it allowed for bridging the empire’s inherent differences. 
As we have seen repeatedly, the activities of the officials did not remain isolated 
or locally contained, but reverberated across the world. The imperial nexus of 
connections could be witnessed in everyplace in the empire. While indubitably there was 
an intense center that gravitated around the king and the royal court, there were many 
other sites, such as Mexico in New Spain, Manila in Asia, Naples in the Mediterranean, 
the Azores in the Atlantic, or Oran in Africa, that functioned as global hinges. The early 
modern Spanish Empire was a dynamic political organization, with many axes and 
connecting points, and some of them enabled direct interconnections, bypassing Madrid. 
Spanish imperial officials permanently swung between the global and the local. 
They embodied a political organization, which despite being decentered in so many 
levels, continued to be essentially a Spanish polity. Imperial officials were able to move 
and interact in different settings and deal with the local societies without loosing sight of 
their imperial mission: the preservation and expansion of the authority of the Spanish 
monarch, and not that of the many centers in which they acted. Therefore, the integration 
of the diversity of people that made up the empire across the world was thought and 
carried out in terms of the needs and goals of the Spanish Monarchy, which had 
Catholicism as its trademark. This imperial framework, however, was not exclusive to the 
royal officials, but shared by many of the imperial subjects. 
Members of the Monarchy understood that they belonged to a global polity, and 
they acted accordingly. This emphasis on the global dimension of the empire neither 
neglects the importance of the local histories, nor implies that imperial rule and the 
	
 296 
colonized societies were the same throughout the world. More to the contrary, the 
Spanish Monarchy was defined by its heterogeneity and the local processes had their own 
particular dynamics, origins, and consequences. The expulsion of the Sangleys, the 
efforts to improve the mining production in Spain, or Guaman Poma’s denunciation of 
the colonial abuses had their own motives and, surely, they can be studied and interpreted 
exclusively in their own terms, as it has usually been the case. My argument, however, is 
that such local histories should not be considered in isolation. They did not occur in a 
vacuum. There was an intense dialogue between the local and the universal, the peculiar 
circumstances and the global desires and goals. Evidently, people in Oaxaca, Terceira, 
Córdoba, or Mesina did not think that all of their actions had global reach, but they 
framed them within an imperial paradigm. 
This global consciousness and mobility forces us to rethink the place of Latin 
America within the Spanish Empire, and what was colonial about it. The matter of the 
specificity of the American experience is indeed extremely hard to solve and requires us 
to look at the whole of the empire, breaking away from the teleology of the national 
historiographies and their victimizing narratives. Oscar Mazín and José Javier Ruiz 
Ibáñez, after presenting the similarities between America and other territories under 
Spanish rule, concluded with the vague affirmation “todo fue específico,” no imperial 
experience was completely different to the other, but also neither of them was the same.3 
Definitely, we cannot reduce American colonialism to the mere presence of Spaniards on 
foreign grounds, or to the imposition of their rule, and not even necessarily to the 
                                                
3 Oscar Mazín and José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez, “Estudio Introductorio,” in Las Indias Occidentales, ed. Oscar 
Mazín and José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez, 32. However, they are mostly focused on the articulation of the Spanish 
Americans and on the legal aspects of this problem, discussing whether the American territories were 
formally a colony or not, and wether its incorporation into the Spanish Monarchy differed in juridical terms 
from that of other territories, such as Portugal or the Low Countries. 
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depiction of the majority of the population as barbarian or wretched. All these things 
happened, to some degree, in other parts of the empire. 
The key to the American specificity, I think, lies in how those elements of 
imperial rule were combined and structured in peculiar ways in the New World, and the 
roles played by native Spanish elites as well as local Indigenous populations. The 
American case is greatly defined by the extent to which the Indigenous population was 
able to insert themselves into the imperial government and administration at a high level, 
and in this regard the conclusion is blatant: no American Indigenous was ever appointed 
corregidor. The integration into the Spanish polity of the native population, who because 
of their alleged wretched nature and recent incorporation into Christendom were thought 
of as a different social and political entity, could not be left in hands of the Indigenous’ 
elite, but instead such duty was handed to the imperial officials. This situation makes 
more acute to study the role played by the lower echelon of imperial officials, who were 
the ligaments between the sovereign and the imperial subjects and who actually 
articulated the Spanish Monarchy, making it possible for Americans, both Spaniards and 
Indigenous, to think of themselves as members of a global polity. I think that a more 
refined understanding of the worldwide dynamics of imperial government can help us to 
better see who and how was included or excluded, exploited or protected, and how such 
categories could change, or rather remained unaltered. 
This imperial political system was built upon the mobility of cosmopolitan 
imperial officials. The fluidity of the global exchanges and the capacity of the monarchy 
to encompass difference under the umbrella of its universal rule allowed for the 
consolidation of the king’s authority, despite the geographic dispersion of his 
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possessions, and the decentered and diffused nature of early modern power. This intense 
circulation did not decrease with the advent of the new century and ruling dynasty. 
However, as Enlightenment ideas became more predominant, many of the Spanish 
Habsburg possessions were lost and the remaining imperial regions were more clustered, 
and a more professionalized body of imperial officials began to take shape, the 
characteristics and limits of such mobility changed. Some of its flexibility and much of 
its global scope were lost. This new paradigm, solidified with the appearance of the 
nation-states, has cast a shadow over our understanding of the early modern Spanish 
Empire, concealing the fact that in the seventeenth century the mobile imperial officials 







Congratulatory letters received by the marquis of Villagarcía: 
• Cardinal Sandoval, archbishop of Toledo, October 9, 1657. 
• Don Benito de Aguiar, steward of cardinal Sandoval, Toledo, October 9, 1657. 
• The residence Hall of Oviedo de Salamanca, October 1657. 
• Don Diego de Vera, Chamber’s Secretary of cardinal Sandoval, October 9, 1657. 
• Count of Amarante, Monforte, October 15, 1657. 
• Don Gómez Dávila, appointed corregidor of Potosí, Seville, October 16, 1657. 
• Maestre de campo don Gabriel Sarmiento de Sotomayor, governor of the 
stronghold of San Luis, San Luis, October 19, 1657. 
• Don Juan de Córdoba, oidor of the Indies, Santiago, October 20, 1657. 
• Don Vicente Gonzaga, governor and general captain of the kingdom of Galicia, 
Pontevedra, October 23, 1657 (written to D. Antonio, son of the marquis). 
• My cousin, don Fernando de Castro y Andrade, archbishop of Jaén, Baeza  
October 24, 1657. 
• Don Antonio de Montenegro y Sotomayor, Tuy, October 24, 1657. 
• The ecclesiastic cabildo of Santiago, Santiago, October 25, 1657. 
• Sister Juana de San Miguel, Vista Alegre, October 25, 1657. 
• The nuns of the convent of San Cristóbal, Vista Alegre, October 25, 1657. 
• Archbishop of Santiago, Santiago, October 27, 1657. 
• Don Vicente Gonzaga, governor and general captain of the kingdom of Galicia, 
October 28, 1657. 
• Friar Diego de Araujo, mayor general of the Benedictine order, October 28, 1657. 
• Captain don Mauro de Pardiñas Villar de Francos, Cádiz, October 28, 1657. 
• Don Rodrigo de Mandía y Parga, bishop of Syria, maestre escuela of Salamanca, 
October 31, 1657. 
• Marquis of Arcos y Tenorio, lord of the house of Sotomayor, governor and 
general captain of Ceuta. My Nephew. Ceuta, October 31, 1657. 
• Count of Paredes, Pontevedra, November 2, 1657. 
• Provincial Father of the Society of Jesuit in Castile, Santiago, November 3, 1657. 
• Don Fernando de Ordóñez, lord of San Paio de Narla, Betanzos, November 4, 
1657. 
• Don Alonso Troncoso de Sotomayor, November 11, 1657.  
• Maestre de campo don Fadrique de Villar, lord of the house of Villar, Paredes, 
December 9, 1657. 
• Don Antonio Payno, bishop of Zamora, elected archbishop of Burgos, Zamora, 
January 10, 1658. 
• Father Antonio de Luna, rector of the school of the Society of Jesus at Palencia, 







Informative and practical letters 
 
• Captain don Mauro de Pardiñas Villar de Francos proposes the means to travel to 
Charcas, Cádiz, October 29, 1657. 
• Captain don Mauro de Pardiñas says the advantages of requesting a ship to 
Buenos Aires, Cádiz, November 26, 1657. 
• A paper given to me by don Felipe Obregón, neighbor of Potosí, about the trip to 
Las Charcas. 
• News from the province of Los Charcas, authority and jurisdiction of the 
President (Obregón). 
• Governments and corregimientos, (Obregón). 
• News from Potosí, its mountain, mines, and everything concerning to them and 
their wealth (Obregón). 
• Paper given to me by don Juan de Santa Ana with individual news from the 
province, presidency of Las Charcas, where he lived many years and married. 
• Don Mauro de Pardiñas, paper with individual news about the trip that can be 
done to Charcas going via Tierra Firme or Buenos Aires, which will be the 
shortest and most convenient, Cádiz, November 4, 1657. 
• Trip that the president of Charcas should do (Pardiñas). 
• Letter from don Francisco de Soto Guzmán to captain Mauro de Pardiñas. 
• Paper from don Francisco de Soto Guzmán with information on the trip to 
Charcas, November 3, 1657. 
• Paper from don Francisco de Soto y Guzmán with the reasons that could and 
should be given to get a navío de registro for going to Los Charcas via Buenos 
Aires, Cádiz, November 11, 1657. 
• Don Francisco de Soto y Guzmán with the reasons that should be given His 
Majesty so every year should be sent from Seville or Cádiz one or two ships to 
Buenos Aires, Cádiz, November 11, 1657. 
• From the marquise, with the prudent and rational warnings and objections on the 
trip to Charcas. I shall see with all veneration and esteem many times this letter. 
Vista Alegre, October 11, 1657. 
• Inquisitor don Pedro de Navia. Proposes the difficulties and objections for not 
going to Las Charcas, Santiago October 13, 1657. 
• Inquisitor don Pedro de Navia, insisting that it is not convenient to go to Las 
Charcas, Santiago, October 14, 1657. 
• The marquise, saying what she and people in Galicia feel about my resolution of 
accepting the presidency of Las Charcas because of the distance of the journey 






Alcalde del crimen: Criminal judge of the audiencia. 
Alcalde mayor: Chief magistrate, also known as corregidor. 
Audiencia: The highest royal court of appeals within a jurisdiction 
Beneméritos: The American subjects descendants from the conquistadors and worthy of 
royal reward. 
Cabildo: Municipal council. 
Capitán General: Commander in chief of a jurisdiction. 
Cédula: Royal decree 
Consulta: A written opinion opinion of the royal councils. 
Corregidor: Chief magistrate 
Corregimiento: The district of jurisdiction of a corregidor. 
Encomienda: Grant of Indians as tribute payers and laborers. 
Informaciones de méritos y servicios: Written summary of an official’s, and his family, 
activities and services rendered to the crown. 
Juicio de residencia: A judiciary review of an official’s conduct in office at the end of his 
term. 
Oidor: Judge in the audiencia. 
Morisco: A person of Muslim heritage and linage that after the Reconquista was allowed 
to remain in Spain if baptized. 
Parián: The sangley bourough in Manila. 









Archivo General de Indias 
 
• Audiencia de Charcas: 26, 58, 121, 122, 416. 
• Audiencia de Filipinas: 2, 5, 6, 8, 22, 27, 28, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 193, 200, 202, 
331, 341. 
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